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ABSTRACT 
 
Designing a hazard intelligence platform enables public agencies to organize 
diversity and manage complexity in collaborative partnerships. To maintain the integrity 
of the platform while preserving the prosocial ethos, understanding the dynamics of 
“non-regulatory supplements” to central governance is crucial. In conceptualization, 
social responsiveness is shaped by communicative actions, in which coordination is 
attained through negotiated agreements by way of the evaluation of validity claims. The 
dynamic processes involve information processing and knowledge sharing. The access 
and the use of collaborative intelligence can be examined by notions of traceability and 
intelligence cohort. Empirical evidence indicates that social traceability is statistical 
significant and positively associated with the improvement of collaborative performance. 
Moreover, social traceability positively contributes to the efficacy of technical 
traceability, but not vice versa. Furthermore, technical traceability significantly 
contributes to both moderate and high performance improvement; while social 
traceability is only significant for moderate performance improvement. Therefore, the 
social effect is limited and contingent. The results further suggest strategic 
considerations. Social significance: social traceability is the fundamental consideration to 
high cohort performance. Cocktail therapy: high cohort performance involves an 
integrative strategy with high social traceability and high technical traceability. Servant 
leadership: public agencies should exercise limited authority and perform a supporting 
role in the provision of appropriate technical traceability, while actively promoting social 
traceability in the system.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1. Background 
 
Food safety is among the top priorities in the public policy agenda of the United States. 
Since the enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act 
in 1906, public agencies have spent considerable effort redefining leadership roles and 
revising food safety strategies so as to cope with changing market conditions and shifting 
policy objectives. For example, in 1940, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was 
split from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and moved to the Federal Security 
Agency, which was later reorganized as the Department of Health and Human Services. 
In 1957, the Poultry Products Inspection Act authorized mandatory poultry inspections, 
after explosive growth in consumer demand for poultry products. In 1958, the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was amended with the Food Additive 
Amendment to address public concerns over invisible hazards from chemicals. In 1981, 
the Food Safety and Quality Service, responsible for the grading and inspections of meat 
and poultry products, was reorganized as the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). 
In 1993, an outbreak of E. Coli O157:H7 signaled a compromised food safety system. In 
1996, as a response to this new type of emerging threat from microbial pathogens, the 
FSIS rule of Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) Systems was finalized. In 2000, HACCP was mandatory and implemented in 
all FSIS- and state-inspected meat and poultry processing plants.  
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In spite of the level of public investment, approximately 2 billion U.S. dollars annually in 
food-inspection related operations, food safety remains a major concern. Recent studies 
estimate that contaminated food consumed in the U.S. caused 47.8 million illnesses, 
134,839 hospitalizations, and 3,037 deaths (Scallan, Hoekstra, Angulo, Tauxe, 
Widdowson, Roy, Jones and Griffin, 2011; Scallan, Griffin, Angulo, Tauxe, and 
Hoekstra, 2011), and economic losses of at least $14 billion annually (Batz, Hoffmann, 
and Glenn Morris, 2011). The high impact on the economy and social welfare indicates 
the urgency of the food safety problem and the need for more effective food safety 
management.  
 
Table 1. Budget Summary of Federal Food Inspections (Dollars in Millions) 
 2011 
Enacted 
2012 
Estimate 
2013 
Budget 
FSIS 1,018 1,014 1,006 
FDA 1,175 1,145 1,151 
Total 2,193 2,159 2,157 
 
Source: USDA FY 2013 Budget Summary and Annual Performance Plan; 2013 FDA 
Budget Summary  
 
In 2009, the President’s Food Safety Working Group (FSWG) advocated a new, public-
health focused approach to upgrade the U.S. food safety system. FDA and FSIS, the two 
leading federal agencies of food safety management, take actions on respective 
initiatives: the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) and the FSIS HACCP-
Based Inspection Models Project (HIMP). While the FSMA receives a general public 
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welcome and support, the implementation of the HIMP has encountered unexpected 
obstacles. The HIMP had an early jumpstart in 1999 when the FSIS first introduced the 
HIMP pilot program in 20 selected poultry plants, with a schedule to expand the program 
to approximately 200 facilities nationwide by the end of 2012. The new inspection 
system intends to create a win-win strategy through a public-private partnership. By 
replacing judgment inspections (conducted by federal inspectors) with self-inspections 
(operated by line workers), the FSIS delegates the authority of sensory inspections on the 
processing lines to poultry plants and requests them to take more responsibility on the 
quality assurance of their own products. The FSIS estimates that it will save $85 million 
over three years by retiring around 1,000 federal inspectors. Poultry companies estimate 
that it will save $250 million a year, as the new inspection method increases throughput 
rates and improves operational efficiency.  
 
However, the plan to expand HIMP has drawn intense opposition. For example, the Food 
Integrity Campaign of the Government Accountability Project, a non-profit interest 
group, called the HIMP “a disaster waiting to happen” (Food Integrity Campaign [FIC], 
2012a) and the expansion of the HIMP “an immediate threat to food safety” (FIC, 
2012a). In the traditional non-HIMP setting, each processing line, equipped with three 
federal inspectors along the line, is operated at a throughput rate up to 140 birds per 
minute (bpm). On the contrary, in the HIMP setting, a processing line is run at a rate up 
to 175 bpm with one federal inspector positioned at the end of the line. Some federal 
inspectors argued that short-staffed, discouraged inspectors simply are incapable of 
handling the expanding span of operation. “[I]t’s easy for an inspector to spot quality 
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control problems like fecal contamination, bruising and feathers. But not at 160+ birds 
per minute, especially when half the birds is not in line-of-sight? Blink and you’ve 
missed half a dozen birds” (Jolly, 2012, para. 10). A retired veteran inspector 
commented, “I’m afraid that the birds covered in bile, feces, and pus will become chicken 
nuggets and be served to young children” (Underwood, 2012, para. 2). Moreover, some 
line workers said that they are powerless to stop the line when they spot defects because 
their efficiency-minded supervisors are not willing to slow down operations. Another 
complained the faster line speed increases the risk of occupational hazards such as fatigue 
and injuries, because jobs at the processing line are highly repetitive and labor-intensive 
in nature. Furthermore, line workers may not have sufficient skills to perform adequate 
self-inspections. Turnover rates of the low-paid, processing-line jobs are high. A line 
worker said that “some would come into the plant and work one hour, and resign … 
Every week they had to hire new workers” (Jamieson, 2012, para. 3). But, “visually 
inspecting the chickens as they literally ‘fly-by’ at rapid speed” (Ferguson, 2012, para. 3) 
requires learning and experience, which are hampered by high labor turnover.  
 
Whereas there are criticisms, the HIMP is well-intentioned and a key move to revamp the 
U.S. food safety system for the 21st century. As an industry practitioner points out, “the 
days of ‘poke-and-sniff’ inspection are thankfully long gone and those on-line inspectors 
are the last vestige of that practice. You can’t see or smell Campylobacter or Salmonella. 
Visual inspection for pathogen detection is a pointless pursuit” (Jolley, 2012, para. 9). 
“The proposed inspection system will better protect the public from food-borne illnesses 
by reducing reliance on old-fashioned visual and sensory inspection and moving to 
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prevention-oriented inspection systems based on actual risk to consumers” (Peterson, 
2012). In defense of the HIMP, an administrator of the FSIS argues: “the data is clear that 
in these plants [HIMP-adopted], the poultry produced has lower rates of Salmonella, a 
pathogen that sickens more than 1 million people in the U.S. every year. These plants 
also maintain superior performance on removing the visual and quality defects that don’t 
make people sick. Those are the facts, based on the data” (Jolley, 2012, para. 15). The 
industry seconds the view: “our members believe a statistically valid, scientifically-based 
approach to poultry processing will improve food safety and better protect public health” 
(National Chicken Council [NCC], 2012, para. 1).   
 
The situation becomes even more complicated when an issue of trust is involved in public 
relations. “The companies cannot be trusted to watch themselves”, a federal inspector 
said (Avila, 2012, para. 5), for that “productivity is their main responsibility, rather than 
ensuring food safety” (FIC, 2012b). Although self- inspection is only one part of an 
integral system which includes multiple measures such as testing and protocols, “it seems 
that many in the chicken industry know how to cheat the system by rigging the tests”, a 
reporter said (Ferguson, 2012, para. 5). Some even regard the delegation as “letting the 
fox guard the henhouse” (Jolley, 2012, para. 25). On May, 2012, after an extended public 
comment, the controversy continues. The National Chicken Council and the National 
Turkey Federation, the representatives of the industry, while strongly supporting the 
HIMP for “it takes the handcuffs off production and saves the poultry industry millions 
annually” (Jolley, 2012, para. 16), express their concerns on public relations: “The folks 
who are against the idea will suggest that faster line speeds will create more food safety 
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problems and will be the first to scream ‘I told you so’ when the first recall happens. It 
won’t matter that line speed might not be the cause” (Jolley, 2012, para. 17). In an 
increasingly complex food system, it is extremely difficult to rule out all possible sources 
of hazards with a single function of ex ante control. Thus, it is fairly to argue that 
“perfection is impossible” and to view “outbreak response as an integral part of the 
prevention system” (Taylor, 2011). Nevertheless, when preventive control fails in a food 
safety environment lacking a consensus and trust, “the fallout created by the inevitable 
recall if the plan is perceived as being pushed through without due diligence would be 
devastating to the poultry industry” (Jolley, 2012, para. 24).  
 
2. Complexity 
 
The new policy initiatives shift the direction of food safety management from reaction to 
prevention. The main reason for this radical change is that an increasingly complex food 
system renders ineffective the traditional approach of food safety management. The U.S. 
food system is characterized by its complexity. Complexity, a phenomenon associated 
with inter-correlated activities “in which a great many independent agents are interacting 
with each other in a great many ways” (Waldrop, 1992, p11), suggests that our food 
system is formed and shaped by the simultaneous interplay of multiple consumers and 
suppliers with heterogeneous preferences. With the scale of consumption -- more than 1 
billion meals are consumed every day; with varieties of food choices – hundred 
thousands of food products are available and new products are introduced frequently; 
with specialization in food supply – from farm to table a number of suppliers may be 
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involved in the integration and transformation of multiple food ingredients; and with 
reliance on global sourcing – food imports in 2011 comprise approximately 15% of the 
total U.S. food supply, 75% of seafood, 50% of fresh fruit, and 20% of vegetables, it is 
unlikely to accurately predict how this system would change, because means-end 
relationships under interactions and interdependencies are often unknown or at least not 
clear. Under this environment, effective management to secure consumption experiences 
free of food safety concerns is a daunting challenge, as a food hazard may occur 
unexpectedly at any point in the complex food system and pose a threat to the public 
health. 
 
The traditional command and control approach of food safety inspection was introduced 
in the early twentieth century, when the food system was less complex. The design of the 
operations followed a closed-system logic that ex ante optimization would turn food 
hazards into an insignificant random factor which could be properly handled by a reactive 
strategy. Taylor (1997: p15-16) offers a glimpse of this control orientation in food safety 
inspections.  
 
“In the USDA system, inspections carry out continuous inspections of meat and poultry 
plants by physically examining every carcass passing through slaughter houses and 
making daily inspections of plants that process products ranging from fresh, cut-up 
chicken parts to pepperoni pizza and chicken noodle soup. USDA employs nearly 7,500 
full-time inspectors who continuously inspect more than 6,000 plants. In 1994, inspectors 
individually examined approximately 130 million head of livestock, and 7.5 billion 
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chickens, turkeys, and other poultry. Carcasses and processed products cannot be 
shipped into commerce without the USDA mark of inspection.” 
 
Under conditions of complexity, exercising command and control is a different case. It 
raises a concern of “the folly of Type II errors”, a threat to the effectiveness of a public 
program (Landau and Stout, 1979). In statistics, a Type II error refer to a false negative, 
i.e., a false null hypothesis is not rejected by the statistical testing method employed. In 
the context of food safety management, a Type II error occurs when a food safety 
inspection program fails to detect food hazards and allows them to pass through the food 
system without being captured, indicating the deficiency of the control technology 
employed by the program. Landau and Stout (1979) argue that the efficacy of any control 
technology is subject to the level of knowledge available to the control system. Because 
the “administrative man” under uncertainty is characterized by bounded rationality, i.e., 
cognitive limits on rational decision making for problem solving (March and Simon, 
1958), knowledge acquisition is necessary for effective control. However, learning in the 
complex and dynamic task environment is contingent upon circumstantial knowledge. 
This situational learning requirement contradicts the nature of public operations, which 
are best suited for routine and standardized processes. If the task environment is not 
stable enough and requires frequent learning, given bounded rationality, routine decision 
making, standard procedures, and environmental complexity, a public preventive control 
program would face a disadvantageous situation and suffer from unintended 
consequences due to Type II errors.  
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The current policy initiatives address this concern by “de-complexifying” the food 
system with rules and standards. If the task environment is more stable and predictable, 
the burden of constant situational learning would be relieved, so that the command and 
control program could stay effective. Following this rationale, The Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) and other science-based measures serve as key policy 
tools for implementing preventive control, which is the dominant logic (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986) of the new food safety management system. A stabilized food system would 
facilitate proactive food safety inspection in two ways. First, it relieves workload, 
because some food hazards are removed at sources. Second, it enables quicker response, 
because food hazards would be detected earlier in a less ambiguous environment. In 
addition, when the preventive control fails, the system would have more sufficient 
resources and response time for the effective containment of food hazards.  
 
Whatever the benefits, challenges remain. Across the farm-to-table spectrum of the food 
system, many critical points are in fact located beyond the reach of the command-and-
control of the food safety agencies or science-based analytical measures. For example, 
before an imported product enters the U.S. food safety inspection system, it may be 
produced under different jurisdiction and food safety standards. During product 
transformation, food ingredients may be mixed and blended and lose their identities for 
food safety traceability. After a product is sold to consumers, suppliers may not have 
power and incentives to further guarantee food safety, but food hazards may still arise 
from consumers’ improper handling or consumption practices. Moreover, the food 
system constantly evolves, as differentiated products and services with new features are 
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entering the market, and as new pathogens and hazards are emerging. Furthermore, a 
food hazard is a “bad”. In a sense, it is a pathological phenomenon of a diseased food 
system, a by-product from human errors or system failures. Because it is not a regular, 
and generally, not even an intentional output, it is regarded as a “surprise” to the system, 
something characterized by its random nature and not fully known to the centralized 
command of the food safety agencies. 
 
3. Collaborative Partnerships 
 
If imperfect knowledge is an inherent characteristic of the complex food system and if 
situational learning is a constant requirement for effective food safety management, 
preventive control, to a greater or lesser degree, is always subject to Type II errors. 
Prahalad’s argument is poignant: “the dominant logic …, like blinders on a horse, allows 
organizations to perform well at their current task in the short term. The logic keeps us 
focused on the road ahead, but also limits our peripheral vision” (Prahalad, 2004, p178). 
The good intention to create an operational focus instead bring forth “the pretense of 
knowledge” (Hayek, 1989), the “tragic irony” described by Landau and Stout (1979) 
from “an attempt to control a problem that should be managed” (p153): “time after time, 
control systems, imposed in the name of error prevention, result only in the elimination of 
search procedures, the curtailment of the freedom to analyze, and a general inability to 
detect and correct error” (p155). Therefore, the policy goal of preventive control should 
be further reinforced by some added capabilities beyond the traditional command and 
control approach that relies on a sole central authority to enforce food safety.  
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The FSWG proposes a grand vision to modernize food safety “by building collaborative 
partnerships with consumers, industry and our regulatory partners” (FSWG, “Our 
Commitment”). A collaborative partnership is defined as “an alliance among people and 
organizations from multiple sectors … working together to achieve a common purpose” 
(Rouses and Fawcett, 2000, p369). In the field of public health, it is regarded as an 
increasingly popular strategy (Rouses and Fawcett, 2000) and viable approach to develop 
knowledge and initiate action (Israel, Shultz, Parker, and Becker, 1998). While current 
public strategies focus on strengthening command and control “by fostering coordination 
throughout the government including enhancing our food safety laws for the 21st 
century” (FSWG, “Our Charge”), the broader definition of collaboration points out an 
alternative path to reduce Type II errors by promoting prosocial behavior among 
collaborative partners including all stakeholders in the food system.  
 
Prosocial behavior refers to “voluntary, intentional behavior that results in benefits for 
another (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987, p92), such as helping, sharing, donating, 
cooperating, and volunteering (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). In the complex food system, 
if each individual acts as a social entrepreneur, by performing food safety inspection in 
his or her local niche, sharing circumstantial knowledge, passing hazard intelligence, and 
even coordinating with one another to remove hazardous materials, prosocial behaviors 
become constructive engagements that transform the complex food system into an 
“organized complexity” (Hayek ,1989). Research shows that improvised, emergent 
prosocial behaviors indeed complement and contribute to public operations to cope with 
contingencies in a natural disaster (Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli, 2006).  
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However, collaborative partnerships for food safety inspection require more than 
prosociality. Food safety inspection deals with contingencies. When a food hazard occurs 
unexpectedly, time would not be not gracefully given for orderly acquisition of sufficient 
knowledge. Problem-solving is oftentimes processes of “muddling through” out of 
compromised decision-making and learning-by-doing processes. Moreover, food safety 
involves hard science. Detecting certain kinds of food hazards, especially biological and 
chemical ones, would require special technologies or professional skills not equipped by 
or available for everyone in the food system. Furthermore, food safety inspection requires 
high reliability. Any failures would result in serious losses to individuals and society. 
Casual voluntarism, which is often driven by feelings and heuristics, needs to be assured 
in order to guarantee satisfactory performance outcomes. In this regard, system 
governance still requires certain centralized control to secure the bottom line of food 
quality.  
 
Paradoxically, centralized control would inevitably suppress prosocial qualities, such as 
empathy (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987), emotional expressiveness (Roberts and Strayer, 
1996), and autonomous motivation (Weinstein and Ryau, 2010), which are critical to 
prosocial ethos that carries the keys to define meaningful problems, devise creative 
solutions, and drive innovative outcomes. As an alternative thinking, centralized control 
is not the only feasible approach to achieve system governance. Promoting and deploying 
prosocial activities, if properly designed and managed, could be a case of “mutual 
coercion mutually agreed upon” (Hardin, 1968), coordinating activities and exercising 
decentralized control. Resulting private ordering also provides a foundation for 
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implementing more efficient public policies. In the social era, “there’s no way we could 
ever be this collaborative” (Merchant, 2013). When command and control regulation is 
increasingly unpopular, understanding the dynamics of non-regulatory supplements to 
central governance becomes crucial.  
 
4. Research Question 
 
Food safety management in the 21
st
 century needs creative strategies for combating 
challenges in the complex food system. This dissertation echoes the call for a new, 
public-health focus of food safety management and contributes to the implementation of 
the envisioned collaborative partnerships (FSWG) with two objectives. First, it proposes 
a hazard intelligence platform that utilizes open source intelligence (OSINT), organizes 
diverse collaborative partners, and coordinates prosocial activities. Second, it tests the 
hazard intelligence platform that empowers multiple collaborative partners, including 
consumers, suppliers, producers, laboratories, public agencies, etc., to perform various 
kinds of inspections so as to safeguard the food system.  
 
Operating the hazard intelligence platform involves plural governance. In addition to 
formal hazard communications, “non-regulatory supplements” represent hazard 
information and intelligence resulting from social sharing. Such informal social 
communication (Festinger, 1950) would not be controlled and understood by the public 
agency. Thus, a platform is a necessary policy instrument to reveal and visualize the 
landscape of prosocial activities in the food system. The supplementary inputs are 
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collected and stored in the conceptualized “intelligence platform” and serve as linkages 
among collaborative partners, leading to the formation of fluid and flexible “intelligence 
cohorts”. In turn, the social inputs provide a form of social traceability that, when 
coupled with technical traceability, contributes to stronger identification of food hazards 
and higher visibility in the food system.  
 
To examine the potential of the hazard intelligence platform along with notions of 
traceability and intelligence cohorts raises the research question on the relationships 
between different sources of hazard intelligence and system performance. Specifically, 
three questions are of interest:  
1. How should public agencies engage collaborative partners for high-performance 
innovation?  
2. Do social inputs significantly contribute to collaborative performance?  
3. How do social inputs contribute to collaborative performance?  
 
The theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) and transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985) are adopted as the theoretical framework to address the self-
organization of prosocial behaviors and plural governance (technical and social) on 
fundamental activities behind the notion of food safety inspection such as engagement, 
interaction, and exchange so as to develop models, propositions, and hypotheses. 
Empirical studies are conducted in the context of food recall. Food recall deals with 
response and recovery when formal food safety control systems fail. The reverse logistics 
activity provides an ideal focus to examine the performance of the prosocial aspect of 
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collaborative partnerships. Data are collected from the open-source Recall Case Archive 
of the Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA. The grounded theory approach, a 
creative research strategy developed in anthropology and sociology for studying complex 
phenomena, provides guidelines for data processing. The categorical data analysis, 
specifically, multinomial regression and nested logit regression, is applied to obtain 
empirical results.  
 
The dissertation is structured as follows (Table 2). Chapter 1 provides the rationale and 
raises research questions. Chapter 2 explains the context of empirical studies, including a 
brief introduction to food recall, methods, and data. Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual 
background with 5 topics. Chapter 4 introduces the mental model and a brief economic 
analysis. The two chapters represent a normative approach to address the first research 
question. Chapter 5 defines two kinds of traceability, and answers the second research 
question regarding the significance of the social approach. Chapter 6 applies the notion of 
intelligence cohorts and corresponds to the third research question regarding the 
integration of the technical and social approaches. Chapter 7 summarizes the preceding 
chapters and concludes with future research agenda.  
 
 
  
 
1
6
 
Table 2. Structure of the dissertation  
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Chapter 2 
Empirical Context 
 
1. Food Recall 
 
Definition 
Food recalls in the meat and poultry industry occur when contaminated products are 
deemed hazardous to public health and retrieved from markets and distribution channels. 
Recalls, by definition, are distinct from other actions of consumer protection taken by 
food suppliers (See Table 1). In contrast to market withdrawal, recalls deal with food 
hazards which would expose consumers to vulnerable situations. In contrast to stock 
recovery, recalls go beyond the boundaries of a single food supplier and hence involve 
joint operations across a "technologically separable interface" (Williamson, 1981, p552). 
Because of its public nature, oftentimes a recall of a meat or poultry product is assisted 
by the FSIS to coordinate voluntary actions taken from multiple parties and to safeguard 
public interests.  
 
Since the public agency does not exercise absolute authority and only provides necessary 
coordination and assistance, a food recall is by nature a collaborative action. Multiple 
stakeholders in the food safety community – consumers, buyers, distributors, suppliers, 
third-party service providers, and public agencies – all share the responsibility of an 
effective recall to assure a food market safe and clean.  
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Table 1. Comparison between voluntary firm actions of product removal  
Activity Definition 
Food recall 
A firm's voluntary removal of distributed meat or 
poultry product from commerce when there is reason 
to believe that such products are adulterated or 
misbranded under the provisions of the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act or the Poultry Products Inspection Act. 
Market withdrawal 
A firm's voluntary removal or correction of a 
distributed product that involves a minor company 
quality program or regulatory program infraction that 
would not cause the product to be adulterated or 
misbranded. 
Stock recovery 
A firm's voluntary removal or correction of product 
that has not been marketed or that has not left the 
direct control of the firm; in other words, no portion of 
the lot has been released for sale or use. 
* Source of reference: FSIS Directive 8080.1 Revision 6 
 
Public Task Force 
To adapt FSIS’ functional organizational structure to collaborative task requirements, a 
cross functional teamwork is set up as the recall committee, “a committee of 
representatives from various FSIS offices and staffs assembled to respond to potential or 
real health hazard incidents reported to the Recall Management Staff (RMS)” (FSIS 
Directive 8080.1, rev7, p6). The recall committee consists of representatives from 
multiple departments and groups, for example, Health Hazard Evaluation Board (HHEB), 
Office of Policy and Program Development (OPPD), Office of Public Health Science 
(OPHS), Congressional and Public Affairs Office (CPAO), Office of Public Affairs and 
Consumer Education (OPACE), Office of International Affairs (OIA), Office of Program 
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Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review (OPEER), Office of Food Defense and Emergency 
Response (OFDER), etc. At the core of the public recall operations are two key positions, 
Recall Management Staff (RMS) and District Recall Officer (DRO), that serve as 
coordinators, in Likert’s term “linking pins” (Likert and Likert, 1976, p184), maintaining 
the structure of an interaction-influence network which connects diverse and dispersed 
resources in the food system. As for communications with stakeholders, representatives 
from the CPAO are responsible for media relations. Members from the OPACE manage 
general public relations and consumer competence in food safety knowledge.  
 
Public Operations 
A recall case starts from an identification of a food hazard. If a food hazard does not 
exist, there is no need for any public intervention which will disturb the spontaneous 
order of the market. When a food hazard occurs, a system-wise awareness of the problem 
is necessary to create a sense of urgency in the food safety community so as to activate 
the food system’s self-correcting mechanism. While creating such awareness involves 
collective actions and organizational learning, essentially, it is initiated by individual 
learning and organization-wide knowledge sharing. “All learning takes place inside 
individual human heads; an organization learns in only two ways: (a) by the learning of 
its members or (b) by ingesting new members who have knowledge the organization 
didn’t previously have” (Simon, 1991, p125). Indeed, food hazards can be detected and 
hazard intelligence can be generated by different members of a food system (Table 2) – 
in general, consumers, suppliers, and public agencies.  
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After a suspicious food hazard is detected in the system, a preliminary inquiry is 
conducted to determine whether it is a false alarm. Making a decision to initiate a recall 
case requires due diligence, because a recall will distort regular operations in the market 
and could result in high social and economic costs. In a normal FSIS preliminary inquiry, 
a District Recall Officer (DRO) is in charge of inspection to collect field intelligence – 
product, contact, and other relevant information. If a potential food hazard involves 
imported products, a representative of the Office of International Affairs (OIA) will be 
the liaison to collect additional information. All information is forwarded to the 
designated Recall Management Staff (RMS). Gathered information is translated into 
intelligence and transferred to the Recall Committee for further deliberations.  
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Table 2. Sources of hazard intelligence 
 
Scenario Stakeholder 
1 The company that manufactures or distributes the product Firm 
2 
Consumer complaints reported through the FSIS Consumer 
Complaint Monitoring System (CCMS) 
Consumer 
3 Test results from FSIS sampling programs Public agency 
4 
Observations or information gathered by FSIS inspection 
program personnel in routine duties or investigations 
Public agency 
5 
Epidemiological or laboratory data submitted by State or 
local public health departments, other USDA agencies, and 
other Federal food safety agencies such as FDA, CDC.  
Public agency 
6 
Other agencies such as Department of Defense, Department 
of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and foreign 
inspection officials. 
Public agency 
 
* Reference: FSIS Directive 8080.1 rev6 
 
Determining a recall case is a difficult decision which involves seemingly irreconcilable 
trade-offs under time pressure. When clear science-based evidence is not available, for 
example, inconclusive or inconsistent laboratory testing results, the Recall Committee 
needs to make a judgment call. In this case, two questions are debated (FSIS Directive 
8080.1 rev7, p7):  
 
1) Does FSIS have reason to believe that the product in question is adulterated or 
misbranded under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) or the Poultry 
Products Inspection Act (PPIA)?  
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2)  Does any of the product in question remain in commerce or available to 
consumers?  
 
If the answers for both questions are “yes”, the Recall Committee issues a recall 
recommendation. However, loopholes exist. For example, regarding the second question, 
“the Committee determines that the product is so long out of date that it is unlikely to still 
be available to consumers, or the Committee is unable to identify a responsible party for 
the product. In these circumstances, the Committee should not recommend a recall” 
(FSIS Directive 8080.1 rev7, p8). Although the suspicious food hazard is not recognized 
as a threat serious enough to the society, it could still cause harms to consumers at the 
individual level. Because some biological food hazards are contagious, individual cases 
of infection could be escalated if food safety conditions are not secured. Therefore, 
system safeguard is required. Moreover, consumer vulnerability is a concern. Additional 
consumer education, organization, and communication are desired to build the last line of 
defense in the system.  
 
When the Recall Committee recommends a recall, a recall recommendation will be 
prepared by the Recall Management Staff (RMS). After the decision is approved by the 
Assistant Administrator (AA) of the Office of Field Operations (OFO), a written letter is 
sent to the recalling firm. The firm could follow the FSIS “Product Recall Guidelines for 
Firms” to recover products in commerce as soon as possible. The RMS also notifies 
CPAO to issue a Recall Release to the media, to contact other public health partners 
through the email subscription service, and to update information on the FSIS website.  
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The recalling firm is responsible for developing a recall strategy and implementing it, 
based on the recall recommendation, including communicating with relevant stakeholders 
and removing recalled products from commerce. While the Food Safety Modernization 
Act has endowed FDA with authority to issue a mandatory recall when a firm fails to take 
necessary actions to assure public health, currently recall of meat and poultry is on a 
voluntary basis. In other words, FSIS has no legal authority to mandate what a firm 
should do – the public agency only advises, and a recall is subject to a firm's 
implementation. Nevertheless, if a firm refuses to cooperate and take responsibility, FSIS 
can exercise its influence through "bully pulpit" -- providing information for consumers 
to boycott questionable products, withdrawing public inspectors to technically shut down 
a firm's operations, or, as the last resort, detaining defective products in commerce (FSIS 
Directive 8410.1 "Detention and Seizure"). Based on the Directive 8080.1 rev6, FSIS 
would conduct effective checks to verify the firm’s actions, subject to risk-based criteria 
and “availability of Agency personnel” (p16), revision 7 clarifies this somewhat 
ambiguous definition and specifies FSIS’ responsibilities in the verification the 
effectiveness of industry’s recall operations (attachment 1 of the rev7).  
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Table 3 Plural patterns of food recall operations 
 
Number of recalls 
 
Number of pounds recalled 
 
Note: (1) UA stands for undeclared allergen; FOD, foreign object debris.   
          (2) Quantity recalled measured in 1,000,000 pounds 
          (3) Source of data: Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA. 
 
Verifying recall effectiveness is a challenge to standardized public operations. Food 
recalls involve bifurcate operations with two separate processes of different and 
sometimes conflicting natures. First, food hazards are “admitted” into the system on a 
discrete, case by case basis. Second, food hazards are removed from the system on a 
continuous, volume basis. Table 3, for example, shows that the overall number of recall 
cases has generally increased over time, while the number of pounds recalled decreased. 
In the decision-making processes, a Recall Committee would make two types of 
mistakes. On the one hand, a Type I error, a false positive, fails to identify a food hazard 
as a real threat and exposes Public Health to the risk of food-borne illnesses. On the other 
hand, a Type II error, a false negative, fails to specify a food hazard and would cause 
tremendous economic losses to food suppliers and unnecessary disturbances to the 
society. From the standpoint of the public agency, protecting vulnerable consumers 
should always be the top priority. Nevertheless, scapegoating suppliers, although it can 
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pacify public uneasiness in the short run, is not an ideal solution. After all, suppliers can 
be vulnerable too.  
 
If the actions taken by the recalling firm meet FSIS requirements, RMS submits a 
recommendation of case closure to the AA OFO. If approved, RMS notifies the recalling 
firm. Subsequently, the FSIS web master moves recall case files to the Recall Case 
Archive on the FSIS website. Table 4 summaries the general procedures of a recall case.  
 
Table 4  Two-stage processes of food recalls   
Stage Process Activity 
1     Hazard identification 
1. Detecting food hazards 
2. Conducting preliminary inquiry 
3. Making recall recommendations 
2     Hazard control 
1. Initiating collaborative recall actions 
    1) Firm actions 
    2) Public notification and hazard communication 
    3) Effectiveness checks 
2. Closing the case  
 
2. Grounded Theory Approach 
 
Definition  
Grounded theory is a research approach first proposed by Glaser and Strauss (2009) as an 
alternative theory developing strategy based on data collection (cf., the orthodox 
approach, mentioned in Turner (1981), which focuses on the quantitative testing of 
hypotheses derived from theories specified a priori). Glaser and Strauss (2009) used the 
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term “grounded” to describe the approach’s emphasis on “the discovery of theory from 
data”, suggesting a post-hoc, iterative, and structural characteristics of its analytical 
processes. In other words, grounded theory is a general methodology for developing 
theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analyzed (Strauss and Corbin, 
1994).  
 
The main advantages of grounded theory lie in its flexibility and pragmatism (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990). As Turner (1981, p225) points out, it allows researchers to develop their 
own conceptual models pertinent to the substantive areas of their studies and to apply 
their “creative intelligence to the full” in solving real-world problems. Moreover, it is 
especially suitable for studying social phenomena of interactions and the underlying 
rationality, because the approach “tracking the cognitive problems of data analysis by 
bringing them out into the open” (Turner, 1981, p230). Martin and Turner (1986) argue 
the choice of research methods for studying work organizations must take into account 
the complexities – entities operating in divergent or conflicting ways, so as not to risk the 
research bias mentioned by Glaser and Strauss (2009, p1): “an overemphasis … on the 
verification of theory and a resultant ‘de-emphasis’ on the prior step of discovering what 
concepts and hypotheses are relevant for the area that one wishes to research”. 
Considering the nature of agribusiness as an applied science and the food safety problem 
under study, it is believed that grounded theory is the ideal empirical approach not only to 
generate useful knowledge but also promising to discover practical solutions.  
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Procedures 
While one important feature of grounded theory is its “fitness”, “faithful to the everyday 
realities of a substantive area” (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, p276), to achieve intended 
research objectives, “ to develop a well-integrated set of concepts that provide a thorough 
theoretical explanation of social phenomena under study” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p5), 
valid studies still need to follow specific procedures concerning “how to record data, how 
to label or classify data in ways which facilitate the rearrangement of the material to 
reveal new properties, and how to tackle this reshuffling process” (Turner, 1981, p229). 
Referring to the 9 stages discussed in Turner (1981, p231) and 11 canons listed in Corbin 
and Strauss (1990, p6), a framework of “3C” procedures was set up that fit the research 
context, with an emphasis on three key components, i.e., concept, category, and 
comparative. The 3C framework represents an iterative process of knowledge exploration 
on the research topic in order to identify key variables and define the research problem.  
 
1) Concept discovery:   
Concepts are the basic units of analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). To conceptualize a 
complex phenomenon, Glaser and Strauss (2009, p35) argue that "multiple formal 
theories are also necessary, since one theory never handles all relevancies, and because 
by comparing many theories we can begin to arrive at more inclusive, parsimonious 
levels." Further, because actual raw data or direct, clear-cut measures are often not 
available in complex situations, coded data serve as indicators of the phenomena. 
Therefore, conceptual labels are assigned to give the relatively fluid qualitative data a 
workable structure. As the research strategies recommended by Corbin and Strauss 
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(1990), coded data are conceptualized into exploratory models with intentions to “build a 
theoretical explanation by specifying phenomena in terms of conditions that give rise to 
them, how they are expressed through action/interaction, the consequences that result 
from them, and variations of these qualifiers” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p9).  
 
2) Category generation:  
Categories are the cornerstones of the grounded theory approach (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990, p7).  
In a formal research process, qualitative data are first documented through observations 
of a phenomenon in interests. The collected data are then transformed into categories 
through data coding for further exploration on meaningful patterns.  
 
3) Comparative analysis:  
Glaser and Strauss (2009, p1) advised “a major strategy that we shall emphasize for 
furthering the discovery of grounded theory is a general method of comparative 
analysis”. Turner (1981, p241) also mentioned a specific technique to “use extreme 
comparisons to the maximum to identify key variables and test emerging relationships”. 
Corbin and Strauss (1990) argued that constant comparisons help researchers reduce bias, 
achieve precision and consistency, and find patterns or regularities in the data structure. 
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3. Categorical Data Analysis  
 
Categorical data analysis is a statistical modeling technique for studying how 
independent variable(s) explain and predict a dependent variable which takes discrete 
values, for example, categorical (1, 2, 3) or binary (0, 1). To analyze a complex 
phenomenon and to explore the structure of a problem, one intuitive research strategy is 
to assume a linear relationship between independent variable(s) and the dependent 
variable and apply a class of generalized linear models (GLMs), for example, logistic 
regression model, probit regression model, log-linear models, multi-nominal logistic 
regression model, or discrete choice models, based on the nature of the variables. A GLM 
consists of three basic components.  
1) Random component, which identifies the response variable (Y) by assuming a 
probability distribution for it.  
2) Systematic component, which specifies a set of explanatory variable(s), denoted 
by X’s. 
3) Link function, which describes the relationship between the expected value of the 
response variable (Y) and the explanatory variable(s), X’s.   
 
Logistic regression models are a class of GLMs under specified model conditions. The 
dependent variable is binary and assumed to follow the binomial distribution. The link 
function, say g[π(x)], is a logit function in the form g[π(x)] = log{π(x) / [1-π(x)]}, where 
π(x) denotes the probability of the “success” outcome in an event, an odds ratio, {π(x) / 
[1-π(x)]}, expresses the relationship between two specified states of the phenomenon in 
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the probability form, π(x) and [1-π(x)], and the logit, g[π(x)], logarithm of an odds ratio, 
measures how the relationship behaves.  
 
The use of logit concerns two fundamental modeling issues. First, based on the law of 
diminishing returns and the deprivation-satiation proposition, “s-shaped curves are often 
realistic shapes for the relationship … [because] a fixed change in x may have less 
impact when π is near 0 or 1” (Agresti, 2007, p70). In other words, using a probability-
based expression to model responses would better capture the nature of the data. Second, 
the logit is the preferred form than a probability term in modeling. Contrary to a logistic 
regression model, a linear probability model assumes an identity link function and 
directly apply ordinary least squares to estimate parameters. However, a probability takes 
values only between 0 and 1 but the potential range for the systematic component would 
not be bounded so, rendering the statistical model invalid and undermining its predictive 
power. As a logit can be any real number, the logit transformation in the logistic 
regression model preserve the assumed linearity while preventing such a structural defect 
in modeling.  
 
Logistic regression models can take various forms or be extended to multi-category 
responses by changing model specifications (in terms of the systematic component and/or 
the random component), according to how it is believed the configuration can better 
facilitate problem solving (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Different configurations of logistic regression models 
 
Model name Response variable Explanatory variable 
1 Ordinary logistic regression  Binary (two categories) One variable 
2 Multiple logistic regression  Binary (two categories) Multiple variables 
3 Multi-category logit  
Nominal  
(more than two categories)  
Multiple variables 
4 Cumulative logit  
Ordinal  
(more than two categories)  
Multiple variables 
5 Nested logit  Binary, nominal, or Ordinal  
Multiple variables  
Nested structure 
 
1) Basic form: 
The model has one response variable which is divided into two complementary 
categories, for example, success or failure, yes or no, presence or not presence, etc. The 
change of the response variable is predicted by one explanatory variable.  
 
2) Multiple explanatory variables (variation 1):  
The system component of the model can be easily extended to multiple explanatory 
variables. The outcome of the response variable is simultaneously determined by the 
whole set of the explanatory variables. The marginal effect of each explanatory variable 
on the response variable is interpreted as ceteris paribus, all other explanatory variables 
are held constant.  
 
3) One response variable with more than two categories (variation 2):  
When the response variable has more than two categories, the random component follows 
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a multinomial distribution rather than a binomial distribution. Since the odds ratio only 
measures two states at one time, a baseline category is specified to facilitate comparisons 
among multiple categories. The model is composed of (J-1) equations if J categories are 
identified for the response variable. For example, when a response has three categories, 
say, high, medium, and low (as the case of this study), and the category “low” is chosen 
as the baseline for comparisons, the model has two equations for measuring two 
relationships respectively (high vs. low and medium vs. low). Although the relationship 
between high and medium is not explicitly stated, it can still be inferred by comparing the 
two equations in the model.  
 
4) Ordinal response categories (variation 3):  
When the response variable has more than two categories and the categories can be 
ordered, a cumulative logit model can take advantage of the category ordering and 
provide simpler model outcomes and alternative interpretations. To utilize the additional 
information and improve modeling efficiency, the model needs to meet the proportional 
odds property (Agresti, 2007, p180). If the proportional odds assumption is supported, all 
categories are used to generate cumulative logits. Moreover, each explanatory variable 
has the same effect on equations for different cumulative logits. Thus, the model has one 
summarized equation that describes the general disposition of the response variable.  
 
Agresti (2007) argues that “latent variable motivation” is the main reason for modeling 
with proportional odds structure. The categories are ordered according to a certain 
criterion, a process that “relates to a model for an assumed underlying continuous 
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variable”, if the explanatory variables can be plausibly associated with the latent variable. 
For example, in this study, we argue that the transaction cost (Williamson, 1985), i.e., the 
cost of coordination (Ouchi, 1979), is the latent variable underlying the explanatory 
variables, specifically, technical traceability and social traceability.  
 
5) Ordered explanatory variables (variation 4):  
A nested logit model can be utilized to better interpret the relationships between 
explanatory variables in the systematic component. In this structure, explanatory 
variables form a tree diagram of a Bayesian decision-making process. An explanatory 
variable is located under other explanatory variables being set as the netting variables, 
and thus its effect on the response variable is conditioned by those of the netting 
variables. The ordered structure enables researchers to model the phenomenon under 
study as sequential choices and measure differential effects of comparative path-goal 
strategies.  
 
Incorporating logistic regression analysis into the empirical research framework provides 
an opportunity to enhance the potential of grounded theory methodology. The 
comparative nature of the logit is consistent with Glaser and Strauss’ (2009) notion that 
“grounded theory is a general method of comparative analysis” and their ideal of 
“constant comparative method” (Glaser and Strauss, 2009). Moreover, the combination 
of qualitative data generation and quantitative data analysis also concurs Strauss and 
Corbin’s (1994) strategy to adopt multiple, complementary methods for researches both 
practical and rigorous. Furthermore, the data processing capacity of the logistic 
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regression analysis allows us to overcome Turner’s (1981) argument that the grounded 
theory approach is “least useful when dealing with large-scale structural features of social 
phenomena” and to apply this creative empirical approach in the field of public 
management for developing practical policy solutions.  
 
4. Data 
 
Data are collected from the Recall Case Archive at the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS), USDA., a publicly accessible online database that compiles all press 
releases and notification reports issued by the FSIS regarding recalls of meat, poultry, and 
processed egg products from 1994 to the present. 415 recall cases were selected within 
the time frame between September 13, 2005 and April 20, 2012. The truncated sample is 
a necessary “compromise”, because a key measure in the empirical study, “the quantity of 
product recovered”, was included in the archive only after September 2005. Without such 
information, it would be difficult to evaluate recall performance objectively. 
Nevertheless, the selection of data would not significantly impact the research quality. In 
the empirical model, a dummy variable which measures structural changes in the food 
recall environment indicates no significant shift in the data structure along the chosen 
time frame. Further, as all meat and poultry plants are mandated to implement HACCP by 
January 25th, 2000, recall cases issued after 2005, 5 years after the initiation, would fully 
reflect the effect of this major change in the industry. Therefore, selected data were 
generated under comparable preventive control standards and relatively consistent for 
benchmarking recall performance. Moreover, although the empirical models were 
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developed with the latest data available in the mid-2012, the archive has been updated 
since as more food recall incidents occurred. Suggested by the grounded theory approach, 
a practical empirical research is a constant comparison inquiry. The models thus can be 
viewed as the initial stage of an ongoing research project to construct a knowledge 
warehouse. Data not used in the current study present opportunities for evolutionary 
research in the future, investigating efficient mechanisms for effective management of 
dynamic food safety resources in the diverse food system.  
 
In the archive, the unit of analysis is a recall case. Each recall case summaries key 
elements of recall operations, including food business (name, location); product (brand 
name, specification, data of production, traceability numbers); distribution (types of 
buyers, destinations of distribution); inspection (the party who discovered the hazard, the 
method used to discover the hazard); recall characteristics (recall class, types of hazard); 
recall performance (Announced recall quality, actual recall quantity). For example, on 
August 13th, 2009, the recall case number 042, Sterling Pacific Meat Co. announced a 
recall of 3516 pounds of ground beef products, branded as Fatburger and Cattleman’s 
choice in various specifications and packaging. The company, a wholesaler, distributed 
products to restaurants in two states, California and Arizona. Products were contaminated 
by E coli O157:H7 and regarded as high risk, class I recall. The biological food hazard 
was detected by the FSIS during a regular record review. When the case was closed, 0 
pound of the contaminated products was recovered. In another example, on July 14th, 
2008, the recall case 023, Nestlé Prepared Foods Company announced a recall of chicken 
sandwich products, branded as “Lean Pockets”. The products were distributed to retailing 
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outlets nationwide. Some products contained pieces of plastic, a physical food hazard 
detected by consumers. The company recovered 41,555 pounds out of the 199,417 
pounds of recall quantity. Although in general reporting data are qualitative (except for 
the announced and actual recall quantities are quantitative), rigorous documentation 
procedure and consistent format allow data transformation for further analysis.  
 
Table 6 profiles the dataset with 5 characteristics, each of which was encoded into 3 
categories based on consistent, observable patterns in the database.  
 
Table 6. Characterizing and categorizing the database 
 Characteristics Category Definition 
1 
Collaborative 
performance 
High Recovery rates greater than 75% 
Moderate Recovery rates between 25% and 75% 
Low Recovery rates less than 25%  
2 
Technical 
competence 
Low Recall cases involve physical hazards.  
Medium 
Recall cases involve hazards which were identified 
by discrepancies under pre formulated managerial 
plans and standards.  
High Recall cases involve biological hazards.  
3 
Social 
involvement 
High Food hazards were discovered by consumers. 
Medium Food hazards were discovered by suppliers. 
Low Food hazards were discovered by public agencies. 
4 Industry type 
Beef Recall cases involve beef products. 
Pork Recall cases involve pork products. 
Poultry Recall cases involve poultry products. 
5 Market scope 
National 
Recall products were distributed to more than 10 
states. 
Regional 
Recall products were distributed between 1 to 10 
states. 
Local Recall products were distributed within 1 state.  
 
Collaborative performance is defined by the effectiveness of recall operations, measured 
by the percentage of announced recall quantity actually recovered. Operations with 
 37 
 
recovery rates greater than the third quartile (75%) are deemed as high performance. 
Operations with recovery rates less than the first quartile (25%) are treated as low 
performance. Those between the first and the third quartile are regarded as medium 
performance. According to table 7, in the dataset, almost half, 49.64%, of the recall cases 
falls into the category of low recall effectiveness. Less than one-fifth, 18.31%, of the 
cases attains relatively high performance. The situation indicates an urgent need for a 
performance strategy.  
 
Table 7. Univariate analysis: collaborative performance 
Measure Definition Frequency % 
High recall effectiveness Recall ratio > 75% 76 18.31 
Moderate recall effectiveness  Recall ratio < 75% but > 25% 133 32.05 
Low recall effectiveness Recall ratio < 25% 206 49.64 
 
Technical competence describes technical capabilities of recall operations, defined by the 
required degree of search to identify food hazards. On the one hand, occurrences of 
physical hazards indicate high visibility, because hazards can be detected directly by 
sensory inspections. On the other hand, biological hazards indicate low visibility, because 
hazards, when latent, require special technology to identify and reveal them. In-between 
are the food hazards identified through the application of managerial plans, rules, and 
standards; for example, labeling discrepancy, violations in HACCP plan, documentary 
errors, etc. Although the hazards were not directly visible, the use of pre-formulated 
managerial tools enables the detection of potential hazards by visual inspections. Table 8 
shows that more than half of the recall cases, 57.35%, involve high technical competence. 
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Interestingly, high technical competence does not directly translate into high recall 
performance.  
 
Table 8. Univariate analysis: technical competence 
Measure Definition Frequency % 
Low technical 
competence 
Searchable hazards detected  35 8.43 
Medium technical 
competence 
Semi-searchable hazards detected  142 34.22 
High technical 
competence 
Biological hazards detected  238 57.35 
 
Social involvement indicates the degree of stakeholder participation in recall operations. 
The social aspect is measured by different social roles of stakeholders performing 
collaborative hazard discovery in the food safety commons. On the one hand, when food 
hazards were detected by public agencies, recall operations are regarded as low 
involvement for the high degree of centralization. On the other hand, when food hazards 
were detected by consumers or buyers, recall operations are defined as high involvement 
for the high degree of decentralization. When food hazards were detected by suppliers 
and other third party service providers, recall operations are regarded as medium 
involvement.  
 
Table 9 shows in most cases, 85.54%, hazards were detected by public agencies or 
suppliers. Inferring from the result, consumers may not have the competence to take 
initiatives and requires technical supports. Moreover, promoting social involvement 
would be a feasible strategy if the empirical study identifies a significant positive 
association between involvement and recall performance.  
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Table 9. Univariate analysis: social involvement 
Measure Definition Frequency % 
High social 
involvement 
Hazards detected by consumers 60 14.46 
Medium social 
involvement 
Hazards detected by suppliers 87 20.96 
Low social 
involvement 
Hazard detected by public 
agencies 
268 64.58 
 
Industry type summarizes a supply-side factor that impact recall performance. Food 
hazards emerge in different proportions, because each industry has unique manufacturing 
practices, products, supply chains, and critical control points. Table 10 shows more than 
half, 58.80%, of recall cases are related to beef industry. The higher percentage would 
suggest more attention on the beef industry according a risk-based rationale.  
 
Table 10. Univariate analysis: industry type  
Measure Definition Frequency % 
Beef industry 
Hazards detected in beef related 
products 
244 58.80 
Pork industry 
Hazards detected in pork related 
products 
67 16.14 
Poultry industry 
Hazards detected in poultry related 
products 
104 25.06 
 
Market scope summarizes demand-side factors that influence recall performance. The 
scale of reverse logistics implies task difficulty of recall operations. Table 11 shows that 
29% of recall cases appear in the national market; 37% in the regional market; 34% in the 
local market. A slightly lower percentage in the national market may indicate large 
companies are more capable to handle food safety problems. However, the trend of 
internet sales would obscure the measure.  
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Table 11. Univariate analysis: market scope  
Measure Definition Frequency % 
National market 
Products distributed to more than 
10 states 
120 28.92 
Regional market 
Products distributed between 1 
state and 10 states 
153 36.87 
Local market Products distributed within 1 state 142 34.22 
 
Table 12 presents cross references between the four observed factors and their 
relationships to three different levels of recall performance, based on the distribution of 
recall cases. In the beef industry, operations at the regional and local markets would be an 
emphasis for system improvement. Although public agencies have already been heavily 
present in those markets, interventions only achieve moderate or low recall performance, 
suggesting the need for alternative strategies. Promoting social involvement may help. 
However, cases of consumer involvement are mostly related to physical hazards with 
search attributes and to moderate and low performance. Before delegating responsibility 
and authority, public agencies would need to spend efforts on consumer education. 
Moreover, transforming non-searchable attributes into search attributes (Caswell and 
Mojduszka, 1996, p1251) would provide necessary technical supports. In terms of 
supplier involvement, because small- and medium-sized producers and vendors are 
relatively incompetent, public agencies could consider strengthening supplier trainings, 
issuing more specific quality standards and practices, appointing channel captains, or 
promoting market mechanisms. In the pork and poultry industries, interestingly, more 
moderate- or low-performance cases involve the national or regional markets, indicating 
a different direction for quality improvement. Public agencies would need to emphasize 
on tightening industry standards and qualifying large companies in the industry.   
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Table 12. Distribution of recall cases  
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Chapter 3 
Intelligence Platform 
 
1.  Strategic Food Safety Inspection 
 
Inspection is critical to assuring food safety in the complex food system. The definition 
from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), “examination of a product 
design, product, service, process or plant, and determination of their conformity with 
specific requirements” (ISO 17020:2012), suggests that food safety inspection is a control 
function with two main goals: identification of hidden food hazards and verification of 
food quality. In complexity, to meet various task conditions, effective inspection would 
require an integrated approach that combines multiple inspection methods. Table 1 re-
categorizes types of inspection methods listed in Shingo (1986) according to alternative 
approaches and goals.  
 
Table 1. Types of inspection methods 
 Centralized control Decentralized control 
Identification Judgment inspection Self-inspection 
Verification 
Statistical quality control 
(SQC) 
Successive inspection 
 
Judgment inspection discriminates the status of an object under check into two states – 
defective or acceptable. The objective is to identify defects and to keep defective objects 
from moving to subsequent supply stages. Judgment inspection has the main advantage 
 43 
 
that it is easy to understand and implement, with one simple objective – to discover 
defects. However, due to its postmortem nature, it is often criticized as wasteful. Any 
operations involve costs. Identifying defects without further corrective and preventive 
actions would mean that the same defects could recur and incur more costs. Therefore, as 
the third of his 14 principles for transforming business effectiveness, Deming (1986, p23) 
asserted, “Cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality.  Eliminate the need for 
massive inspection by building quality into the product in the first place.” 
 
Self-inspection requires each work unit to conduct inspection and be responsible for own 
work outcomes. By delegating the power of centralized control, it is the strategy to 
implement the ideal – building quality from the source. It has the advantage to improve 
system efficiency by removing redundant communication and unnecessary external 
control. However, the method is not without any concerns. As Shingo (1986, p77) argues, 
“it has long been held that there are two flaws to be reckoned with: workers are liable to 
make compromises when inspecting items that they themselves have worked on, and they 
are apt occasionally to forgot to perform checks on their own”. While Shingo acclaims 
the benefits of self-inspection, establishing credibility is fundamental to the integrity of a 
system based on self-inspection. “If it were possible to guard against these flaws, then 
self-check system would be superior to a successive check system” (Shingo, 1986, p77). 
 
The credibility of an inspection system can be verified in two ways. Technical-wise, 
statistical quality control (SQC) relieves the burden of costly mass inspections (i.e., 
continuous inspections) and provides science-based measures and risk-based analyses. 
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On the downside, SQC for inspection involves sampling. Its accuracy in a complex task 
environment raises a concern of “the pretense of knowledge” (Hayek, 1989). Moreover, 
the lagging effect can be a serious concern. When regularity or a structural trend is 
observable through data collection and analysis, the feedback may fail to capture the 
urgency of a problem and lose its value.  
 
Social-wise, successive inspection amends the shortcomings of SQC with a non-
statistical aspect of checks and balances. The operation is carried out at the nearest 
possible subsequent (ideally, the next) supply stages by different parties. In a production 
line setting, when a defect is discovered, it is required to shut down the production line 
right away and inform the work unit where the defect was generated. Proximity reduces 
the lead time of communication. However, as Shingo (1986, p78) points out, “there may 
be cases in which the actual circumstances of defect generation have already vanished by 
the time information is relayed back by a worker at the next process”. Maintaining 
traceability along supply stages is hence desired.  
 
Like “Shuai-jan”, the agile snake living in the Ch’ang Mountain mentioned by Sun Tzu 
in The Art of War, with its head and tail fully coordinating to repulse assailants, an 
integrated inspection system forms a food safety community, which consists of 
consumers, suppliers, public agencies, and all other relevant parties such as academia and 
third-party service providers, all of whom are stakeholders, because food safety is a 
matter of everyone’s health and benefit. Since all stakeholders share the responsibility of 
food safety management, each works on his or her power and discretion to detect, reduce, 
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and eliminate food hazards from the community. Nevertheless, judgment, statistical 
quality control, and successive inspection are still located within the conceptual rut of 
double checking – the conventional sense of inspections — and thus are essentially 
wasteful in terms of Deming’s rationale. Therefore, self-inspection should be the 
preferred method, and other methods exercise due diligence to safeguard the system. This 
conceptualization advances the meaning of inspection one step forward from a stand-
alone centralized control activity into the realm of total quality management and 
organizational learning and redefines inspection as a strategic value-creating activity in 
collaborative partnerships. Strategic food safety inspection is thus defined as:  the 
integration of multiple inspection methods with the goal to generate synergistic system 
performance.  
 
The feasibility of this conceptualization is supported by the development of new 
information and communication technologies. Advancing technologies are changing the 
ways people communicate with one another and constructing expansive networks of 
interconnected resources through social media. Thus the strategic food safety inspection 
system uses both formal and informal communication to achieve its goal. In this light, 
food safety inspections are not the job only for public agencies or producers. Imagine the 
provision of public service without command and control; no principal-agent 
relationship; no cat-and-mouse game, and no mutually assured destruction. Imagine all 
stakeholders relinquishing myopic strategic behaviors and committing to collaborative 
innovation on better food quality and public health. Such a system would also be immune 
from moral hazard of the commons dilemma.  
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2. Food Safety Commons 
 
Empowering consumers and suppliers promotes collaboration in the food safety 
community for achieving collective goals. Research shows that the empowerment of 
employees in public sector organizations would be expected to have positive results 
(Fernandez and Moldogaziev, 2011). However, food safety is a public good. The strategy 
to build a food safety community for strategic food safety inspection would encounter the 
so-called commons dilemma. In 1833, William Forster Lloyd raised the problem during 
the enclosure movement in England when he observed overgrazing on the shared pasture 
land, i.e., the commons. This occurred out of individual herders’ selfish, but rational, 
pursuit of short-term economic benefits, resulting in the depletion of public pasture, a 
consequence detrimental to everybody in the community, including those individual 
perpetrators. In the market economy, self-interestedness is fundamental to 
entrepreneurship, which holds the key to innovation. That is, mediated by a competitive 
process, an individual’s desire to fulfill wishes is supposed to drive a self-correcting 
spontaneous market order, guiding efficient and effective uses of resources, and 
achieving collective gains (Hayek, 1945). Paradoxically, the commons problem points 
out a situation contrary to the expectation -- short-term seemingly rational pursuit of 
individual goods could lead to long-term irrational collective bad, a paradoxical 
phenomenon called “the tragedy of freedom in a commons” (Hardin, 1968, p1244).  
 
“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” is the essential takeaway from the lesson, 
argued by Hardin (1998, p682). Thus, it involves a philosophical debate baffling 
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humanity for millennia – the free will problem: the tension between individualism and 
collectivism. Free will is defined as “the unique ability of persons to exercise control over 
their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility” (O’Connor, 2014). 
A “legitimate” free will, the beneficial kind of self-interestedness to the society, is 
inseparable from moral responsibility. Morality refers to “a code of conduct that, given 
specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons” (Gert, 2012). 
Responsibility refers to the burden of obligation, blameworthiness ascribed for causing 
harm (Smiley, 2011). Morally responsible people exercise their free will prudently 
without causing harm to others. Although negative externalities may still result from 
ignorance or accidents, justice is upheld through retribution. Moral responsibility is an 
invaluable asset to a society, because it keeps at bay those wasteful activities such as 
haggling and wrangling, allowing a focus on the positive aspects for a healthy societal 
evolution. In addition, it offers an efficient approach to deal with uncertainty, because it 
indicates a path for muddling through the grey area between self- and collective 
interestedness.  
 
Hardin (1968) argues that the incompatibility between individual and collective interests 
“has no technical solution” (Hardin, 1968, p1243). The technological approach, “the 
techniques of the natural sciences” (Hardin, 1968, p1243), in his opinion, is a futile 
attempt, because the problem involves a dynamic game of human interactions that goes 
beyond the bounded rationality of mathematical exercises. Rather, the solution demands a 
change in human cognition on morality, induced by social arrangements that “produce 
responsibility … arrangements that create coercion … [while] mutually agreed upon by 
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the majority of the people affected”, suggested by Hardin (1968, p1247). However, the 
food safety community belongs to a different class of commons. While food safety is a 
public good, food safety inspection service is a second-order public good (Kollock, 1998, 
p206). The service intends to achieve adaptation through not only conformity but also 
innovation (Merton, 1938, p676). While coercion would be a practical argument in 
certain situations, in the long run, its efficacy is a concern. Since any form of coercion 
compromises and suppresses free flows of social energy, it risks its own undoing (Follett, 
1919, p577).  
 
Follett (1919) offered an alternative conceptualization. A community does not have static 
ends but rather has “a creative process of integrating” (Follett, 1919, p576). Self is not a 
“dign-an-sich” but is “always in flux weaving itself out of its relations” (Follett, 1919, 
p577). Collective value is attained through “the integrating of ‘wishes’ from individuals” 
(Follett, 1919, p576) in which “the greatest contribution a citizen can make to the state is 
to learn creative thinking, that is, to learn how to join his thought with that of others so 
that the issue shall be productive” (Follett, 1919, p581). As a functional whole, 
stakeholders are engaged in a common business – “they jointly assume the risks and 
share the burdens and the benefits of the enterprise. More than that, they share each 
other’s frailties” (Follett, 2012). Kindled from this feeling of “an interweaving of 
obligations” (Follett, 2012), responsibility is jointly developed with self-respect and 
pride, leading to credible discretion and constructive empowerment – “if each of us 
exhausts his responsibility by bringing his own little piece of pretty colored glass, that 
would make a mere kaleidoscope of community” (Follett, 1919, p581).  
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Social networks bring Follett’s ideal into reality. Interesting social phenomena go beyond 
the traditional Weberian mindset of mechanical and hierarchical organizational design 
(Weber, 1947) – small-world properties (Travers and Milgram, 1969), six degrees of 
separation (Watts, 2004), three degrees of influence (Christakis and Fowler, 2009), 
network externalities (i.e., demand-side economics of scale), etc. New technologies allow 
information to be communicated and knowledge to be shared in a more efficient and 
effective fashion and change the ways people socialize and interact with one another. For 
example, in 2005, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) issued a report, 
envisioning the notion of an “Internet of Things” – “for anytime and anyplace, 
connectivity for anyone and anything”.  The ideal ubiquitous computing and 
communicating power is substantiated by the progress in radio-frequency identification 
technology, wireless sensors, and nanotechnology.  Artificial intelligence is embedded in 
“smart things” which enable powerful social organizations. In recent years, the vision has 
begun to take shape. Mobile devices, such as smartphone, smartwatch, tablet, and head-
mounted display, etc., create an augmented reality (AR) that unblocks barriers between 
people and unlocks value-creating opportunities from relationship-building activities. 
Increasingly connected social networks enhance interactivity and facilitate resource 
sharing within commons.  
 
3.  Intelligence Platform 
 
An intelligence platform is essentially a virtual location that allows information 
processing and knowledge sharing. In other words, it is an information architecture that 
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organizes knowledge stored in a system and allows users to share valuable knowledge 
with those in need. It is a fundamental performance strategy to manage intelligence 
generated by diverse stakeholders so as to improve the use and access of knowledge held 
at dispersed locations in an open food system. Through the platform, public agencies are 
able to tap into previously unused external resources – consumers, suppliers, and other 
public agencies – and collaborate to prevent food hazards from developing. The 
conceptualized food safety commons consists of diverse work groups (see Hackman, 
1990 for the definition of a work group).  For example, Johnson (2012) lists 14 public 
agencies which directly or indirectly share food safety responsibility in their operations.  
Many food suppliers develop HACCP plans and have proprietary quality control systems.  
Consumers, from direct consumption experiences, may have the street wisdom 
complementary to the technical knowledge equipped by public agencies and suppliers 
(Wang, Van Fleet, and Van Fleet, 2014). Last but not the least, consumer and third-party 
groups may have in-depth knowledge on specific topics of their interests.  If strategic 
food safety inspections are collaboratively performed by multiple stakeholders in the 
food safety community, the risk of Type II errors in public operations would be greatly 
reduced. 
 
However, collaboration may not be taken for granted as a spontaneous behavior. 
Consumers may be occupied by daily errands and have limited spans of attention.  
Suppliers may not be willing to share their proprietary sources of competitive advantages.  
Public agencies may be driven by bureaucratic or political considerations.  Self-
interestedness is a powerful human behavioral driver – in general, stakeholders have the 
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tendency to prioritize self-fulfillment before devoting to a collective good.  
Notwithstanding, self and collective agendas may not always be contradictory.  When 
stakeholders share common interests, social gatherings in differential scales and forms – 
teams, groups, corporations, or communities – would be organized for the pursuit of self-
interestedness while at the same time contributing to collectiveness, whether consciously 
or unconsciously.  In the world full of diversity and complexity, fragmented but isolated 
organizations create a controversial social phenomenon, so called “knowledge silos”, 
which, as a problem pointed out by Offsey (1997, p114), “provide adequate functionality 
for specific workgroups or business processes, but are unreachable by others in the 
organization”.  In essence, the question is a matter of resource sharing.  The presence of 
knowledge silos greatly limits the efficacy of a food safety community, because erected 
barriers inhibit information flows, resulting in some counter-intuitive phenomena such as 
Infofamine (a user perceived lack of information) or infoglut (deluge of overloaded 
information).  While tearing down the artificial walls between isolated knowledge silos is 
an intuitive reaction, the implementation is not as straightforward as it seems to be, as it 
may bring in unintended consequences.  Resorting to centralized control and standardized 
operations would indiscriminately bulldoze everything -- the good, the bad and the ugly.  
Ironically, consequent weakened functionality of knowledge silos would contradict the 
original purpose of the strategy – knowledge integration for synergy. Therefore, 
collaboration needs a mechanism “to preserve the creation and processing functions 
inherent in knowledge silos, while offering all user access to the knowledge contained in 
the silos” (Offsey, 1997, p120).   
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Knowledge sharing for collaborative innovation is an alternative way of thinking to 
preserve diversity while promoting cooperation.  In this approach, a collective agenda is 
identified that all members with diverse backgrounds share common interests and each, 
to each his own, contributes “two cents” for the betterment of a society.  Food safety is 
one topic that provides the great opportunity to promote mutual understanding and 
resource sharing and to build communityship (Mintzberg, 2009), because safe and clean 
food is desired by everyone.  The organizational design for such a food safety community 
corresponds to Hayek’s prescription in the use of knowledge in society – a decentralized 
system with a rational economic order (Hayek, 1945).  In Hayek’s view, a 
communicative platform is a crucial element for the well-functioning of such a 
decentralized and rational system.  Taking market and price mechanisms as an example 
(Hayek, 1945, p526 and p527), the platform facilitates system-wide information flows, 
creating and maintaining a self-organized order so as to achieve common goals. In the 
context of food safety management, an intelligence platform needs to be constructed to 
facilitate food hazard communications.  It needs to be flexible enough so as to encompass 
all the value-creating potentials of diverse stakeholders.  Moreover, it needs to be 
efficient enough so as to promote resource integration and to transmit intelligence in 
time. Furthermore, it needs to be rational enough so as to maintain public trust and 
confidence. 
 
In a sense, an intelligence platform serves as an information hub “cross docking” 
knowledge stored at multiple stakeholders (Figure 1). Conceptually, an intelligence 
platform is similar to the notion of “value networks” based on the service-dominant logic.  
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Lusch, Vargo, and Tanniru (2010) define a value network as "a spontaneously sensing 
and responding spatial and temporal structure of largely loosely-coupled value proposing 
social and economic actors interacting through institutions and technology, to co-produce 
service offerings, exchange service offerings, and co-create value" (p20).  Value creation, 
the main purpose of a value network, involves liquefying information resources and 
bundling and re-bundling resources (Lusch et al., 2010, p22 and p23) in order to identify 
value propositions that meet satisficing criteria (Simon, 1956, p136) – the synergy 
condition.  Moreover, because knowledge is an operant resource (Vargo and Lusch, 
2004), processes of value creation suggest learning, evolving and adapting to changing 
requirements as soon as an opportunity emerges – the efficiency condition.  Therefore, on 
an intelligence platform, agility, i.e., quick adaptation for improved value proposition, is 
the core competence to realize the power of this creative setting; value is created and 
realized through two drivers – synergy and efficiency.  However, the two value divers 
have some conflicting characteristics in nature.  On the one hand, an effective use of 
relevant knowledge demands a structure flexible enough to accommodate diverse 
stakeholder requirements and meet their evolving needs.  On the other hand, an efficient 
access to dispersed knowledge across society requires a structure stable enough to 
withstand disturbances arising from the fragmented knowledge landscape.  Pursuing both 
synergy and efficiency at the same time would result in cognitive dissonance and create 
internal conflicts in an organization.  
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Figure 1 An Intelligence platform integrates stakeholders 
 
 
 
A plural form of management that treats the two drivers separately and integrates them 
for actual value realization may be a practical approach to reconcile the two seemingly 
contradictory characteristics of an intelligence platform.  In Thinking, Fast and Slow, 
Kahneman (2011) proposes two sub-systems related to human cognitions and decision-
making behaviors.  System 1, the fast thinking, represents an instinctive and emotional 
decision-making mode. The value-driven mechanism here is associative memory, the 
capability to link relevant knowledge stored in the system to interpret situations, to 
generate a coherent story, and to develop a positive feeling of confidence.  In contrast, 
system 2, the slow thinking, corresponds to a deliberate and logical decision-making 
mode. The dominant mechanism here is the executive control of memory, the capability 
to conduct complex comparisons and computations and to make reasoned choices.  
System 1 operates automatically and effortlessly in making heuristic decisions, shaping 
the definition of situations, and filtering information cues in the decision-making 
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environment.  System 2 is mostly idle because it is costly to make deliberate decisions.  
While it is only activated when information cues enter the system drawing a focus of 
attention, system 2 carries composure and will power to verify performance outcomes of 
system 1 and to make conscious changes in decision rules.  In Kahneman’s conceptual 
framework, a human mind processes information in a much more dynamic manner than 
that described in Stigler’s sequential search model (Stigler, 1961) – that information is 
more than a unified commodity, search is not just a standardized sampling process, and 
search efficiency is a way station rather than the destination to value creation, while a 
sequential search order is still prevalent in decision-making processes – that system 1 
serves as the energy-conserving default mode and system 2 safeguards the system and 
only intervenes when situations require.  The two systems reinforce each other in a 
fashion that offers opportunities to minimize decision-making effort while maximize 
performance. 
 
In the food safety commons, when members of diverse backgrounds engage in strategic 
food safety inspections, some function as agents of system 1 and others serve as agents of 
system 2.  The concept of transactive memory system can be a useful framework to 
conceptualize and operationalize this collaborative relationship as “a set of individual 
memory systems in combination with the communication that takes place between 
individuals” (Wegner, 1987, p186).  In Wegner’s construct, a group that “thinks” as a 
whole involves two functions: first, “the operation of the memory systems of the 
individuals” and second, “the processes of communication that occur within the group” 
(Wegner, 1987, p191).  The first involves organizational memory – “[i]nformation is 
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entered into memory at the encoding stage, it resides in memory during a storage stage, 
and it is brought back during the retrieval stage” (Wegner, 1987, p186); the second 
employs symbolic interactions – “[t]he transactive process may thus operate at retrieval 
to search for a label that can prompt access to the desired item in the internal or external 
storage of at least one group member” (Wegner, 1987, p191).  Constructing systemic 
collaboration for value creation requires “an understanding of the manner in which 
groups process and structure information” (Wegner, 1987, p185).  It involves two 
processes: first, a process of labeling – locating in the system where the relevant 
knowledge is; and second, a process of cephalization (Coase, 1937, p400) – 
communicating the knowledge to the foci of problem-solving.  Further, the 
communication involves two kinds of information which indicate sources of knowledge: 
first, personal expertise, and second, circumstantial knowledge responsibility (Wegner, 
1987, p192).  
 
However, system 1 and system 2 are not perfect decision support systems, because lapses 
could happen between their coordination.  System 1, according to the prospect theory, is 
subject to cognitive biases inherent in heuristic thinking under uncertainty (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979), and system 2 tends to neglect the significance of the psychodynamic 
unconscious, i.e., intuition and emotion (Epstein, 1994; Simon, 1987).  Therefore, 
coordination between the two sub-systems is not always streamlined and seamless, as 
“gaps” exist between loosely-coupled interactions between the system-1 and system-2 
agents.  This concern in decision biases is also described in Shultz and Holbrook (2009, 
p125) in terms of the notion of vulnerability. On the one hand, “people are economically 
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vulnerable if they know what is good for them but do not have the abilities, skills, funds, 
and other resources needed to acquire it.”  For example, many biological food hazards 
such as E. Coli, Salmonella or Norovirus are not subject to sensory inspections and 
require special laboratory testing to identify them.  On the other hand, “people are 
culturally vulnerable if they have plenty of resources to acquire what they need but just 
do not know what is good for them” – for example, food hazards could result from 
insufficient cooking temperature, cross contamination, improper storage conditions, etc. – 
mishandling of food due to a lack of knowledge or due diligence.  In a collaborative food 
safety environment, interactions and group dynamics could intensify the negative impact 
of decision biases and vulnerability.  Resulting underperformance would demoralize 
group members, discourage cooperation, and threaten system integrity. Therefore, 
accountability is crucial. As Wegner (1987, p192) argues, “an effective transactive 
memory in a group should not leave the responsibility for information to chance. If a 
clear expert does not exist in a domain, a channel for the processing of that information 
should nevertheless be established, either explicitly or implicitly”. In a dynamic and 
temporal sense, responsibility is anchored by accountability and reflected in traceability 
on an intelligence platform.  
 
4.  Structural Hazard Communication 
 
Hazard communication, i.e., exchanges of hazard knowledge and information, provides 
opportunities to develop useful and traceable measures. According to the social 
comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), when facing unknown situations, people tend to 
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communicate with peers to reduce feelings of uncertainty and insecurity. Effective hazard 
communication among diverse stakeholders in a complex environment requires an 
information framework, which explicitly organizes interactive elements so as to create a 
commonly understandable coherence for communicating knowledge claims (Egan, 1972, 
p66). Structural hazard communication thus can be conceptualized by four interrelated 
structural elements – resource, identity, structure, and knowledge – the RISK framework.  
 
4.1 Resource (R):  
The compilation of stored hazard information and knowledge forms the resource base 
(Barney, 1991) of a hazard communication system.  In a sense, the collection of available 
resources represents organizational memory (Walsh and Ungson, 1991) which 
substantiates distinctive sensing capabilities (Day, 1994) and the path toward dynamic 
capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  The four attributes of resources, valuable, 
rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991, p106-p111), imply that 
the involvement of circumstantial knowledge possessed by diverse stakeholders is critical 
for generating competitive advantages and hence superior organizational performance.  
 
4.2 Identity (I):  
An identity serves as what Polanyi (1967) called the "subsidiary" (a pointing finger) for 
sense-giving and sense-reading, when decision making involves a complex phenomenon 
difficult to be articulated under time pressure.  In a collaborative setting, an identity that 
functions as signals or symbols (Feldman and March, 1981) creates subsidiary awareness 
(Polanyi, 1967) and leads to symbolic interactions (Blumer, 1986), a mechanism to 
 59 
 
conserve cognitive resources and to facilitate efficient coordination, by providing a focus 
of attention (March and Simon, 1958), encouraging vicarious learning (Bandura, Ross, 
and Ross, 1963), and guiding heuristic information processing (Chaiken, 1980).  
 
4.3 Structure (S):  
A hazard communication structure is an agreement that states objectives, tasks, and 
activities, and coordinates the overall hazard management system.  The coordination is 
implemented by two kinds of information processing.  First, coordination by plan 
disseminates pre-established information, and second, coordination by feedback involves 
transmission of new information (March and Simon, 1958, p160).  The former represents 
the intention of the system, and the latter reflects the responsiveness of the stakeholders.  
While both can be products out of deliberate efforts, feedback always has, whether it is 
recognized or not, a voluntary and effortless element called intuition (Simon, 1987).  
Together "an arduous straining of the imagination is followed by a virtually spontaneous 
appearance of the solution" (Polanyi, 1967, p320), setting the path-goal (House, 1971; 
Evans, 1970) that addresses value propositions for implementing efficient hazard 
communication.   
 
4.4 Knowledge (K):  
Knowledge represents the practical use of resources, identities, and structure, ensuring 
the system not to be trapped in “red tape” or indulged in the status quo.  In a collaborative 
context, collective cognitions are derived from organizational learning.  Effective 
organizational learning requires “an understanding of the mechanisms that can be used to 
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enable an organization to deviate from the culture in which it is embedded”, which 
involves exploitation, enhancing existing knowledge, and exploration, acquiring new 
knowledge (March, 1991).  While exploitation is fundamental to improve organizational 
efficiency, in the case of collaborative innovation, “the vulnerability of exploration” 
(March, 1991, p73) and “the nontraditional quality of organizational learning” (Weick, 
1991) pose challenges to organizational effectiveness in terms of “motivation obstacles” 
and “cognitive boundaries” (Simon, 1991, p131).  Nonetheless, the impact can be 
alleviated by lateral diffusion of knowledge enabled by shared understanding and ability 
to communicate (Simon, 1991, p131). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the RISK perspective of a strategic food safety inspection system.  
The system is composed of four modularized organizational functions.  At the foundation 
lies the food safety community as the resources base (R).  Multiple stakeholders such as 
consumers, producers, channel members, and public agencies, who possess various kinds 
of hazard relevant knowledge, commingle under a common vision to create cleaner, 
safer, healthier, and satisfying food choices.  At the other end located an ad hoc food 
recall task force, which represents the knowledge (K) of the system.  From a practical 
perspective that “form follows failure” (Petroski, 1992, p22), food recall can be viewed 
as learning opportunities to develop system safeguards and improve the system when ex 
ante efforts inevitably fail due to bounded rationality (Taylor, 2011, p9).  The two 
organizational modules are connected by a communicative platform functioning as an 
open forum for stakeholders to negotiate mutually agreeable standards (S).  Planned 
standards (for example, HACCP), observed standards (for example, TQM), and emergent 
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standards (for example, voluntary compliance) – standards of three different kinds 
coordinate diverse stakeholders.  The coordination is enabled by hazard communication, 
through which hazard knowledge is translated and summarized into various forms of 
identities (I), for example, food labels, brands, consumer reports, advertising, stories, or 
word of mouth.  The identities serve as organizational symbols, with differential degree 
of information richness, assisting stakeholders of differential degree of competence in 
making appropriate decisions. An example of such structural communications is the 
Hazard Communication Program (HAZCOM) of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA).  In this interactive system for managing hazard information and 
knowledge, OSHA requires employers to disclose hazardous substances in workplaces, to 
provide employees and emergency personnel with access to resources (for example, a 
material safety data sheet (MSDS) or equivalent), and to support employees with 
appropriate training to understand health and safety risks. Elements of the RISK 
framework together create a system for managing strategic food safety inspection and 
hazard intelligence.  
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Figure 2. The RISK Framework for Structural Hazard Communication 
 
 
 
5.  Engagement 
 
In the food system, the food market provides a naturally active platform that facilitates 
hazard communication and coordinates plural aspects of exchange behaviors: economic 
costs and social information processing.  Economic costs are measureable and involve 
capital (e.g., computers, servers, smart phones, tablets, etc.) and exchange costs (e.g., 
carrier subscription fees, costs of information supply).  Social information processing 
involves primarily the reliability of information obtained voluntarily from consumers and 
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by regulation as well as voluntarily from suppliers and other stakeholders in the food 
system.  As a result, two distinct effects and consequent market forces would drive how 
consumers and suppliers process information in the food system.  
 
5.1 Informational effect and the force of differentiation:  
Brynjolfsson and Hu (2001) argue for the prominence of the “Long Tail effect” in a 
networked environment.  As market participants are better informed under new 
technologies, lower search costs enable a better fit between diverse attributes of demand 
and supply.  If the pattern of transactions is conceptualized as a normal distribution, new 
information would level the concentration of transactions at the average and create “fat” 
or “long” tails.  If this is the case, the conventional Pareto principle, or the 80/20 rule, 
may not anymore be the dominant heuristic to explain market behavior.  Clemons (2008) 
describes this enriched state of knowledge as “informedness”.  On the one hand, 
consumers know what is available in the marketplace with precise attributes and at the 
precise price they need and want.  On the other hand, suppliers respond to elaborated 
consumer demand with “hyper-differentiation” and “resonance marketing”.  It is believed 
that enhancing information availability for consumers provides suppliers with unlimited 
potentials to differentiate their offerings, explore underserved markets, and attain superior 
performance. 
 
5.2 Social effect and the force of integration:  
The interactive nature of the new technologies impact consumers and suppliers 
individually and collectively as well.  In the traditional neoclassical economic paradigm, 
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value is created and added unilaterally by suppliers through the combination and 
accumulation of supply activities.  Demand is exogenous to supply, as consumers are 
passive recipients of products.  The two separated entities of supply and demand are 
connected through exchanges and coordinated by prices.  As social networks are 
reshaping the traditional hierarchical organization of markets, an individual consumer is 
no longer a faceless part of the aggregate silent representative consumer.  Rather, 
consumers are empowered to let their voices be heard or even actively participate in 
value-co-creating activities to develop new market opportunities (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy, 2004).  Increasing needs for value co-creation in the market suggest that 
consumers and suppliers would build a collaborative relationship, which can be explained 
by the notion of "product market" through the lens of the socio-cognitive view of 
marketing.  Rosa, Porac, Runser-Spanjol, & Saxon (1999) suggest that a product market 
is formed when consumers and suppliers co-create a product conceptual system through 
the enactment of product or channel attributes in consumption and other social 
interactions.  A stabilized market results from a closer and stronger relationship with 
fewer endogenous and exogenous disturbances in the environment.  At this stage, 
consumers and suppliers agree on common agenda and reach congruent goals, and the 
market is “domesticated” (Arndt, 1979). 
 
The two market forces bring in mixed impacts on food safety management.  Structuring 
communication on the intelligence platform would face a dilemma that Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967) described in their empirical study on differentiation and integration in 
complex organizations – “Other things being equal, differentiation and integration are 
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essentially antagonistic, and one can be obtained only at the expense of the other” 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, p47).  Surprisingly, the research found that high 
performance organizations are both “highly differentiated and well integrated” (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967, p1).  To explain this counterintuitive phenomenon, Lawrence and 
Lorsch argued that certain conditions “seem able to make it possible to achieve high 
differentiation and high integration simultaneously” (p47) and that the key is the 
deployment of “integrative subsystems” (p31) that are “intermediate between those found 
in subsystems they were to coordinate” (p31), that initiate social influence (p33), and that 
provide behavioral standards (p37).  
 
The RISK framework functions as an integrative subsystem to coordinate unorganized 
entropy of social energy in the food safety commons and transcend the creative diversity 
into a concentrated knowledge power in the recall task force to effectuate collaborative 
innovation.  Since, in the dynamic processes, the platform is only a “way station”, i.e., a 
mediating mechanism, when an engagement occurs on the platform, value is derived 
from the need for mobilization coordination (Warren et al., 1974) which represents 
“short-term, ad hoc efforts of coordination between pairs of organizations” (Van de Ven 
and Walker, 1984).  At the micro-level, each interaction is a refreshing start, full of 
value-creating potentiality, an “embryonic stage in the development of inter-
organizational relationships.”  These often involve interactions in an “unstructured form” 
and are “set in motion by a single organization that has a particular objective for which it 
must gain support, cooperation, or resources from a number of other organizations”, in 
which “the agent of an organization mobilizes other pertinent organizations – or parts of 
 66 
 
them – around its own objectives.”  In other words, the boundary-spanning agent serves 
as entrepreneurs “who gathers together the resources and forges the ad hoc relationships 
needed to enable his or her organization to pursue its own objective” (Van and Ven and 
Walker, 1984: p598).  At the macro-level, certain patterns of interactions would be 
observable if value creation is an ongoing need.  This is especially the case in food safety 
management, when food hazards are mostly unexpected and thus vulnerability (Shultz 
and Holbrook, 2009) are constantly present.  The structure is so important because it 
offers a continuing basis for relationship building.  Without an organizational structure, 
interactions based on random walks could be costly. 
 
Social exchange theory (Lawler, 2001; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1958) provides a micro-
macro linkage to explain how the structure of the dynamic phenomenon is formed. 
Homans (1958, p597) conceptualized social behavior as exchange and argued that 
“interactions between persons is an exchange of goods, materials and non-materials”. 
Outcomes of social interactions thus explain “the variations in the values and costs of 
each man to his frequency distribution of behavior among alternatives, where the values 
(in the mathematical sense) taken by these variable for one man determine in part their 
values for the other” (Homans, 1958, p599). Essentially, social exchange is about how 
stakeholders jointly respond to uncertainties and ambiguities in collective value-creating 
processes (Lawler, 2001, p323).  Given the conditions of irresolvable knowledge deficits, 
both cognitive and emotional reactions would be enhanced “when they succeed or fail at 
using exchange opportunities to deal with these uncertainties” (Lawler, 2001, p324).  The 
role of value creation in the process of constructive engagement could be seen using 
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Homans’ propositions (Emerson, 1976, p339), with their instrumental focus to develop 
actionable propositions for effective hazard communication and a guideline for 
collaborative food safety management.  
 
P1. The Value Proposition:  Participants in the food safety process are more likely to take 
actions that are more valuable to them.  
 
P2. The Success Proposition:  When a participant in the food safety process takes an 
action that is rewarding, that participant is likely to repeat that action.  
 
P3. The Stimulus Proposition:  When a current situation is similar to one in the past in 
which a participant in the food safety process took an action that was rewarding, that 
participant is likely to repeat that action in the current situation.  
 
P4. The Deprivation-Satiation Proposition:  However, due to diminishing returns, the 
value of rewards to a participant in the food safety process for any action decreases with 
repetition.  
 
P5. The Rationality Proposition:  Participants in the food safety process are more likely to 
take actions that have greater perceived value, in terms of expected reward (formation) 
multiplied by the probability of receiving the reward (density). 
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In Figure 3, an EIPDF model with the five propositions indicated is proposed to explain 
dynamic processes leading to a social equilibrium which infers the structure of an 
intelligence platform.  When one party engages in a social exchange, it offers a value 
proposition for all parties involved.  Through interactions, the proposition is enacted and 
value is co-created.  A higher level of value creation motivates organizational 
performance, which positively reinforces collaborative behaviors. Reinforced behaviors 
lead to more stable relationships, in terms of the concept of density (Lusch et al., 2010, 
p23).  Anchored density forms the structure of relationships and set constraints for future 
interactions.  From this sense, social exchange represents a frame of reference that 
facilitates the use of social power in influencing behaviors (Emerson, 1976, p335 and 
p338).  
 
Figure 3 Social influence processes and platform structure 
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6.  Discussion 
 
Human beings feel good when they care about each other and build social bonding.  This 
emotional side of human nature is so powerful that it is regarded by some scholars as the 
main driver for moral responsibility and collective actions (see Haidt, 2001).  Feeling 
how others feel and thinking what others think enables people of different backgrounds to 
develop mutual understandings, establish closer relationships, and reach consensus in 
conflicts.  Albanese and Van Fleet (1985a) recognize this “soft power” of social relations 
and emphasize the use of social information to generate positive group dynamics.  In the 
context of work-groups, “social cues from respected co-workers or supervisors about task 
characteristics may cause a group member to perceive a task as unique.  These social cues 
may serve to reduce the free-riding tendency if they enhance perception of task 
uniqueness and serve as a special incentive for public-good contributions.  Social cues 
that deemphasize task uniqueness may have the opposite effect” (Albanese and Van 
Fleet, 1985a, p252-p253).  Salancik and Pfeffer (1978, p226) explain the rationale of the 
social information approach – “individuals, as adaptive organisms, adapt attitudes, 
behavior, and beliefs to their social context and to the reality of their own past and 
present behavior and situation … as a function of the information available to them at the 
time they express the attitude or need”; an individual’s “immediate social environment” 
is an important source of information and impacts “the relative saliency of information 
relevant to the person”. 
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In 1759, 18 years before the release of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith published his 
first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which he expressed his “alternative” 
mindset antithetical to homo economicus.  “How selfish soever man may be supposed, 
there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of 
others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it” (Smith, 1759; quoted by Smith, 1998, p2).  The act of 
sympathy is regarded by Adam Smith as the basis for cooperation because “nothing 
pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our 
own breast” (Smith, 1759; quoted by Coase, 1976, p530). 
 
While acknowledging the importance of human emotion, Smith held a rather composed 
stance toward its applications. “It is not the love of mankind which makes the ‘man of 
humanity’ willing to make this sacrifice, but because he sees himself through the eyes of 
an impartial spectator” (Coase, 1976, p531). In the complex food system, bounded 
rationality and associated cognitive and emotional biases suggests there is still a need for 
a leader who always has a clear and just mind, in Adam Smith’s term, an “impartial 
spectator”, focusing exclusively on the welfare of all members of the system and 
safeguarding the system from potential “psychopathic pursuit of grandiose sense of self-
worth” (Hare, 1993). According to Van Fleet and Yukl (1986), effective leadership is 
situational, subject to the identification of leaders and the nature of social influence, 
which involve both epistemological and reciprocal influence processes. Although “all 
learning takes place inside individual human heads” (Simon, 1991, p125), leader-member 
exchange (LMX) theory (Dansereau, Graen, and Haga, 1975), multiple linkages model 
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(Yukl, 2006), and leader-environment-follower-interaction (LEFI) theory (Wofford, 
1982) support the concept that leadership can be shared, i.e., performed by a variety of 
members in an organization. However, cognitive resources theory (Fiedler, 1986) implies 
that attributional biases inherent in organizational behaviors could negatively impact 
collaborative performance. Viewing the food system as a food safety community, the 
public agency empowers competent partners in the private sector and enacts servant 
leadership (Greenleaf, 1973), envisioning common goals, providing necessary technical 
and social support, and warehousing knowledge that facilitates "efficient cultures" 
(Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). Together, the emergent leaders and the servant leader 
collaborate on (1) task objectives and strategies; (2) commitment and compliance in task 
behavior to achieve these objectives; (3) group maintenance and identification; and (4) 
the culture of an organization (Yukl and Van Fleet, 1992, p149). This comprehensive 
view of leadership based on self-managed autonomous work groups is the essence of 
involvement-oriented food safety management system – building an intelligence platform 
through social interactions, exerting social influence through constructive engagements, 
and achieving coordination and cooperation through strategic food safety inspections.  
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Chapter 4 
Constructive Engagement 
 
1. Spontaneous Order 
 
To set up an intelligence platform, the public agency should refrain from arbitrarily 
exercising centralized authority and unilaterally imposing a fixed informational structure 
for stakeholder interactions. Inhibiting the spontaneous order of information flows 
reduces involvement, which is critical to the success of a knowledge warehouse. After all, 
an intelligence platform without involvement becomes an “information morgue”. A low 
density of participants, although easier for control, will limit the synergy the platform can 
create. Instead, a more appropriate strategy for the public agency is to take the role of a 
servant leader, learning, participating, and assisting the spontaneous order by managing 
traceability through the system. In this evolutionary approach of strategic formulating, 
involvement – stakeholders’ active participation in the food safety commons – enables 
the public agency to observe their behaviors and hence develop information structure 
which better reflects the spontaneous order and can practically facilitate the growth of the 
food system.  
 
The food market provides a built-in platform for policy implementation. Catallaxy, "the 
order brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market" 
(Hayek, 2012, p108-109), is acclaimed as the “marvel”, “one of the greatest triumphs of 
the human mind” (Hayek, 1945, p527). The special kind of spontaneous order in a market 
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coordinates diverse individual actions and utilizes knowledge and skills scattered all over 
society, without the necessity of a single plan, of a deliberate central authority, of perfect 
knowledge, or even of completely congruent goals and desires among all members. 
Although spontaneous, catallaxy is by no means an aggregation of thoughtless reflex. 
Rather, purposive actions are integral to its configuration, as Hayek pointed out, “its 
misfortune is the doubt one that it is not the product of human design and that the people 
guided by it usually do not know why they are made to do what they do” (Hayek, 1945). 
In his conception, entrepreneurs, who “constantly search for unexploited opportunities” 
(Hayek, 2002; translated by Snow), keep the spontaneity anew and alive. 
 
In market exchange, if each participant is a social entrepreneur, by performing food 
safety inspection in his or her local niche, sharing circumstantial knowledge and market 
intelligence, and coordinating with others to remove hazardous products and services, the 
exchange becomes a constructive force which further transforms the market into an 
“organized complexity” (Hayek, 1989). In this light, prosocial activities reflect how 
innovative opportunities are contextualized (Garud, Gehman, and Giuliani, 2014). The 
envisioned collaborative partnerships (FSWG) are implemented by entrepreneurial teams 
(Harper, 2008, p622) developing more encompassing entrepreneurial cognitions, “the 
knowledge structures that people use to make assessments, judgments, or decisions 
involving opportunity evaluation, venture creation, and growth” (Mitchell, Busenitz, 
Lant, McDougall, Morse, and Smith, 2002, p97).  
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Entrepreneurial teamwork for the market-based, prosocial approach of food safety 
inspection is different from Harper’s conceptualization that “team members are on an 
equal footing in the joint enterprise” (Harper, 2008, p623). While food safety is a 
common interest, members of market-based teams would not share comparable 
knowledge and motivation. They have heterogeneous competence - some enjoy more 
economic and cultural resources; others are handicapped. They have different motives - 
suppliers are driven by profit incentives and growth opportunities; consumers, by 
personal needs and wants; public agencies, by political and performance concerns. In this 
regard, efficacious collaborative partnerships need to shape and maintain opportunity 
structures (Merton, 1959) that can hold the entrepreneurial teamwork supportive and 
accountable.  
 
In Hayek’s (1945) view, the use of knowledge sets up three kinds of opportunity 
structures in markets: centralized, decentralized, and pluralistic. In a centralized structure, 
all relevant facts and intelligence are assumed to be acquired by a single command so as 
to formulate an optimal plan. In a decentralized structure, all facts and intelligence are 
assumed to be distributed and possessed by every member. While in an open and 
complex task environment, a centralized structure would limit the extent of innovation 
due to bounded rationality, a decentralized structure would render a system disintegrative 
and inefficient. In a pluralistic structure, centralized and decentralized structures co-exist 
in a market. On the centralized side, experts develop specialty knowledge; system 
administrators manage infrastructure, repair deficiencies, and resolve conflicts. On the 
decentralized side, each member possesses circumstantial knowledge as it is given. 
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Separately located knowledge is then integrated through communication and transferred 
to relevant decision makers.  
 
Coordination in such processes of communication is a major concern, because a 
pluralistic structure would not be in a clean-cut, half-and-half formation. Rather, the 
spontaneous order has an amorphous structure which exhibits unbounded potentials and 
reflects the dynamics of “kaleidic interactions” (Shackle, 1974), however, “wherein it is 
impossible to fully coordinate activities …, [and] the process of entrepreneurial 
innovation is always in disequilibrium” (Garud et al., 2014, p1181). In other words, 
stability is not an inherent property of the pluralist structure. As “an entrepreneur’s 
imagination continually changes based in part on new information generated by 
interactions with other entrepreneurs and stakeholders” (Garud et al., 2014, p1181), the 
spontaneous market order is an aggregation of contextual phenomena with its equilibrium 
to be maintained momently through communicating both physical evidence and socially 
derived interpretations and meanings (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978, p228; Festinger, 1954).  
 
2. Communicative Actions  
 
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action explains how collaborative 
partnerships are achieved with both sense and sensitivity. Communicative action refers to 
“the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish 
interpersonal relations. The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action 
situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of 
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agreement” (Habermas, 1984). Central to the theory is the concept of interpretation that 
multiple actors negotiate definitions of a complex situation which would consequently 
admit of consensus. Language is given a prominent role in this process of collective 
interpretation. Nevertheless, Habermas’ concept on the use of linguistic expressions for 
coordination is by no means subject to Hardin’s criticism on mass communication and his 
negative connotation of propaganda. Rather, it concurs with the notion of 
“performatives” in the theory of speech acts (Austin, 1962) and the collective acceptance 
theory of social institutions (Miller, 1984).  
 
Performatives are “invoked” joint actions (Austin, 1962), “sayings which are also doings 
… speech acts which bring about an outcome in the external world … the outcome 
depends on collective acceptance” (Miller, 2012). In the theory of communicative action, 
the action specifically refers to symbolic expressions with which the actor engages 
certain kinds of interactive relations in the context of the objective world (identified by 
physical objectives and events). Rationality, defined as the acquisition and the use of 
knowledge by speaking and acting subjects (actors), is a critical element to be maintained 
throughout the process of realization from intent via communicative action to outcomes. 
Another crucial enabler, validity claims, defined as rational expressions which have “the 
character of meaningful actions, intelligible in their context, through which the actor 
relates to something in the objective world”, anchor the elusive feeling of trust in the 
dynamic process. How do communicative actions drive the performance of collaborative 
partnerships? In short, in a communicative action, an actor proposes a claim which is 
open for objective appraisal in order to invite other actors to take a “rationally motivated 
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position”. As knowledge is embodied in symbolic expressions, rationality is extracted 
through argumentation, “continuing communicative action with reflective means”. 
Whether that symbolic expression can lead to a motivated agreement and a joint action 
depends on how its validity claims are evaluated against the conditions of its validity, i.e., 
“background knowledge inter-subjectively shared by a communication community 
constituted of all participants”.  
 
While consensus is the focal intent of communicative actions, whether the internal 
coherence can lead to superior organizational performance is an empirical question and 
beyond the theoretical scope. In the context of strategic food safety inspection, 
entrepreneurial teams that function as market-driven organizations require a distinct 
ability to anticipate market events and trends ahead – market sensing capability (Day, 
1994). Using concepts of Day (1994, p43) and the EIPDF model in the previous chapter, 
Figure 1 depicts the evaluation of validity claims in a stylized sequence. A negotiated 
agreement involves two interrelated processes in five sequential stages. On the one hand, 
the explicit process of information processing consists of five activities: symbolic 
expression, intelligence generation, collective interpretation, intelligence utilization, and 
performative evaluation. On the other hand, the latent process of knowledge sharing 
includes four elements: organization memory, its augmentation, social sentiment, and 
collective unconsciousness. In the dynamic processes, hazard information is first 
translated into a symbolic expression and used as a control signal to engage collaborative 
partners. Through social interactions, hazard intelligence is generated from two different 
sources regarding technical attributes and social responses. Collective interpretation of 
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the hazard intelligence drives the imagination of entrepreneurial teamwork and guides the 
utilization of intelligence. The conceptual model further highlights the importance of 
collaborative performance, and its reinforcing effect through the process of feedback. 
Organization memory refers to “the stored information from an organization’s history 
that can be brought to bear on present decisions” (Walsh and Ungson, 1991, p61). 
Together with social sentiment and collective unconsciousness, the “non-regulatory 
supplements” to centralized governance, represent the tacit aspect of social processes that 
serve as a repository for collective insights, drive collective imagination, and set the 
course of ongoing inquiries. To the public agency, the social responses to information 
cues would be observed only indirectly through proxy measures. Therefore, observability 
of dynamic social behaviors raises another concern that, while “to manage is not to 
control” (Landau and Stout, 1979), “if you can’t measure it, how can you manage it” 
(Broadbent, 2007)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
7
9
 
Figure 1. Communicative actions of collaborative partnerships in food safety inspection 
 
Adapted from Day (1994, p43), market sensing: processes for learning about markets 
 
 80 
 
In communicative actions, social information processing does not naturally follow a top-
down, hierarchical, or mechanical order and allow for exact control. Rather, free flows of 
social energy would more likely to reflect a bottom-up, organic pattern of “swarm 
intelligence”. Bonabeau and Meyer (2001) observed the collective behavior and swarm 
intelligence that emerges from a group of ants.  "Individually, they have meager 
intelligence.  And they work with no supervision ... for social insects teamwork is largely 
self-organized, coordinated primarily through the interactions of individual colony 
members ...  Although these interactions might be primitive, taken together they result in 
efficient solutions to difficult problems (such as finding the shortest route to a food 
source among myriad possible pathways)" (Bonabeau and Meyer, 2001, p108 and 109).  
The emergent, self-organized, social behavior is not a product of chance and randomness.  
Rather, certain elements are antecedent to it. "Individual ants emit a chemical substance -
- a pheromone -- which then attracts other ants.  In a simple case, two ants leave the nest 
at the same time and take different paths to a food source, making their trails with 
pheromone.  The ant that took the shorter path will return first, and this trail will now be 
marked with twice as much pheromone as the path taken by the second ant, which has yet 
to return.  Their nest mates will be attracted to the shorter path because of its higher 
concentration of pheromone.  As more and more ants take that route, they too lay 
pheromone, further amplifying the attractiveness of the shorter trail" (Bonabeau and 
Meyer, 2001, p108).  Counterintuitively, the collective, efficient activity is not directed 
and controlled by any queens or generals, but determined by two simple rules of 
individual ants: first, lay pheromone; second, follow the trails of other ants with the most 
pheromone concentration. This is an example of Likert’s system 5 – managing without a 
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boss (Likert and Araki, 1986; Likert and Likert, 1976, p33) that prosocial activities can 
drive to the performance of a working system.   
 
3. Free-riding Tendency 
 
Indeed, human society is much more complicated than an ant colony. While ant 
behaviors are directed by robotic and programmed reactions, it is argued that human 
behaviors are fundamentally driven by self-interestedness (Smith, 1937). If conflicts exist 
between individual sub-goals and the collective goal, individuals would not be motivated 
to participate in communicative actions. Collaborative partnerships would deviate from 
the intended policy goal due to the free-riding problem. The free riding tendency refers to 
the phenomenon that members of a group obtain benefits from group membership but do 
not bear a proportional share of the costs of providing the benefits (Albanese and Van 
Fleet, 1985a, p244). Albanese and Van Fleet argue that free riding behaviors, although 
not desirable, are “rational”, i.e., expectable, outcomes within group settings. The supply 
of a public good in this context will inevitably be “suboptimal” (assuming an optimal 
amount of such a good can be conjectured). Further, the shortage of the public good 
would be more severe as the group size increases.  
 
Although counterintuitive, the free riding tendency has its psychological roots. According 
to March and Simon (1958), human beings are not omniscient, but have a general feature 
of “bounded rationality”, i.e., cognitive limits on rationality, under which decision 
makers are intended to be rational but it is so only in a limited sense, due to cognitive, 
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behavioral, and emotional reasons. Cognitively, decision making would be influenced by 
selective attention when multiple alternatives are present. Due to capacity constraints of 
the brain and sense organs, human beings can only process a limited amount of 
environmental stimuli at a time. When multiple stimuli vie for attention, decision makers 
have to prioritize alternatives and ration cognitive resources to avoid sensory overload. 
Behaviorally, the focus of attention would be driven and reinforced by the pursuit of self-
interestedness, which to an extreme extent is described as “selfish” interests (Albanese 
and Van Fleet, 1985a, p252), “solemnity of the remorseless working of things” (Hardin, 
1968, p3), or opportunism (Williamson, 1998). Emotionally, the attentional processes 
would be further distorted by risk attitudes, perception of uncertainty, and feelings of 
stress. Hence, March and Simon (1958) described “satisficing” as the tendency of human 
beings under uncertainty to select not an unknown optimum but rather the first minimally 
acceptable alternative perceived. Consciously or unconsciously, bounded rationality sets 
the course of perception and expectation and shapes a decision maker’s preference, i.e., 
“satisfactory standard” (March and Simon, 1958).  
 
When collaborative partners hold different satisfactory standards, collaborative decision 
making would encounter the issue of conflicting sub-goals. When collaborative partners 
hold different satisfactory standards, conflicting sub-goals indicate a possibility that 
collaborative outcomes would not attain maximum public interest. March and Simon 
(1958, p154) explains the processes of conflict resolution through coordinating sub-goal 
formation with three critical factors: the focus of attention, the focus of information, and 
the span of attention. The essential task to align multiple sub-goals is to create a focus of 
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attention within an organization. To do so involves a two-fold strategy. First, an 
informational strategy adjusts the focus of information that sets up a frame of reference, 
providing guidelines for organizational members to adjust individual definitions of 
situation and satisfactory standards. Second, a social strategy manages the span of 
attention that determines the capacity of organizational members and the magnitude of 
their efforts for alignment. The March and Simon’s model represents a deliberate strategy 
crafted by a “chess master” (Simon, 1987). When a centralized command (acting as 
Simon’s chess master) carefully manages information flows throughout an organization, 
including inflows, outflows, intra-vertical flows, and intra-horizontal flows, subjective to 
the responsiveness to the information supply, organizational members (chessmen) are 
expected to align their attention to the focus. The convergence of expectations 
(Malmgren, 1961) would lead to the attainment of collective goal.  
 
Under the trend of Internet of Things (IOTs), bits and bytes generated from the use of 
information and communication technologies, consciously or unconsciously, influence 
how people interact with one another and frame their decisions. The so-called "digital 
pheromones" (Bonabeau and Meyer, 2001, p109) have become an increasingly prominent 
factor that drives decisions and shapes behaviors. In this brave new virtual reality, social 
networks open a creative avenue for the public agency to manage public attention. 
Engagement through Internet and social media allows coordination with more efficient 
regulatory interventions by the use of social information to drive motivation for 
cooperation. Real-time information service and word-of-mouth effects create a sense of 
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direction and shape the structure of task environments. In two ways, social networks 
impact the structure of communication actions.  
 
1) Decision framing:  
A push-based strategy resorts to opinion leaders and vertical communications. 
Influentials with significant social power on others (Libai, Bolton, Bügel, de Ruyter, 
Götz, Risselada, and Stephen, 2010, p271) have the charismatic effects that a small 
number of individuals are able to leverage social media to mobilize a relatively large 
group of followers.  
 
2) Community building:  
A pull-based strategy relies on social capital and horizontal communications. Social 
capital, defined as advantages and opportunities accruing to people through membership 
in communities (Bourdieu, 1986), provides a basis for exerting behavioral influence 
through relational value enclosed in peer-to-peer bonds and socially-embedded 
exchanges (Laibai et al., 2010). Interestingly, social capital is most efficacious when a 
community involves members with internal locus of control. In this regard, a lively 
community by nature should be self-organized and driven by organic information flows.  
 
The social orientation of market-based collaborative problem-solving, contrasting to the 
technical chess-master logic, generates a self-correcting counterforce to the free-riding 
tendency when intrinsic satisfaction is enhanced (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985a, p252). 
Those who possess superior knowledge and higher motivation stand up as emergent 
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leaders. They perceive innovative opportunities and conceive action plans. Their 
leadership behaviors are transformed into information cues for communicative actions. 
Followers respond to the calls and their following behaviors generate information traces. 
The responsiveness further provides references for social comparison. The self-organized 
symbolic interactions in the communicative actions represent “the dynamics of tacit 
knowing” (Polanyi, 1967, p319). Information cues and traces form a traceability structure 
of tacit knowing and create meaning through sense-giving (laying a digital pheromone; 
technical traceability) and sense-reading (responding to the trace; social traceability). The 
two activities, for integrating “signs of potentialities” (p321) and exerting “the power of 
anticipatory intuition” (p321), are “essential kinship of heuristics and verification” (p322) 
which enact “a body of anticipatory outline” (p322) that reflects rational processes of 
argumentation, “continuing communicative actions with reflective means”. Maintaining a 
coherent traceability structure is so important to efficacious collaborative partnerships 
because “random trial and error unguided by such a perspective will never add up to a 
skillful performance” (Polanyi, 1967, p322).  
 
4. Constructive Engagement 
 
In control theory, the control of a system is operated by two instruments: control signal 
and controller. A control signal provides reference that, when attached to the output of a 
plant, a controller can monitor and adjust the output by changing the value of the signal. 
In Hayek’s conceptual framework of catallaxy, prices exemplify a control signal that 
coordinates the access and the use of knowledge and provides traceability in the market 
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system. While a succinct form, prices have limited capacity to extract, register, and 
convey full information from all market activities. Hence, self-correction based on prices 
is never meant to be “perfect” (Hayek, 1945, p527), and coordination solely through 
prices would result in market failures. As Hayek pointed out, the price system is “just one 
of those formations which man has learned to use” (Hayek, 1945, p528). Along with 
prices, a market would resort to other information systems, for example, word-of-mouth, 
labels, packages, advertisements, consumer reports, public information notices, etc. 
Various market signals visualize social responses and provide opportunities for the public 
agency to engage collaborative partners and to generate open-source intelligence 
(OSINT). Moreover, the public agency needs to actively engage collaborative partners so 
as to elicit responses and induce desired prosocial outcomes. According to Albanese and 
Van Fleet (1985a, p253), “the basic strategy for counting the free-riding tendency is to 
build various private goods that are contingent on the provision of the group’s public 
good into the group member’s incentive system”. In the context of market-based 
communicative actions, the strategy of constructive engagement is implemented by 
bundling prosocial symbolic expressions with private goods to induce desirable social 
responses. An economic analysis demonstrates the feasibility of the strategy.  
 
Referred to notations in Table 1, the bundling of a symbolic expression with a private 
good is expressed as:   
α + βM(x, e) 
In the market, collaborative partners perceive a call for actions through salient 
information cues and reveal their behaviors. The relationship between information cues 
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and the true task characteristic is not deterministic, subject to heterogeneous perception, 
expectation, and preference. Economic justification of the bundling is represented as 
benefits and costs of the supply of information regarding the differentiated attribute:   
α + βM(x, e) – c(x) 
The economic value is maximized as the optimal level of x is chosen, under the first-
order condition:  
βMx – c’(x) = 0 
The optimal level of the task characteristic x* is implicitly defined as x* = x*(β, e). 
Comparative statics ∂x*/ ∂β = -Mx / βMxx – c’’ indicate positive definite. Assume 
collaborative partners are risk-neutral to the symbolic expression itself. Their risk 
attitudes are reflected in their responses (β). Collaborative partners perceive the symbolic 
expression and maximize their expected value from task characteristics. Collaborative 
partners expect benefits from processing the market signal, and therefore, let  
E[B(x,e) - α - βM(x,e)], subject to: (1) E[α + βM(x, e) - c(x) ] = u0; and (2) x = x*(β, e). 
The first-order condition to maximize the constrained objective function equals to:  
E[ (Bx – C’) ∂x*/ ∂β ] = 0. 
Substituting results from economic value maximization and taking a second-order Taylor 
approximation of M and C, one can derive an expression of β*.  
β* = E[(Bx)*(Mx)] / E[(Mx)*(Mx)] = Cov(Bx, Mx) / Var(Mx) 
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Table 1. List of notations 
Symbol Definition 
α A private good 
M A symbolic expression that elicits social responses 
x A task characteristic indicated in the symbolic expression (M) 
e A random noise, assuming e ~ N(0, σ2) 
β 
A measure of the economic incentive that drives social responses to the 
symbolic expression (M) 
C Cost of provision of the symbolic expression (M) 
B Perceived benefits from the task in terms of the characteristic (x) 
u0 Reservation utility of collaborative partners 
 
The analytical result indicates that, in communicative actions, economic incentives that 
induce social responses are driven by two factors. First, the covariance between perceived 
benefits and the symbolic expression indicates the degree of goal congruence. Second, 
the variance of the symbolic expression suggests the degree of situational ambiguity. On 
the one hand, a higher degree of goal congruence strengthens the economic incentive for 
social responses. On the other hand, a higher degree of situational ambiguity reduces the 
efficacy of the symbolic expression. The factors correspond to the two dimensions in 
communicative actions, knowledge sharing and information processing. The result also 
concurs with the notion of involvement as personal relevance in Celsi and Olson (1988) 
that the motivation of an individual to process information can be viewed from two 
aspects. The social aspect of knowledge sharing is determined by “a function of the 
personal relevant knowledge that is activated in memory in a particular situation” (p211). 
The technical aspect of information processing is determined by “the extent that relevant 
knowledge can be retrieved from memory in a given situation” (p210).  
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If properly designed and managed, the symbolic expressions can be sources of social 
influence because social cues from respected peers about task characteristics create a 
sense of task uniqueness and promote individual contributions (Albanese and Van Fleet, 
1985a). However, the strategy is a double-edged sword. Social cues deemphasize 
uniqueness would cause opposite effects that result in free-riding or, even worse, selfish 
behaviors. Lest well-intended public operations adversely impact the prosocial spirit, 
prudent interventions are necessary in consideration of involvement from collaborative 
partners. As an alternative public strategy to direct interventions, Shultz and Holbrook 
(1999) argue for strategic application of communicative interactions and systematic 
deployment of explicit and measurable indicators in the task environment for prosocial 
outcomes. Ensuing accountability further allows the public agency to construct practical 
control signals, coordinate diverse interests, and drive system performance. Traceability 
throughout the course of communicative actions brings to the surface meaningful 
measures by creating a representation of tacit social dynamics that indicate conflict 
situations and promote self-organized checks and balances.  
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Chapter 5 
Traceability 
 
1. Traceability in Food Supply 
 
The International Organization of Standardization (ISO 8402:1994) defines traceability as 
“the ability to trace the history, application or location of an entity by means of recorded 
identifications”. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
includes a dynamic aspect in the Codex Alimentarius (Latin for food code): 
“traceability/product tracing is the ability to follow the movement of food through 
specified stage(s) of production, processing and distribution”. European Community 
Regulation 178/2002 offers a definition more pertinent to food and agribusiness in 
details: “the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or substance 
intended to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed, through all stages of 
production, processing and distribution”. Modern food and agribusiness supply involves 
interdependent actors and numerous inputs, processes, and outputs. In order to be 
effective, “traceability must be managed by setting up a traceability system” (Moe, 1998, 
p211), which constitutes a record keeping system designed to track the flow of product or 
product attributes through not only internal production processes but also external supply 
chains (Golan et al., 2004). In this context, the concept of traceability incorporates a 
supply chain view. Under which, transactions (i.e., exchange relationships between 
consumers and suppliers) are sustained by interactions of three activities – flows of 
physical products, flows of information, and flows of financial rewards – in a symbiotic 
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cycle. Traceability systems along supply chains operationalize on the dimension of 
information, emphasizing on five factors – what (unit of analysis), who (actors), where 
(locations), when (events), and how (methods) of a subject under considerations.  
 
Van Dorp (2002) defines a traceability system from the perspective of information 
management, including three layers: item coding (the physical layer), information 
architecture (information layer), and planning and control (the control layer). Item coding 
identifies products’ unique properties, such as forms, fits, or functions, and embeds them 
in codes. This activity establishes a link between a product and associated information to 
increase the efficiency of the system. Information architecture manages the flow of 
information in terms of quantity and quality by setting up de-coupling points in the 
supply chain to determine the degree of aggregation of information, and assures 
information quality through quality audits and certification. The two levels build a 
foundation for the third, planning and control, which optimizes production activities with 
respect to feedback from tracking activities.  
 
Traceability costs arise from activities of these three layers. First, costs of product 
differentiation relate to managing an item coding system that enables tacking units to be 
separated from one another and preserved their unique identities. Second, costs of 
recordkeeping relate to managing the information architecture that collects and maintains 
information on products and product attributes. Depending on the objectives of a system, 
these activities vary in the degree of sophistication, resulting in the characteristics which 
we can observe from a traceability system: the breadth, which describes the amount of 
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information the system records; the depth, which defines how far back or forward the 
system tracks in a supply chain; and the precision, which reflects the degree of assurance 
a system can specify a particular product movement or characteristic. 
 
Suppliers have three general objectives to develop and maintain traceability systems. 
First, a system is designed to improve supply management. By tracking production, 
inventory, and sales, a system provides information for finding the most efficient 
approach to coordinate logistics activities. Second, a system is designed to assure quality 
management. By tracking product movements, a system isolates the sources of potential 
hazards, clarifies liability, and limits the extent of risk associated with a food safety 
failure. Third, a system is designed to facilitate marketing management. By tracking 
product attributes desired by consumers, a system differentiates among products and 
creates new market opportunities. Suppliers are thus able to attain higher profits, cost-
wise, from business environment with lower costs and less risk; and, revenue-wise, from 
a market position with better margins. An economically justifiable amount of investment 
on a traceability system is then determined by estimating and weighing the benefits that 
the system can bring to the company (Golan et al, 2004).  
 
Food and agribusiness companies have spent substantial efforts in improving traceability 
technology. In the product identification technology, for example, the Universal Product 
Code (UPC), or the bar code, is a labeling scheme based on standards set up by the 
Uniform Code Council (UCC) of the U.S. and European Article Numbering (EAN) 
System. It contains a series of 12-digit or 14-digit numbers that represent certain 
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attributes of a tracking unit. While it is a widely adopted industrial practice and the cost 
of application is low, it has very limited capacity for storing information. Moreover, 
retrieving data requires scanning the label with a bar code reader, which may not function 
well in a wet and cold environment. The radio frequency identification (RFID) is a newer 
technology without these two limitations. Based on the standard, Electronic Product Code 
(EPC) set up by the UCC and EAN, a RFID tag embeds a computer chip and its own 
power source so that it can actively and automatically receive and send a large amount of 
data. In addition, the tag can be recycled, reprogrammed, and reused for lowering costs. 
One potential drawback is that RFID tags can only be read by machines and cannot be 
processed manually by humans, and therefore makes the investment in a reliable RFID 
system utmost important (Thompson et al., 2005). Other technological development in 
quality and safety measurement, genetic analysis, environmental monitoring, geospatial 
positioning, and software for system integration are becoming practical industrial 
applications (Opara, 2003).  
 
Traceability Problem 
In the U.S., while private food and agribusiness companies have developed a significant 
capacity, they may not be motivated to improve traceability to a socially optimal level 
without incentives – a case of market failures (Golan et al., 2004). Extant economic 
literatures address causes of market failures from two aspects: information asymmetry 
and public goods. Taking the previously mentioned supply chain view, information can 
be transformed and incorporated as a part of product specifications. A market-based 
solution can then be devised by balancing product offerings and financial rewards, 
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although the value of anonymity (Golan et al., 2004) raises an issue of moral hazard. 
While the principal agent model is applicable, the impact from monitoring costs would 
attenuate the effort and cause deviations from the status of optimal traceability supply. 
Further, traceability has a characteristic of public goods (Richards et al., 2009). 
Traceability supply may suffer from a free rider problem, resulting in reverse selection. A 
mandatory traceability system is a standard government response to this problem. 
However, it is criticized to be ineffective, failing to accommodate various use cases in 
different industrial sectors. In addition, the current public budget constraint does not 
welcome the development of a fully encompassing but costly system.  
 
Modern food and agribusiness supply chains in the U.S. are characterized by their 
efficiency-driven trends. In general, food and agricultural products are income inelastic in 
nature. Consumer spending on such products has changed less proportionally as income 
rises. This phenomenon causes the so called “farm problem”. In essence, farms and food 
companies are constantly facing declining profits, while an invisible price ceiling exists 
for their products but some of the input costs keep pace with income. Vertical integration, 
standardization in products, and global sourcing for low-cost inputs are then the three 
major approaches to secure margins. These three forces interact and result in 
consolidation in operations. Firms that are vertically integrated enjoy scale economies in 
unit fixed cost allocation, in marketing standardized products, and in global operations. 
However, as Coase (1937) prescribed, costs of errors outweigh the gains when firms over 
stretch their boundaries beyond management capacity.  
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (Beef), hoof-and-mouth disease (pork), microbial 
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contamination of fresh produce (Spinach), poisons in animal feeds (Chinese pet food), 
unhealthy food additives (Chinese dairy products) and genetically modified organism 
(GMO) products are a few in the long list of food safety events that have drawn public 
attention. During a food safety outbreak, all companies in the industry can be impacted 
from a loss of sales. For example, the E Coli outbreak from fresh spinach in 2006 has 
caused a change in consumption preferences. Even after processors in California formed 
an industrial association, California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing 
Association (LGMA) to control quality and boost public confidence, U.S. consumers 
have still purchased less spinach. In a worst scenario, public trust in the capability and 
integrity of the industry could be so low that a market collapse would result, leading to a 
deadweight loss of the whole industry.  
 
While both private and public sectors in the U.S. are aware of the severity of the problem, 
and recognize that traceability is the first step of the food supply chain quality 
management (Roth el al., 2008), market failure becomes an obstacle in the supply of 
traceability. The public sector is not efficient in identifying and tracing all various use 
cases (Golan et al., 2004) but the private sector does not have sufficient incentive to cover 
the gaps (Richards et al., 2008). According to Arrow (1969), “market failure is not 
absolute; it is better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in 
general impede and in particular cases completely block the formation of markets”. 
Therefore, the problem of insufficient traceability supply can be examined from the lens 
of transaction costs economics for possible remedies.  
 
 96 
 
2. Review on Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Transaction Costs 
A transaction occurs when a product or service is transferred through an interface 
between two separate parties. Ideally, the product or service moves smoothly with a 
constant full speed. The neoclassical economic theory portrays such a frictionless 
business environment. A firm is regarded as a production function that selects through 
alternatives to minimize input costs and maximize consumer utility. The invisible hand, 
the price mechanism, coordinates all consumers, firms, and economic activities moving 
toward an optimized status of equilibrium, so that the market is looked like “ocean of 
unconscious cooperation”. However, this ideal is not always true.  In reality, as Coase 
(1937) pondered the justification of “islands of conscious power”, he argued that there 
are frictions – costs of using the price mechanism, named as transaction costs. In Coase’s 
ideas, to organize production through the price mechanism, an actor needs to first 
discover relevant prices in the market, and then negotiate and conclude a contract with 
another actor for each exchange transaction. It is costly to conduct these two activities. 
Thus, a firm is formed to allow an authority to direct resources, saving the costs of 
marketing. However, organizing firms is not a panacea either. The expansion of a firm is 
subject to two forces. First, the size of a firm is constrained by diminishing returns of 
management, because costs of errors increase as a firm grows. Second, in a competitive 
environment, a firm takes over an activity from another firm only if the cost of running 
an operation internally is less than the cost of acquiring the same outcome of the 
operation from the market. The boundary of a firm thus is determined by a tradeoff 
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between the two sources of transaction costs. In addition to cost comparisons, the 
presence of uncertainty, “the fact of ignorance and the necessity of acting upon opinion 
rather than knowledge”, makes a firm more effective than the price mechanism. While 
Coase pointed out the needs for forecasting and an inevitable process of cephalization 
under uncertainty, he left the sources and implications of this effect for future researches.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Following Coase’s (1937) idea that a firm has coordinating potential to tradeoff 
transaction costs, Williamson (1998, 1981, 1979, 1971) developed a micro-level 
analytical structure for transaction cost economics and offers a more extensive 
understanding of the topic. The foundation of Williamson’s framework is built on two 
behavioral assumptions, based on Herbert Simon’s (1979) studies on human nature. (1) 
Bounded rationality describes the limited competence of human actors to formulate and 
solve complex problems and to process information. While bounded rationality is not 
necessarily hyperrationality, it does not mean irrationality either. Human agents are 
intended to be rational, farsighted, rather than myopic, although, in an economic sense, 
all complex contracts are still inevitably incomplete, containing gaps, errors, or 
omissions. (2) Opportunism is viewed by Williamson as the central concept in the study 
of transaction costs. Human actors are assumed to be self-seeking with guile, not only 
pursuing self-interest but also applying false or empty threats or promises to take 
advantage of others if an opportunity to gain more profits is present. Accordingly, a 
contract without a credible endorsement will not be self-fulfilled.  
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In this framework, the transaction is the basic unit of analysis. The operationalization of 
the transaction cost economics is based on principal dimensions, asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency, the three key features of a transaction. Uncertainty signifies 
the disturbances to which transactions are subject. Frequency indicates whether and how 
transactions recur. Asset specificity represents the degree to which durable transaction-
specific investments are incurred. The transaction-specific assets take various forms, such 
as physical assets, human assets, site specificity, and dedicated assets, etc. Under this 
analytical framework, a firm serves a role not only as a production function transforming 
inputs into outputs, but also as a structure governing transactions. Given bounded 
rationality and opportunism, a firm acts on the three transactional dimensions, with an 
objective to set up order in an exchange relationship, mitigate potential conflict threats, 
and thus realize mutual gains. This objective is achieved by selecting the appropriate 
governance mode from discrete structural alternatives – market, hybrid, or hierarchy. The 
governance modes differ in their competence, in terms of adaptability, incentive intensity, 
and control instruments (Table 1). Contingent to the institutional environment, the 
efficacious governance mode economizes transaction costs and better support exchanges.  
 
Table 1. Features of alternative governance modes 
Feature / Mode Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Adaptability Low Medium High 
Incentive intensity High Medium Low 
Control instruments Low Medium High 
 
In sum, transaction costs measure frictions occurred in exchange relationships, for 
example, the cost of using price mechanisms (Coase, 1937). Under this framework, an 
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economic organization is not conceptualized as a neoclassical production function which 
transforms inputs into outputs in a streamline. Rather, it is a governance structure that 
conditions behaviors from agents with different preferences, needs, and capabilities and 
trying to solve economic problems of each’s own. Given bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Williamson, 1998, p31), with the objective to develop private orderings 
that resolve conflicts and thus realizes mutual gains, agents interact on three transactional 
attributes that define the property of the “technologically separable interface” 
(Williamson, 1981) - uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency. The exercise of the 
“discriminating alignment hypothesis” (Williamson, 1998, p37) identifies the right 
governance structure that economizes transaction costs, by aligning governance structures 
(for example, market, hybrid, hierarchy) with transactional attributes (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. A transaction cost analytical framework 
 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a multidimensional construct and arises from different sources and 
perspectives. For example, Koopmans (1957) distinguished between primary and 
secondary uncertainty while Milliken (1987) defined a typology of uncertainty 
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dimensions as state, effect, and response uncertainty. Additionally, Sutcliffe and Zaheer 
(1998) tested three sources of uncertainty in a transaction, primary, competitive, and 
supplier uncertainty. Although empirical studies from John and Weitz (1988) and Heide 
and John (1990) found that other types of uncertainty, such as volume, or technological 
uncertainty, have effects on firms’ vertical integration decisions, in the context of a 
transactional relationship, Williamson (1998) contends that the behavioral uncertainty is 
the relevant form, as it is human actors’ behaviors, including how they initiate or respond 
to different types of changes, that impact transaction costs. While bounded rationality 
causes all contracts to be incomplete, opportunism subjects them to hazardous results. 
The effects of these two characteristics may come from all human actors involved in the 
transaction; for example, both suppliers and customers, or even other suppliers and 
customers who are currently not involved but have the potential to influence the 
transaction. Sources of uncertainty are explained by situational ambiguity in the task 
environment and goal conflict among collaborative partners. Derived from the economic 
analysis in the previous chapter, the two dimensions imply root causes of high transaction 
costs. 
 
1) Situational ambiguity:  
Referred to classification schemes of Nelson (1970) and Darby and Karni (1973), 
common food and agribusiness products can be categorized into three types according to 
their search, experience, or credence attributes. While consumers can examine a 
product’s search attributes before purchase or experience attributes after consumption, it 
is impossible for them to discern credence attributes, because they simply do not have the 
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necessary capacity and capability to monitor production processes or to detect properties 
in the product content. Differences between the three product attributes suggest the 
intensity of hidden information, implying the degree of information asymmetry and thus 
potential hazards to which transactions are exposed (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Relationships of product/service attributes and uncertainty 
Characteristics Attribute saliency Hazard potential 
Search High Low 
Experience Medium Medium 
Credence Low High 
 
2) Goal congruence:  
Goal congruence indicates whether consumers and suppliers are like-minded. 
Collaborative partnerships are only feasible when congruent goals lead to equal and 
mutually beneficial agreement. Therefore, a critical question is whether consumers and 
suppliers maximize their joint utility, or pursue their own sub-goals at the expense of the 
other party. Conflicts between the goals of two parties can arise for several reasons (Table 
3). In terms of morality, consumers and suppliers may hold different moral and value 
standards and exhibit Williamson’s (1998) behavioral assumption, opportunism as self-
seeking with guile, pursuing own interests at the expense of other parties. In terms of 
information, information asymmetry may exist and thus cause transaction parties unable 
to acquire necessary information for making correct decisions. In terms of competency, 
suppliers fail to fulfill their promises to consumers, or even worse, are not capable of 
meeting customer requirements. Consumers may not be equipped with the necessary 
knowledge or skills to perceive or process market signals sent by suppliers. In terms of 
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market structure, competitive conditions and market power may also explain conflicts 
between suppliers and consumers. For example, suppliers under an over-crowding market 
may deviate from consumers’ benefits in order to survive cut throat competitions. 
Moreover, suppliers or consumers with market power may exercise their power to 
achieve better trade terms.  
 
Table 3. Causes of goal incongruence 
Aspect \ Party Supplier Consumer 
    Ethics 
Myopia 
Suppliers only concern own goals 
(production, sales, or profit). 
Egocentrics 
Consumers only concern own 
goals (satisfaction). 
    Information 
Information disclosure 
Suppliers remain anonymity in 
key information. 
Information asymmetry 
Consumers do not access full 
product or process information. 
    Competency 
Quality 
Suppliers are not capable of 
fulfilling promises or demand. 
Vulnerability 
Consumers are not capable of 
perceiving or interpreting market 
signals 
    Market 
The Hunger Game 
Overly crowding and overly 
competitive market conditions 
The Power Game 
Power imbalance between 
stakeholders 
 
 
Asset specificity 
The notion of asset is conceptually identical to that of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). 
Transaction specific assets take various forms, for example, economic, cultural, and 
social capital. Traceability supply creates value through conversions of the forms of 
capital. Thus, investment in transaction-specific assets reduces uncertainty through two 
ways.  
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1) Information effects on situational ambiguity:   
Information effects indicate conversions between economic capital and cultural capital. 
Efficient processing of information is an important and related concept in transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1979), because human actors make decisions – assessing 
situations, forming expectations, selecting choices, and evaluating outcomes, based on 
their perceived information, information available to them at the time of decision making 
and their interpretation of the available information. On the one hand, bounded rationality 
constrains human actors’ abilities to receive, store, retrieve, and process data. When they 
encounter complex and uncertain transactional conditions, this limitation causes an effect 
of “information impactedness”. Information sticks to the source and does not transmit 
freely, because information receivers are unable to process it. Moreover, observational 
economics show that “the acquisition of information often involves a set-up cost” 
(Radner, 1970), a fixed cost in nature. This minimum cost threshold represents the costs 
of information search, which is independent of the scale of demand, often causing the 
acquisition of information less economically justifiable and intensifying the problem of 
bounded rationality. Furthermore, it takes efforts and costs to coordinate different human 
actors, a problem Williamson termed as “convergence of expectations”. Especially in a 
highly variable and uncertain environment, in terms of higher levels of bounded 
rationality and opportunism, it may require constant communications and negotiations. 
High coordination costs would make information processing prohibitive. On the other 
hand, bounded rationality can be countered by investing in “unsticking” information (von 
Hippel, 1994), such as expert system or a user-friendly computer database. Although the 
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human nature of bounded rationality still makes all contracts incomplete, the investment 
in information assets enables human actors to be more farsighted, alleviating the degree 
of cognitive limitation. As information is less costly and information processing is more 
convenient, more information is available and increases the probability to detect 
opportunistic behaviors.  
 
2) Social effects on goal congruence:  
Social effects indicate conversions between economic capital and social capital. A 
transaction involving specific assets is referred as an idiosyncratic transaction. In 
idiosyncratic transactions, investment in assets only for certain customers’ usages incurs 
non-marketable expenses and cost-bearing consequences. The degree of asset specificity 
impacts the relationships between transactional parties, specifically, increasing the degree 
of interdependency. Therefore, asset specificity locks both parties in the transaction. On 
the one hand, interdependency breeds potential hazards in the transaction. Bounded 
rationality makes it prohibitive to devise an inclusive contract to cover all possible 
scenarios. Hence, both parties can only agree on general terms of trade first and negotiate 
for contingent adjustments in the future. However, opportunism may urge transactional 
parties to exploit economic surplus from other parties, when there is an opportunity, until 
the perceived marginal net benefits of other parties are reduced to zero. This effect from 
opportunism under conditions of contract incompleteness would result in constant 
bargaining and haggling between transactional parties as they are tied in the transaction 
and cannot walk away, increasing transaction costs. On the other hand, by definition of 
“transaction-specific”, suppliers cannot apply the assets for other purposes. Customers 
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cannot either switch to other suppliers for a favorable deal with products or services in 
the same specifications, because production by using non-specific assets generates higher 
costs. Therefore, when the degree of asset specificity is high, both transactional parties 
may be willing to commit to the continuity of their exchange relationships, decreasing 
transaction costs. From this perspective, specific assets act as “hostages” of transaction 
parties, bringing in credible commitments to support transactions. The efficacy of 
government interventions in correcting market failures therefore lies in the economics to 
transform specific asset investment from threats to commitments of parties under 
transactions. As Williamson (1983) comments, “failure to recognize the economic 
purposes served by hostages has been responsible for repeated policy error”. 
 
Frequency 
The notion of frequency indicates the degree of hazard communication. Traceability 
supply generates relational value through relationship building. Thus, frequency of 
transactions implies two ways to mitigate uncertainty.  
 
1) Information effects on situational ambiguity:  
Information effects correspond to “linking” between collaborative partners. Familiarity 
brings communication economics. When contractual parties transact frequently, more 
interactions can generate learning effects in information processing. Example of this 
include, developing specialized languages and codes, being more efficient in normal 
operation procedures, or reducing the degree of impactedness and coordination costs. 
Further, as the costs of information collection are a fixed cost in nature, allocated unit 
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cost is lower in a recurrent transaction, resulting in transaction specific savings in 
observational economics.  
 
2) Social effects on goal congruence:  
Social effects correspond to “bonding” between collaborative partners. Recurrent 
transactions are a necessary condition for an interdependent contractual relationship. 
Without assurance of continuing transactions, a supplier would not be willing to invest in 
or develop transaction specific assets, unless the expenses can be fully covered by 
customers in limited transactions, not a usual case. Higher frequency of transactions 
brings familiarity to contractual parties at the interfaces in which human actors in charge 
of operations interact with one another more often, and thus can build personal trust in 
relationships. As the level of trust increases, personal integrity may suppress opportunism 
and then reduce the degree of uncertainty. Moreover, recurrent transactions act as infinite 
repeated games in the game theory. Each contractual party is motivated to maintain 
goodwill in hope for future profits, because the probability for opportunistic behaviors to 
be detected is higher in repeated games than that in one-shot games. Therefore, 
opportunism and potential moral hazards are curbed. Contractual parties can form more 
constructive engagements, avoiding suboptimal bargaining and haggling and resulting in 
effective adaptations.  
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
3. Social Traceability 
 
The food and agribusiness industry is a complex system that encompasses interdependent 
actors and numerous inputs, processes, and outputs. As a result, collaborative 
partnerships for strategic food safety inspection consist of interactions of multiple 
identities, for example, different types of food hazards, actors, products, supply chains, 
etc. The complexity of the system would make the identification of hidden food hazards 
economically unjustifiable if traceability needs to be provided solely by the public agency 
or any single agency alone. Nevertheless, the social aspect of transactional attributes 
points out an opportunity to bypass the unsolvable economic trade-off. The hysteresis of 
insufficient traceability supply can be alleviated by a social remedy through voluntary, 
prosocial behaviors.  
 
Recent developments in information and communication technologies have profound 
implications for the traceability problem. The Internet of Things (IOTs) and cloud 
computing exhibit both evolving and converging properties, which could greatly enhance 
connectivity and interoperability of the networked society. The systemic nature of 
traceability opens an opportunity to organize social networks as food safety commons 
and apply Hayek’s concept on the use of knowledge from dispersed and unknown 
sources. As suggested by Shultz and Holbrook (1999, p221), “more feasible strategies 
involve approaches that actually increase group size but with an emphasis on the 
collective pursuit of self-interest”, as “the more globally integrated those systems, the 
greater the probability that consumer vulnerability will decrease” (Shultz and Holbrook, 
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2009, p127). However, technologies can be a double-edged sword to effective 
organizations. On the one hand, ”technological advances will facilitate dissemination of 
information, enhancement of communication, education of all stakeholders, and 
verification” (Shultz and Holbrook, 1999, p224). On the other hand, “complex real-world 
dilemma of global propositions can adversely affect communication, transparency, and 
trust” (Shultz, 2014, p11). More specifically, Farrell and Saloner (1985) point out a 
possibility of the dark side of social networking that “non-binding communication of 
preferences and intentions … exacerbates the problem of asymmetric inertia” (p72) 
which escalates bandwagon effects and results in “excess momentum” or “excess inertia” 
(p81). The paradox poses challenge to the public agency when engaging collaborative 
partners in communicative actions. “There must be economic and cultural solutions, 
including systemic and societal approaches to problem solving”, as suggested by Shultz 
and Holbrook (2009, p126).  
 
Shultz (2014) categorizes diverse actors in commons into two types of stakeholders. Type 
I endogenous stakeholders, who are familiar with the local task environment, possess the 
power of circumstantial knowledge. Type II exogenous stakeholders, who are equipped 
with a broader scope and well-supplied of resources, hold the power of expert 
knowledge. Traceability supply in a self-organized food safety commons thus can be 
described was an agent perspective by the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 2001). 
Personal agency represents the grass-root efforts from Type I stakeholders that generate 
and disseminate field intelligence in the commons. Proxy agency consists of the Type II 
stakeholders who provide direct intelligence generation and supporting activities which 
 109 
 
are not able to be carried out by individual Type I stakeholders, for example, testing 
services from the public agencies and third-party laboratories, information services from 
practitioners, education services from consumer groups, etc. Collaboratively, a collective 
agency of food safety intelligence provides a more encompassing traceability in the food 
system.  
 
The social aspect of traceability also explains in the collective agency the “socially 
coordinative and independent effort” (Bandura, 2001, p1). With respect to the 
coordinative effort, in communicative actions, knowledge is embodied in symbols as 
information and communicated to all stakeholders. Stakeholders share knowledge and 
seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of actions. The 
collaboration consequently determine how situational ambiguity is reduced and whether 
goal congruence is attained. In order to form validity claims, traceability is the necessary 
temporal and spatial mechanism to facilitate objective appraisal, continuing 
communicative actions with reflective means, and meaningful, intelligent actions, 
because it enables stakeholders to communicate past experiences and learn from 
performative outcomes. With respect to the independent effort, traceability is a necessary 
“fact-finding” mechanism (Lewin, 1947, p13) in a complex task environment. Individuals 
play an initiative role to define new decision premises and then encrypt them into 
organizational knowledge. “It was learning by an individual that had consequences for an 
organizational decision … all learning takes place inside individual human heads” 
(Simon, 1991, p125). Therefore, the notion of “self-regulation of motivation and action” 
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(Wood and Bandura, 1989, p366) is an important consideration in the provision of 
traceability.  
 
Based on the above discussion, traceability is a critical factor dealing with situational 
ambiguity and goal congruence. The agentic perspective suggests that, in addition to a 
technical aspect of attributes, the ability to trace and track an identity can be traced and 
tracked from a social aspect of roles. In communicative actions, stakeholders freely 
respond to symbols. In order to recognize the processes of self-identification and self-
verification (Burke and Stets, 1999), it is necessary to discriminate between social 
traceability and technical traceability. Table 4 summarizes the extended definitions of 
traceability.  
 
Table 4. Extended definitions of traceability in the context of communicative actions 
Traceability 
The organizational capability to verify the history, application, 
and location of any entity by means of recorded identifications. 
Technical traceability 
The organizational capability to verify the history, application, 
and location of any entity by means of identified attributes. 
Social traceability 
The organizational capability to verify the history, application, 
and location of any entity by means of identified roles. 
 
Although traceability is initiated by individual stakeholders and realized as an 
organizational capability, the transition between individual and organizational learning is 
not an automatic, spontaneous, and streamlined process. Driven by self-interestedness, it 
won’t be a surprise that agents would fail to perform their due diligence, because of the 
free-riding tendency (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985a). Moreover, agents would exhibit 
selective moral disengagement (Bandura, 2002) and misuse their expert power for self-
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serving purposes. Levitt and March (1988) observe three distinct features of learning as 
an organizational behavior. First, organizations are oriented to targets (Simon, 1955). 
People organize themselves into groups for purposes stated explicitly or implicitly in 
means-ends. Second, organizational actions are history-dependent (Lindblom, 1959). 
Organizational development can be traced by paths-goals. Third, individual behavior 
within an organization is based on routines (Cyert and March, 1963). The routines serve 
as behavioral norms to set the paths. Therefore, Levitt and March (1988, p320) 
conjecture, “organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into 
routines that guide behavior”. Therefore, in the empirical study, we investigate the 
significance of social traceability in the organizational context, how it relates to 
organizational performance, and whether it is supplemental to the conventionally-
defined, technical aspect of traceability.  
 
Hypothesis:  
1. Technical traceability is positively associated with collaborative performance.  
2. Social traceability is positively associated with collaborative performance.  
3. Social traceability is positively associated with technical traceability.  
 
Traceability allows the system to build organizational memory by remembering the trail 
of activities involved in complex social interactions - who, what, where, when, how 
much, and how often. Moreover, the intelligence generated by traceability enables the 
deduction of “why” these activities were happening so as to examine relationships of 
means-ends sequentially, spatially, and in time. Consequently, a more transparent task 
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environment facilitates precise interventions when/if those activities were dysfunctional, 
inefficient, and/or harmful, which otherwise would further intensify the threat from food 
hazards.  
 
4. Empirical Exploration  
 
Measures 
Table 5 summarizes the definitions of measures, and corresponding descriptive statistics 
and category generation. Recall effectiveness is measured by the percentage of 
announced recall quantity which is actually recovered. To conduct a comparative 
analysis, recall ratios are categorized into 3 levels of performance, high, moderate, and 
low. Recall cases are assigned into three cohorts according to levels of performance.  
 
“Social traceability” is measured by stakeholder roles that detected food hazards. The 3 
role identities, consumers, suppliers, and public agencies, signify various scopes of social 
networks, corresponding to Williamson’s notion of governance structure, i.e., market, 
hierarchy, and public bureau, respectively. Voluntary hazard detection by consumers 
indicates high stakeholder involvement and thus a high level of social traceability. 
Suppliers, driven by their profit motive, represent a medium level of social traceability, 
while public agencies, centralized operations with limited participation, imply a low 
level.  
 
“Technical traceability” is measured by the type of food hazards detected. A low level of 
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technical traceability is indicated by physical hazards whose search attributes (Nelson, 
1974) require the least level of asset specificity. A medium level of technical traceability 
in the archive is represented by the procedural hazards, for example, labeling 
discrepancies, misbranding, or HACCP violations, whose “semi-search” attributes are 
created by preset managerial intelligence systems. A high level of technical traceability is 
marked by biological hazards, for example, Salmonella, Listeria, E Coli, and other 
microorganisms or toxins, etc. which are mostly invisible and require investment in 
special technologies to make them “searchable”.  
 
Four contextual factors define the traceability environment. On the supply side, “industry 
type” measures the effect of different industrial practices in the beef, pork, and poultry 
industries. On the demand side, “market scope” measures 3 different scales of 
distribution (national, regional, or local). A larger scale would imply dispersion and 
increase the difficulty for effective recall. In addition, 2 dummy variables measure effects 
of the new information and communication technologies. The use of internet and social 
media for hazard communications would strengthen informational linking and social 
bonding, and thus improve recall performance.  
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Table 5. Definitions, Descriptive Statistics, and Coding 
 
Recall Effectiveness (Y): 
Category Definition Count % Code 
High performance Recall ratio > 75% 76 18.31 1 
Moderate performance Recall ratio < 75% but > 25% 133 32.05 2 
Low performance Recall ratio < 25% 206 49.64 3 
Remarks: recall ratio = actual recovered recall quantity / announced recall quantity  
 
Technical Traceability (X1): 
Category Definition Count % Code 
Low technical 
traceability 
Physical hazards of search 
attributes 
35 8.43 1 
Medium technical 
traceability 
Procedural hazards of semi-search 
attributes 
142 34.22 2 
High technical 
traceability 
Biological hazards of non-
searchable attributes 
238 57.35 3 
 
Social Traceability (X2): 
Category Definition Count % Code 
High social traceability Hazards detected by consumers 60 14.46 1 
Medium social 
traceability 
Hazards detected by suppliers 87 20.96 2 
Low social traceability 
Hazards detected by public 
agencies 
268 64.58 3 
 
Interaction (X3): Interaction term between social traceability and technical traceability  
 
Industry Type (X4): 
Category Definition Count % Code 
Beef industry 
Hazards detected from beef related 
products 
244 58.80 1 
Pork industry 
Hazards detected from pork 
related products 
67 16.14 2 
Poultry industry 
Hazards detected from poultry 
related products 
104 25.06 3 
 
Market Scope (X5): 
Category Definition Count % Code 
National market 
Product distribution to more than 
10 states 
120 28.92 1 
Regional market 
Product distribution between 1 and 
10 states 
153 36.87 2 
Local market Product distribution within 1 state 142 34.22 3 
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Table 5. Definitions, Descriptive Statistics, and Coding (continued) 
 
Social Media (X6):  
Category Definition Count % Code 
Not available 
Do not use Twitter for 
communication 
238 57.35 0 
Available Use Twitter for communication 177 42.65 1 
 
Webpage (X7):  
Category Definition Count % Code 
Not available 
Do not use “Ask Karen” for 
communication 
51 12.29 0 
Available 
Use “Ask Karen” for 
communication 
364 87.71 1 
 
Model 
Multinomial logistic regression is applied to model the 3-category response variable of 
recall effectiveness. Cohort dynamics are explored by two types of models. First, a 
generalized logit model compares performance outcomes between cohorts, as the 
response variable is regarded as nominal, specified as follows, with j = 1 or 2; i = 1,…, 7.   
log (πj / π3) = αj + βijXij 
The model consists of 2 equations. Because the baseline category is set as the cohort with 
low recall effectiveness (J), the first equation compares the odds of the high performance 
cohort (j=1) vs. the odds of the low performance cohort (J), and the second equation does 
the odds of the medium performance cohort (j=2) vs. the odds of the low performance 
cohort (J). The log of odds (π) of the response variable (Y) is modeled as a linear 
combination of the predictor variables (X1 to X7).  
 
Second, in a cumulative logit model, a cumulative probability, P(Y ≤ j), represents that Y 
falls at or below a particular point of j. Since j = 3, P(Y ≤ 1) = π1; P(Y ≤ 2) = π1 + π2; P(Y 
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≤ 3) = π1 + π2 + π3. The cumulative probabilities reflect the ordering as P(Y ≤ 1) ≤ P(Y ≤ 
2) ≤ P(Y ≤ 3) = 1. P(Y ≤ 3) is not utilized for modeling, because it equals to 1. Thus, the 
model has two functions, specified as follows, with j = 1, 2, or 3; i = 1,…, 7.  
Logit [P(Y ≤ j)] = αj + βiXi 
When j = 1, the logit of the cumulative probabilities is expressed as:   
Logit [P(Y ≤ 1)] = log {P(Y ≤ 1) / [1- P(Y ≤ 1)]} = log [π1 / (π2 + π3)] 
When j = 2, the logit of the cumulative probabilities is expressed as:   
Logit [P(Y ≤ 2)] = log {P(Y ≤ 2) / [1- P(Y ≤ 2)]} = log [(π1 + π2) / π3)] 
The cumulative logit model allows the two functions to differ in their intercepts, while 
restricting and assuming the predictor coefficients to be the same. The score test for 
proportional odds evaluates true or false the null hypothesis that this proportional odds 
assumption is valid. With a p-value greater than 0.1, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
 
By utilizing information from the ordering of response categories, the model is equipped 
with the proportional odds property that the same parameter estimate (β) applies for each 
cumulative probability, invariant to the choice of response categories. In other words, the 
effect of a predictor Xi is regarded as identical for the (J-1) cumulative logits. When the 
model fits, it has advantages of simpler interpretations and potentially greater power 
(Agresti, 1996, p180). Further, the proportional structure of the model can be used to 
explore an underlying continuous variable, if the relationship between the assumed 
variable and predictors are plausible (Agresti, 1996, p188). In the present context, the 
latent variable refers to transaction costs of traceability.   
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Results 
Table 6 summarizes the model results. The likelihood ratio test on the global null 
hypothesis shows no evidence of lack of fit in both models. P-values, 0.1247 for the 
baseline-category logit model and 0.1881 for the cumulative logit model, are greater than 
0.05, the chosen level of statistical significance. Moreover, a score test of the 
proportional odds assumption has a p-value 0.1205 greater than 0.1. It is valid to argue 
that the cumulative logit model exhibits the proportional odds property.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
1
1
8
 
Table 6. Summary of Model Results 
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Statistically, contextual factors in both models are not significantly associated with recall 
effectiveness. Although counterintuitive, the results are consistent with research in 
closed-loop supply chain management that distinct operational patterns exist between 
forward and reverse information flows (Tibbon-Lembke and Rogers, 2002). Because 
food recall involves reverse logistics, directly applying measures of forward supply 
chains does not explain changes in recall performance. However, the insignificance of 
social media and webpage, both of which are related to communication, would suggest a 
need for more sensitive measures other than dummy variables.  
 
In the cumulative logit model, technical traceability, with a p-value 0.0079, is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. Since the coefficient refers to the difference in the log of 
odds, a positive value, 1.1667, indicates higher performance improvement with the 
increase of technical traceability. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported. Social 
traceability, with a p-value 0.0467, is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The 
positive coefficient value, 0.8940, also indicates a positive association between social 
traceability and performance improvement. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is also supported. 
The interaction term, with a p-value 0.0098, is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 7 displays the log odds when technical traceability interacts with three different 
levels of social traceability. The positive correlation between coefficients of technical 
traceability and the levels of social traceability suggests hypothesis 3 is supported.  
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Table 7. How social traceability impacts technical traceability, cumulative logit model   
 
Low social 
traceability (X2=3) 
Medium social 
traceability (X2=2) 
High social 
traceability (X2=1) 
Technical traceability 
(X1, Base = 1.1667) 
-0.2826 0.2005 0.6836 
 
However, in Table 8, the positive correlation does not hold vice versa. Social traceability 
is negatively associated with the change of technical traceability. Counterintuitively, 
higher social traceability, when interacting with technical traceability, would not 
contribute to better performance improvement. Therefore, managing traceability requires 
an integrative strategy.  
 
Table 8. How technical traceability impacts social traceability, cumulative logit model   
 
Low technical 
traceability (X1=1) 
Medium technical 
traceability (X1=2) 
High technical 
traceability (X1=3) 
Social traceability 
(X2, Base = 0.8940) 
0.4109 -0.0722 -0.5553 
 
The baseline-category logit model further examines the dynamic relationships between 
social and technical traceability from the “path” of performance improvement. Table 9, 
corresponding to the table 7, indicates that technical traceability, with the coefficient 
1.0229, contributes slightly less to moderate performance improvement, while the result, 
with the level of significance 0.1, is not strongly significant. Social traceability is still a 
positive supplement to the technical solution.  
 
Table 9. How social traceability impacts technical traceability, Baseline-category logit 
model 
 
Low social 
traceability (X2=3) 
Medium social 
traceability (X2=2) 
High social 
traceability (X2=1) 
Technical traceability 
(X1, Base = 1.0229) 
-0.7567 -0.1635 0.4297 
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Table 10, compared to the table 8, shows that social traceability, with the coefficient 
1.2675, has stronger impact to moderate performance improvement, while technical 
competence, indicated by levels of technical traceability, still sets up hurdles for social 
involvement.  
 
Table 10. How technical traceability impacts social traceability, Baseline-category logit 
model  
 
Low technical 
traceability (X1=1) 
Medium technical 
traceability (X1=2) 
High technical 
traceability (X1=3) 
Social traceability 
(X2, Base = 1.2675) 
0.6743 0.0811 -0.5121 
 
While significantly associated with moderate performance improvement, social 
traceability does not lead to high performance improvement. Moreover, social traceability 
of moderate performance more frequently involves suppliers and public agencies, and 
thus incurs higher transaction costs. Technical traceability is a significant factor in both 
performance categories, and, especially, a sole determinant to high performance 
improvement. Thus, the application of social remedy would be contingent, but rather the 
more the better. While high technical competence is directly associated with high-
performance cohort, relatively lower but more “popular” technologies are associated with 
moderate performance cohort that promotes low-cost social traceability and enables low 
performance cohort to “take-off”.  
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5. Policy Implications 
 
According to the results, on the path from low to high performance, the public agency has 
a leadership role to guide the system and to empower collaborative partners. Table 11 
proposes a typology of an intelligence cohort for efficacious public interventions. 
Contingencies in the food safety commons are characterized by two performance drivers 
– social traceability and technical traceability. The integrative framework corresponds to 
the concept of governance in transaction cost economics that efficient governance 
structures vary depending on environments in which transactions are embedded. Through 
proper alignment between transactional contexts and organizational mechanisms of 
control and coordination – specifically, social and informational underpinnings (Ouchi, 
1979), public agencies can alleviate or remove obstacles on market incentives and 
promote traceability.  
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Table 11. Intelligence cohort: alternative governance structures for traceability 
management 
 
               Technical Traceability 
High Low 
Social 
Traceability 
High 
 
Scenario 1 
Spontaneous Order 
 
Remedy: Self correcting 
Measure: Price 
Function: Sense-articulating 
 
Scenario 3 
Organizational Socialization 
 
Remedy: Social 
Measure: Outcome 
Function: Sense-giving 
Low 
Scenario 2 
Organizational Symbolism 
 
Remedy: Informational 
Measure: Process 
Function: Sense-reading 
Scenario 4 
Organizational Learning 
 
Remedy: Social informational 
Measure: Identity 
Function: Sense-making 
 
Scenario 1 characterizes a situation of high technical traceability and high social 
traceability. Stakeholders are able to not only verify task environment through search 
attributes but also reach converged expectations. Under these conditions, price 
mechanisms can function well and the market is the most efficient governance structure. 
Public intervention is not required, wasteful, and would disturb the spontaneous market 
order.  
 
Scenario 2 describes a situation of high technical traceability with low social traceability. 
The high level of technical traceability implies that stakeholders are able to acquire 
sufficient scientific information for their decision making. Ceteris paribus, it would not 
be difficult to verify transactions through search attributes. However, evaluating 
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experience (Nelson, 1974) or credence attributes (Darby and Karni, 1973) would face 
artificial obstacles due to opportunism, self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 
1998). Thus, traceability activities should leverage technical capabilities and develop 
feasible process measures. Polanyi (1967) suggested that these measures, whether they 
are accurate or not, serve as “subsidiary”, i.e., the “pointing finger”, which facilitates 
sense-reading in ambiguous situations. Effective public agency can improve social 
traceability through qualification by providing protocols and incentives that facilitate 
organizational symbolism (Dandridge, Mitroff, and Joyce, 1980) and symbolic 
interactions (Estes and Edmonds, 1981).  
 
Scenario 3 indicates situations with high social traceability but low technical traceability. 
Interestingly, although stakeholders have similar goals, high uncertainty and costs of 
search in the environment hinders mutual understanding. In this case, an informational 
remedy is the focus. High technical uncertainty implies that extensive monitoring 
processes can be costly. High social traceability implies outcome measures, which are 
generally more efficient than process measures, can be effectively enforced. Effective 
public strategy should leverage social capabilities for remedies – socialization tactics 
(Ashforth, Sluss, Saks, 2007) that emphasizes on sense-giving (Polanyi, 1967) and 
induces behavioral changes – for example, defining rules, standards, and regulations, 
promoting training and education, etc.  
 
Scenario 4 is characterized by both low technical traceability and low social traceability. 
The complex situation requires sense-making (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2005) 
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before the implementation of any effective strategy. Developing public strategies would 
need to “engineer” choices under ambiguity and bounded rationality (March, 1978). 
Public agencies would collaborate with competent and trustworthy partners, for example, 
recruiting private contractors or appointing “channel captains”. Utilizing social cues and 
tapping into social informational processing would create salient and unique identities 
(cf. the notion of competitive cohort in Flint and Van Fleet, 2011) and an identifiable task 
environment (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985a).   
 
Empirical findings suggest a synergistic or “plural” strategy that involves both the social 
and informational approach, when a rational economic order is developed from chaos 
(scenario 4) to equilibrium (scenario 1). In commitment and trust theory, Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) also point out two paths that lead to cooperative outcomes. First, relationship 
benefits and termination costs, mediated by relationship commitment, are positively 
associated with cooperation and relational stability. As an alternative path, 
communication and restraint on opportunistic behaviors, mediated by trust, effectuate 
cooperation, constructive conflicts, and transparency. While sending a message of 
cooperative intent can be achieved by either way of commitment or trust, without 
commitment, communication remain to be “cheap talk” (Farrell and Rabin, 1996); 
without trust, credible commitment requires costly “hostage” (Williamson, 1983). 
Nevertheless, trust, cultivated through validity claims in communicative actions, could 
transform relationship commitment from costly economic capital to less expensive social 
capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and achieve an economic order which is both rational and 
efficient (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Commitment, trust, and cooperation 
 
 
In the real world, the 4 scenarios in the conceptualized intelligence cohort are often 
interrelated in a loosely coupled structure – clear-cut boundaries may not exist between 
scenarios and multiple scenarios would be present simultaneously. According to 
Habermas (1984, p95), building trust in such complex situations requires a “cocktail 
therapy”: teleological actions which serve as an objective base of proposition (scenario 
1), normative actions which anchor and instill cultural value (scenario 2), dramaturgical 
actions which allow self-expression of subjective experiences (scenario 3), and 
communicative actions which encourage dialogues and admit of consensus (scenario 4). 
As previously indicated, fundamental to these efforts is the establishment of the 
traceability environment, which, nevertheless, is not arbitrary but evolutionary. 
Therefore, the concept of intelligence cohort needs to be more fully explained and 
analyzed.  
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Chapter 6 
Intelligence Cohort 
 
1. Validity Evaluation 
 
Information and communication technologies open avenues to leverage connective and 
interactive social networks for a prosocial approach to food safety management. A pilot 
study shows that social networking can be a strategy for improving hazard 
communication (Wang, Van Fleet, and Van Fleet, 2014). Individuals in a market could 
function as emergent leaders, known as social media influencers (SMIs) (Freberg, 
Graham, McGaughey, and Freberg, 2011), and, through communication, exercise 
informational social influence for the public good. However, the opportunities bring forth 
both blessings and curses. Spreading the word about negative events through social 
media alone would not solve, and would intensify, the problem, because social media 
users may create noise in the system (Gorry and Westbrook, 2009) and their credibility 
sometimes questioned due to distortions or misinformation (Wright and Hinson, 2012; 
Carlson and Peake, 2013).  
 
The dark side of social networking can be explained by a psychological phenomenon, 
named, framing effects. According to the prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992), framing effects occur when decision makers, under uncertainty, alter their 
preferences in processing different, but logically equivalent, information cues. Such 
effects show evidence of decision biases, which suggest citizen incompetence 
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(Druckman, 2001b), casting doubt on the democratic basis of the envisioned 
collaborative partnerships (FSWG). Whereas, Druckman (2001a) argues the framing 
effects in the literature are overstated. In real-world settings, social context provides other 
references for non-rational minds to follow collective rational choices. Specifically, 
deploying issue frames counterbalances the negative impacts of equivalency frames 
(Druckman, 2004). Nevertheless, issue framing is not without any concerns. Social 
frames and social traps are two sides of the same coin. Phenomena such as the commons 
dilemma (Shultz and Holbrook, 1998) and free-riding tendency (Albanese and Van Fleet, 
1985a) indicate that collective rational choices would not lead to long-term, sustainable 
prosocial outcomes. Paradoxically, social networks as social frames could both reduce 
and contribute to the complexity.  
 
In the theory of communicative action, coordinating diverse collaborative partners is 
implemented through symbolic interactions. In the communicative processes to reach a 
negotiated agreement, opinion leaders propose claims which are open for objective 
appraisal in order to invite followers to take rationally motivated stances. Whether a 
validity claim in the form of symbolic expression can lead to a motivated agreement and 
a joint action depends on self-verification (Burke and Stets, 1999) – how the validity 
claim is evaluated against the conditions of its validity, i.e., “background knowledge 
inter-subjectively shared by a communicative community of all participants”. In this 
regard, stakeholders of food safety commons use social information to validate claims of 
safety. In doing so, they seek out others who are using the same or similar information. 
As a result, food safety commons evolve as collaborative relationships develop.  
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While collaborating with stakeholders would be expected to have positive results as has 
the empowerment of employees in public sector organizations (Fernandez and 
Moldogaziev, 2011), organizing the food safety commons requires more than laissez-
faire. Food safety is a public good and food recalls deal with crisis situations. Self-
organization and communicative actions would not automatically lead to desired public 
interest. Based on the economic analysis in Chapter 4, Figure 1 indicates that valid and 
rational decisions would result in three different kinds of behavioral outcomes, i.e., 
prosocial, selfish, and free-riding, due to goal incongruence, which corresponds to B, and 
situational ambiguity, which is indicated by βM(x, e) - c(x). Therefore, coordination by 
the public agency is still necessary to maintain the integrity of the food system even with 
additional intelligence from consumers and suppliers.  
 
Figure 1. Different rationally motivated positions in communicative actions  
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In the stakeholder negotiated and compliance model, Shultz and Holbrook (1999) posit 
that verification emanated from communicative interactions among all stakeholders 
should be integral to commons management. Specifically, a multistep verification schema 
is built in the system to validate “a step-series of agreed-on, incremental, and measurable 
results at specific periods, while the process is moving toward the final, ideal outcome” 
(Shultz and Holbrook, 1999, p224). Three considerations are especially important when 
designing such an expansive element for integrative commons management.  
 
1) Situation awareness:  
A monitoring function informs and alerts stakeholders to the unfolding processes that 
result from the negotiated agreement.  
 
2) Non-regulatory supplements:  
Participating parties must look “outside the box”, beyond the opinions of centrally 
located set of principal stakeholders, to resolve their commons dilemma.  
 
3) Systemic approach:  
A broader and integrative approach determines the extent to which the negotiated 
agreement affects multiple commons.  
 
Shultz and Holbrook (1999, p225) call for empirical investigations on “systemic factors 
and integrative forces relevant to administrating the integrative effects”. In the food 
safety commons, operational requirements of both collaboration and coordination for 
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cooperation suggest plural governance to regulate activities of contrast natures. With 
stakeholders of diverse knowledge, motivational backgrounds, and evolving needs, 
effective leadership from the public agency requires the design of a platform to manage 
information processing and to engage different types of interactions so as to induce social 
influence while preserving prosocial ethos in collaborative partnerships. This chapter 
introduces the concept of intelligence cohort, tests it in the context of food recall, and 
examines its efficacy for managing the dynamic processes of validity evaluation.     
 
2. Intelligence Cohort 
 
An intelligence cohort is a managerial tool to collect and transform diverse traces of 
information in the system so as to generate useful intelligence and benchmark 
organizational performance. Derived from the notion of competitive cohort (Flint and 
Van Fleet, 2011, p105), intelligence cohort is defined as the set of identities that define 
and exemplify the relevant standards against which subsequent performance should be 
measured and compared. Compared with the notion of benchmarking (Watson, 1993), 
intelligence cohort goes beyond the conventional way of identifying fixed and formalized 
performance standards. Compared with the notion of competitive cohort, intelligence 
cohort considers not only salient but also non-salient entities. Moreover, the sources of 
behavioral influence consists of both social and technical aspects – not limited to the 
social dimension of referent others but including the technical dimension of scientific 
references. Therefore, it is a more encompassing approach to implement traceability 
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strategies, by providing a schematization on complex task environments and organizing 
diverse technical and social identities into a subgroup formation.  
 
To empirically test the concept, a general framework encompasses the “path-goal, 
multiple linkage model of organizational leadership” (Van Fleet and Yukl, 1986), which 
addresses situational effects on leadership performance, and transaction cost economics. 
As diverse stakeholders are self-organized into a food safety community, group dynamics 
function as the “intervening variables”, on the one hand, receiving negative impacts from 
contingencies such as food hazards, and on the other hand, influencing organizational 
effectiveness. In food recalls, consumers and suppliers act as emergent leaders to detect 
and correct food hazards in the market. An intelligence cohort functions as a “situational 
filter” (Dunnette, 1963, p318) and structures the complex linkages between multiple 
stakeholders and collaborative community performance. As shown in Figure 2, the public 
agency takes a role of a servant leader, by constructing an intelligence cohort, to cultivate 
a food safety commons that encourages constructive engagement, mutual support, and 
resource sharing among consumers and suppliers, as well as monitoring symbolic 
interactions in the commons so as to identify vulnerable situations when they emerge and 
take timely actions to neutralize them.  
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Figure 2 Intelligence cohort safeguards food safety commons 
 
 
Traceability is the “eyes” of an organization, crucial to the quality of decision making in 
collaborative but complex task conditions. Figure 3 illustrates how traceability as an 
organizational learning mechanism determines collaborative performance. Dispersed 
intelligence in the system is first consolidated into collective rationality. The two streams 
of social forces then are molded into interactive structure. The solidified social energies 
further set the course of organizational performance. The linkage between the formation 
of collective rationality and the density of interactive structure, and its performance 
implications, presents a strategic concern (referring to the concept of strategic choice in 
Child, 1972). In the food safety commons, symbolic interactions form the structure of the 
hazard communication, which consists of two dimensions. The technical dimension 
characterizes the generation of hazard intelligence and various information cues for 
coordinating purposes. The social dimension describes the responsiveness of stakeholders 
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to these information cues. While information could be actively “fed”, due to bounded 
rationality and selective attention, stakeholders in general only respond voluntarily to 
salient information cues in proximity, i.e., social information. Therefore, in order to 
effectively coordinate stakeholder behaviors, public agency needs to manage public 
attention by monitoring both the technical and social structure of hazard communication. 
This approach offers the public agency an opportunity to shape the structure of hazard 
communication and coordinate “smart” operations that in the food safety community 
diverse interests from multiple stakeholders are acknowledged while the integrity of the 
system is preserved.  
 
Figure 3. Traceability, Intelligence Cohort, and Platform Structure 
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To examine how an intelligence cohort works – strategic choices on traceability 
orientations, dynamic structural characteristics, and performance implications, a 
comparative analysis is conducted in the context of food recalls of meat and poultry 
products. Because of its public and voluntary nature, recalls of meat or poultry products 
are assisted by a “deputy”, specifically, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), 
USDA, to coordinate discretionary actions from various parties in the market and to 
ensure that public interests are safeguarded. Within the public agency, a recall committee 
is formed to coordinate cross functional, regional, and departmental operations. Two key 
coordinators in the teamwork, Recall Management Staff (RMS) and District Recall 
Officer (DRO) serve as “linking pins” (Likert and Likert, 1976, p184) which organize 
public and private stakeholders into an interaction-influence network and adapt the 
functional deployment of public operations to flexible task requirements in collaboration. 
Food recall operations oftentimes involve difficult decisions in crisis situations – with 
insufficient information and incomplete knowledge, while under relentless pressures from 
time-perishable resources, for example, escalating hazard impacts, deteriorating public 
health conditions, and unstable public sentiments. In such task environments, judgmental 
calls are contingent on intelligence available at the point of decision making. In this 
regard, deploying an intelligence cohort would provide invaluable guidance in the 
learning-by-doing processes and facilitate timely and quality decision making.  
 
In managerial practices, developing the self-organized processes is accomplished through 
delegation, which involves three key activities: evaluating task competency, assigning 
responsibility, and maintaining accountability (Van Fleet, Van Fleet, and Seperich, 2014). 
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An intelligence cohort addresses these considerations by integrating three fundamental 
strategies to structure complexity: identifiability, uniqueness, and the use of additive 
tasks. Further, the three strategies are linked to performance outcomes to create a 
temporal sense of urgency. Table 1 summarizes traceability strategies under alternative 
technical and social task conditions. In Scenario 1, traceability will be fully provided as 
private goods by the market mechanism. In Scenario 2, task identifiability intends to 
evaluate individual performance, making individual’s output identifiable and creating a 
task environment in which means-ends relationships are clarified. However, the push-
based strategy of validation is only efficacious given the availability of technical 
measurements. In Scenario 3, for non-identifiable situations, task uniqueness, a pull-
based social strategy, resorts to self-selection and intrinsic motivation from stakeholders 
by providing special incentives of recognition to promote self-identification. Experiments 
show that feeling worthwhile and facing challenging tasks would encourage individuals 
to exert a higher level of contribution in a public task (Harkins and Petty, 1982). In the 
worst case, Scenario 4, when a task is not identifiable and stakeholders are not motivated, 
building a “firewall” is an inevitable compromise to prevent potential damage and 
contain the loss within the “black box”, before a feasible remedy comes to light. Additive 
tasks, for which total organizational performance is the sum of individual sub-group 
contributions, modularize the task environment and enhance operational agility. The 
creation of an additive task structure thus enables resource sharing and social influence 
and facilitates the capability of contingency planning and effective responses.  
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Table 1. Additive task structure for traceability  
 
              Technical dimension 
Traceable Non-traceable 
Social 
dimension 
Traceable 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Market mechanism 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Task uniqueness 
Pull-based social strategy 
Non-
traceable 
Scenario 2 
 
Task identifiability 
Push-based technical strategy 
Scenario 4 
 
“Black box” 
Competitive mechanism 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
Since 1994, the FSIS has systematically documented its recall operations and the results 
of documentation were stored in the Recall Case Archive. As the data were recorded in a 
consistent, routine manner, the database offers an ideal opportunity to apply the grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Table 2 lists the 7 variables encoded for the purpose of 
category generation. Recall effectiveness quantitatively and objectively measures the 
performance of collaborative food recall efforts – the percentage of intended recall items 
were actually retrieved from the market. Food hazards would require special technologies 
to reveal their presence, thus requiring different levels of technical traceability needs. 
Besides the technical dimension, multiple stakeholders collaborate in food recalls, 
creating the needs for social traceability as an alternative type of identification. 
Additional information is available in the Archive and might be useful. On the supply 
 138 
 
side, food recall characteristics might be categorized according to the types of industries, 
for example, beef, pork, and poultry. On the demand side, recall performance might be 
impacted by the extent of distribution, for example, national, regional, and local markets. 
The use of Internet-based communicative platform, for example, AskKaren.gov, would 
promote the access and the use of intelligence in the system. After the encoded 
qualitative data are organized into three cohorts according to different levels of 
performance outcomes, categorical data analysis is applied for the purposes of 
discovering hidden information and useful intelligence and for improving recall 
performance. 
  
 
1
3
9
 
Table 2. List of encoded variables  
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Table 3 summarizes the analytical model settings and results. The 3 models are 
structurally varied to examine the effects of different organizational strategies, while 
sharing the same 7 variables listed in the Table 2. Cohort performance is compared and 
evaluated by two levels of performance improvement - the "high vs. low" group indicates 
high performance improvement, while the "medium vs. low" group indicates moderate 
performance improvement. Changes in recall effectiveness, the dependent variable, is 
explained by technical traceability, social traceability, industry types, market scopes, the 
use of Internet-based platform. In addition to the 5 performance drivers, a structural 
parameter is included to detect whether significant structural changes were present in the 
food system. The likelihood ratio 0.3882 indicates an overall fit of the three models. In 
general, both industry types and market scopes do not significantly explain cohort 
performance. As Guide, Harrison, and Van Wassenhove (2003) argue, factors of regular 
forward supply chains would not predict behaviors in reverse supply chains. The use of 
Internet-based communicative platform is insignificant. Although in theory 
communication is antecedent to trust, which further leads to higher commitment and 
lower uncertainty (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), a dummy variable may not be sensitive 
enough to capture this effect in the data. Lastly, no significant structural change is 
observed in the recall environment. Therefore, it is not a concern in the model validity.  
 
In Model 1, the base model, a laissez-faire setting allows full interactions in an 
unstructured task environment. Regarding high performance improvement, technical 
traceability does not present a statistically significant effect to the performance 
differential. With the logit 0.8937, a high degree of social traceability is associated with 
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the improvement of cohort performance. The interaction term between technical and 
social traceability is not significant. As for moderate performance improvement, both 
technical and social traceability significantly and positively contribute to cohort 
performance. The logit values of 0.8328, and 0.9772, respectively, indicate a low degree 
of technical traceability supply and a high degree of social traceability are associated with 
better cohort performance, while social traceability is a more powerful performance 
driver to than technical traceability. However, after considering the negative interaction 
term between high social traceability and low technical traceability, the strategies are not 
so promising. The negative logit value of the interaction term -1.1976 suggests not every 
interaction is “beneficial”. Indeed, discretion and participation without sufficient 
competency and a shared value would backfire, as mentioned in Harkins and Petty (1982, 
p1227) and Albanese and Van Fleet (1985a, p248). Interactions, when conflicting, would 
decrease the efficacy of the strategies. Therefore, task structure matters.  
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2
 
Table 3. Comparison of 3 models  
 
 143 
 
In Models 2 and 3, a nested arrangement between the technical traceability and social 
traceability represents the use of additive task structures that facilitate orderly 
organizational changes. Interestingly, statistical evidences show that strategies under 
additive task structures have the potential to attain higher performance. On the one hand, 
in the technical-oriented Model 2, technical traceability is regarded as the strategic 
priority. Given the supply of a low level of technical traceability, a high level of social 
traceability does not provide significant conclusions in both high and medium cohort 
performance changes. Whereas, given a high level of technical traceability, a high level 
of social traceability becomes a significant performance driver in both cohort settings. 
Therefore, visibility in the task environment is a prerequisite to delegation, participation, 
and high collaborative performance. On the other hand, the social-oriented model 3 
represents an alternative logic. Social traceability is prioritized as the umbrella strategy, 
under which technical traceability is implemented. Given a high level of social 
traceability, a low level of technical traceability has a negative impact, with the logit -
0.8126, on high performance improvement. The result reinforces the previous finding and 
argues for the importance of technical traceability and visibility. Given a low level of 
social traceability, a low level of technical traceability is associated with moderate 
performance improvement. Centralized operations controlled by the public agency would 
be more effective in a less visible task environment, although the performance 
improvement would be only moderate at best.   
 
In Table 4, logit transformation of model results reveals strategic implications. In the 
cohort of high improvement, comparing the two strategic orientations in Situation 1 and 
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Situation 3, both technical and social approaches could lead to high performance, while 
social orientation would achieve better performance outcomes. The two strategic 
orientations are complementary. 49.16% of the high performance cases are associated 
with a high level of technical traceability given a high level of social traceability. If the 
technical traceability is decreased to the low level, only 21.81% of the cases attained high 
performance. Thus, enhancing technical traceability would increase the efficacy of social 
traceability. Vice versa, 41.67% of the high performance cases are related to a high level 
of social traceability given a high level of technical traceability. If social traceability is 
decreased to the low level, the strategic mix only accounts for 17.04% of the high 
performance cases. Technical traceability becomes more effective with a higher level of 
social traceability. However, the complementary relationship is not fully supported in the 
cohort of moderate improvement. Statistically significant results only occur in Situation 1 
and Situation 4. Potentially conflicting interpretations bring forth further inquiries.  
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Table 4. Probability transformation of model results  
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First, regarding social orientation, focusing on the social orientation in Situation 3 and 
Situation 4, significant results were observed at both high and low levels of social 
traceability. However, the high level of social traceability is associated with high 
performance improvement, while the low level of social traceability is only significant at 
the moderate performance improvement. Hence, improving social traceability increases 
cohort performance, which suggests the value of socialization and social learning. Given 
high social traceability, technical traceability is positively correlated with the density of 
the cases. Given low social traceability, the strategic effect is the opposite. Thus, 
effective technical traceability strategies are contingent on the social structure of the 
organization. Based on the statistical evidence derived from the current dataset, the low 
rate of recall effectiveness, 8.29%, indicates that resorting to a command-and-control 
strategy, by combining low social traceability, which connotes centralized control, and 
high technical traceability, which connotes high investment in traceability technologies, 
does not lead to a satisfactory performance outcome.  
 
Second, regarding technical orientation, focusing on the technical orientation in Situation 
1 and Situation 2, significant results were only observed at the high level of technical 
traceability. Probability differentials between the two performance levels (41.67% vs. 
22.02%; 17.04% vs. 8.29%) indicate the complementary effect of the social traceability. 
Moreover, technical learning may be required in order to fully utilize the enhanced 
technical traceability. In other words, a learning curve should be a consideration when 
investing in traceability technologies.  
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Lastly, regarding the role of the public agency, Situation 4 in the cohort of moderate 
performance improvement indicates the role of the public agency. Centralized public 
operations are not the best solution according to the model results. Nevertheless, before 
stakeholders are motivated and technical traceability is sufficiently supplied, a leading 
role of the public agency is still necessary to safeguard the system, although the 19.05% 
of the cases at the medium performance level is far from ideal. The presence of both 
social and technical learning effects would suggest processes of delegation and learning 
toward high performance, a path conceptually similar to Likert’s management systems 1 
to 4 (Likert, 1967). It will be more appropriate for the public agency to function as an 
emergent or servant leader, with the mindset to promote, facilitate, and support market-
based solutions.  
 
In sum, the empirical testing confirms that both technical traceability and social 
traceability are feasible strategies. From a managerial perspective, three guidelines are 
suggested in constructing an intelligence cohort.  
1. Social significance: taking high social traceability as an orientation, supported by 
high technical traceability, results in the highest performance improvement.  
2. Cocktail therapy: Performance improvement can be attained through integrating 
high social traceability and high technical traceability. 
3. Servant leadership: the public agency should exercise limited authority and 
perform a supporting role to promote social and technical traceability in the 
system.  
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Table 5 identifies the deficiencies of the system and presents “learning opportunities” 
through a survey on the FSIS Recall Case Archive. By using the same variables and 
coding categories in the empirical model, performance implications of a public-private 
partnership are analyzed based on two task roles and their densities of contribution. 
Currently, the public agency plays a major role in generating food hazard intelligence. 
Overall, the public sector accounts for 1.85 times more recall cases than does the private 
sector (65.48% vs. 35.42%). The ratios are more imbalanced in specific contexts, when 
recall cases involve biological hazards (2.90 times; 74.37% vs. 25.63%), the beef 
industry (2.59 times; 72.13% vs. 27.82%), and local markets (2.94 times; 74.65% vs. 
25.35%). Comparing the cases of biological hazards and non-biological hazards, the large 
difference in private participation (25.63% vs. 48.59%) suggests the need to create visible 
and searchable tools to facilitate stakeholders with less sufficient competence, 
“transforming experience and credence attributes into search attributes” (Caswell and 
Mojduszka, 1996, p1251). Regarding the industry, private participation is relative 
balanced in the poultry industry (40.38%) and even greater in the pork industry (55.22%), 
compared to that in the beef industry (27.87%). The situation calls for more effective 
strategies to improve responsibility and accountability in the beef industry. Regarding the 
market scope, private participation decreases dramatically in smaller markets (at the 
national level, 54.17%, regional, 30.07%, and local, 25.35%). The counterintuitive result 
may indicate needs to improve the capabilities of small, local suppliers. In addition, 
social media would offer new opportunities to implement a pull-based strategy that 
organize and mobilize local consumers and supplier from the grass roots. 
  
1
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Table 5. Exploring opportunities for performance improvement  
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4. Discussion 
 
Identity Visibility 
A food safety commons accommodates dispersed sources of intelligence, and an 
intelligence cohort creates an additive task structure to organize diverse intelligence 
generating processes. While in an intelligence cohort traceability is the key to self-
organization and collaborative performance improvement, the saliency of identities is 
mutually determined by both technical and social information processing. In this regard, 
it is not simply a grass-roots movement lacking of a strategic focus, nor solely a 
deliberate strategic plan subject to the “pitfalls of strategic planning” (Mintzberg, 1994). 
Rather, it represents “deliberately emergent” or the “process strategy” that “management 
controls the process of strategy formation – concerning itself with the design of the 
structure, its staffing, procedures, and so on – while leaving the actual content to others” 
(Mintzberg, 1987, p71). Therefore, it is a practical policy tool for managing delegation 
and decentralized control in crisis situations.  
 
A food safety commons involves heterogeneous stakeholders with different knowledge, 
competence, and motivation in food safety management. Therefore, effective strategic 
food safety management needs to consider multiple perspectives regarding determinants 
of organizational performance (Table 6). As Flint and Van Fleet (2011, p113) point out, 
“governmental efforts to provide incubating environments for businesses might be 
influenced by how the targeted companies’ managers and/or entrepreneurial owners 
select a competitive cohort. Performance outcomes in such a situation might be 
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significantly affected by the competitive cohort effect regardless of the characteristics of 
the incubating environment provided to firms”. Essentially, an intelligence cohort can be 
viewed as a simulator for “crafting strategy” (Mintzberg, 1987), i.e., bridging two 
seemingly opposite decision making processes (deliberate and grass-roots), facilitating 
organizational learning (technical and social) so as to reduce complexity in task 
environments and identify feasible strategies.  
 
Table 6. Perspectives of organizational performance 
 
                Technical Traceability 
High Low 
Social 
Traceability 
High 
 
Perspective 1 
 
Industrial/Organizational 
Economics Perspective 
 
Perspective 3 
 
Social Cognition 
Perspective 
Low 
Perspective 2 
 
Resource Base View 
Perspective 
Perspective 4 
 
Competitive Cohort 
Perspective 
* Adapted from Flint and Van Fleet (2011, p105) 
 
While facilitating knowledge and resource sharing, multiplying identities derived from 
frequent symbolic interactions, would cause sensory overload, exhaust cognitive 
resource, and result in counterproductive outcomes. Engulfing by waves of information 
cues, individuals would instead look for sources of information that is visible and trustful, 
with the intent to create a focus of attention and maintain a feeling of locus of control. In 
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this regard, the saliency of identities becomes a key to effectuate behavioral influences. 
An additively structured task environment improves communicative efficiency and 
promotes social exchange.  
 
Identity Verification 
Organizing symbolic interactions on the virtual network of hazard communication could 
be challenging. In Chapter 4, the economic analysis on social exchange, with the purpose 
to decipher the complex processes, indicates that communicative behaviors are 
incentivized by two structural factors, the validity of information cues to the receivers 
(covariance between preferences and signals), and the reliability of information cues 
(variance of signals). On the one hand, the dark-side of diversity is that incongruent 
incentives intertwined with ambiguous task environment would weaken the efficacy of 
differentiated attributes and hence the coordinating power of market signals. On the other 
hand, such a pessimistic outlook would not be necessary. Referred to the social identity 
theory (Hogg, 2001), market stability is attainable if diverse stakeholders would 
voluntarily affiliate themselves to certain social structure. Prototypes, i.e., a cognitively-
represented group formation (of in-groups and out-groups), as a result become salient 
through social categorization processes, based on two kinds of human psychological 
needs - self enhancement (corresponding to the covariance between preferences and 
signals; category fit) and uncertainty reduction (corresponding to the variance of signals; 
category accessibility). Interestingly, the two fundamental motives would create network 
effects in the processes of social categorization. Thus, the forming of prototypes itself is a 
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self-reinforcing cycle to develop a focus of public attention “The more salient the group 
the more profound is the effect”, argued by Hogg (2001, p189).  
 
The phenomenon of prototypicality describes group dynamics in symbolic interactions. 
According to Hogg and Terry (2000, p125), the responsiveness of social identity to 
immediate social context is the secret behind the magic of private ordering with positive 
performance outcomes. As Ouchi argues, “evaluating organization according to an 
efficiency criterion would make it possible to predict the form organizations will take 
under certain conditions” (Ouchi, 1980, p129); “in order to mediate transactions 
efficiently, any organizational form must reduce either the ambiguity of performance 
evaluation or the goal incongruence between parties” (Ouchi, 1980, p135), categorizing 
these “situationally attractive individual characteristics” (Hogg, 2001, p186) involves two 
dimensions: (1) an informational process of attribution, and (2) a social process of 
attraction (Hogg, 2001, p190).  
 
In the intelligence cohort, in order to induce voluntary behavioral changes, a necessary 
strategy is “to quickly identify a set of referent others having influence upon strategic 
decision makers” (Flint and Van Fleet, 2011, p104). Salient entities are the key enablers 
of performance outcomes of a competitive cohort, as they form the foundation of a 
meaningful frame of reference for guiding desired behaviors. The notion conceptually 
corresponds to that of prominence (McCall and Simmons, 1978) or salience (Stryker, 
1980) in identity theories of sociology. McCall and Simmons (1978, p65) define a role 
identity as “the character and the role that an individual devises for himself as an 
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occupant of a particular social position”. When multiple role identities are involved in a 
social organization, different roles are organized in a hierarchy of prominence. The 
prominence of a role identity is determined by how one is supported by others for an 
identity, commits to an identity, and receives extrinsic and intrinsic rewards from an 
identity (McCall and Simmons, 1978; Stets and Burke, 2003). Stryker (1980) emphasizes 
a somewhat more dynamic perspective and argues that a salience hierarchy, rather than a 
prominence hierarchy hypothesized by McCall and Simmons, in which a salient identity 
is one that is likely to be activated more frequently across different situations, determines 
the significance of social information. The two perspectives inspire further thoughts. 
Stets and Burke (2003, p12) argue that McCall and Simmons address “what an individual 
values” (the cognitive aspect) while Stryker emphases on “how an individual will likely 
behave in a situation” (the behavioral aspect). It is a self-affirming mechanism of 
“identity verification” (Burke and Stets, 1999) that bridges the cognitive and behavioral 
aspects and constructs the integrity of multiple identities enacted by an individual. In 
Burke and Stets’ thesis (1999, p347), identity verification is the key linkage in a self-
verification-commitment process that “leads directly and indirectly, through positive 
emotions and trust, to the development of committed relationships, positive emotional 
attachments, and a group orientation; all of these characteristics of a stable social 
structure” (i.e., a rational economic order). The concept of intelligence cohort concurs 
with the sociological view on the effects of identity verification on emotional arousal as a 
powerful driver in heuristic decision making and recognizes the important role of 
emotions to induce social influence and initiate behavioral changes (Flint and Van Fleet, 
2011, p100).  
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System Safeguard 
In collaborative partnerships, markets and hierarchies are organized in a plural 
governance structure, the hybrid, which flexibly accommodates the co-existence of 
disparate social forces. According to Williamson (1998), a viable hybrid governance 
structure is critically determined by the deployment of safeguards, i.e., organizational 
design to mitigate system disturbances, which suggest the function of an intelligence 
cohort. In general, three leading styles of safeguards mediate exchange interfaces for 
hybrid transactions (Williamson, 2008, p10).  
 
1) Power:  
A power safeguard focuses on the exercise of centralized control. Muscular stakeholders 
either vertically integrate operations to gain full control or pass their costs and 
responsibility to less powerful stakeholders, who are forced to provide safeguards and to 
absorb potential risks. In this approach, investments in specific assets for system 
safeguards are made in myopic and inefficient fashion. Thus, transactions are not 
conducted under informed and prudent decisions. Oftentimes, decisions are driven by 
short-term orientation and interests of the muscular stakeholders. In a world of 
asymmetric information and knowledge, this approach invites the escalation of strategic 
behaviors and zero-sum games.  
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2) Naive trust:  
The benign safeguard assumes cooperation between stakeholders to deal with unforeseen 
contingencies and their willingness to promote long-term relationships and to pursue 
mutual gains. Contrast to the muscular approach, trust replaces power as the central 
concept. While this approach has the potential to be both effective and efficient, the blind 
faith would turn out to be a wishful thinking when stakeholders do not share a common 
vision and internalize a collective value. Especially in a world of diversity and conflict 
interests, additional instruments of organizational design are often required to maintain 
cooperation. As Williamson (2008, p10) points out, reputation effects deter defections, 
but they still need safeguards to which mutual benefits can be confidently ascribed.  
 
3) Credible commitments:  
In Williamson’s view, credible commitments are the ideal design of system safeguards to 
effect hazard mitigation. “[O]ut of awareness that all complex contracts are incomplete 
and thus pose cooperative adaptation needs, the parties exercise feasible foresight” 
(Williamson, 2008, p10). Credible commitments can take flexible forms. Different 
contracting practices can be interpreted in piecemeal as partial efforts to reduce the 
escalation of conflict. The cost effectiveness of different ways of credible commitment 
varies with the attributes of transactions (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency). “Whatever the form, credible commitment serves as governance supports and 
should be introduced in cost-effective degree” (Williamson, 2008, p11). However, 
economic considerations of safeguards at the same time raise a concern on “excesses of 
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calculativeness” (Williamson, 2008, p13), which, when perceived negatively, would 
decrease the credibility of a safeguard and increase transaction costs instead.  
 
Dynamics of transactions as Williamson prescribed, the move from market to hierarchy is 
always attended by a loss of incentive intensity and added bureaucratic costs. Hybrid 
governance has the potential to break this tradeoff. However, coordinating among 
heterogeneous stakeholders requires convergence of expectations (Malmgren, 1961). 
Stakeholders need to share a sense of collective responsibility and mutual dependency. A 
consensus is not reachable without congruent information, communication, and 
expectations. In highly complex situations, taking the hostage approach as Williamson 
prescribes (Williamson, 1983) would be prohibitive, and a hybrid governance structure 
would break down, resulting in a no-win situation (c.f. Follett’s notions of community 
and responsibility in Chapter 3).  
 
Involvement 
Push-based strategies are often perceived as cold, hard, unpleasant measures without any 
concern or sentiments. In fact, a push-based strategy also involves subjective feelings. 
Simon (1987) recognized the role of emotion in making management decisions, and it 
may not always be negative, as he also mentioned that “stress interacts with cognition to 
elicit counterproductive behavior” as “the pathologies of organizational decision making” 
(Simon, 1987, p62). However, it should be cautious when negative feelings are involved, 
such as fear, guilt, or other forms of aggression, if sustainable, high productivity is the 
desired outcome. Although resorting to the fear factor is sometimes seductive for its 
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seemingly efficiency and effectiveness on manipulating human instincts, the impact is 
only short-term and subject to diminishing marginal returns. Moreover, unintended 
consequences are always a concern. Furthermore, voluntary behaviors would be 
suppressed. Kurt Lewin’s legendary experimental studies in 1939, on the social climates 
of groups and behaviors of children in response to three different styles of leadership 
(autocratic, democratic, and Laissez Faire), offers substantial evidence for the arguments 
(Lewin et al., 1939). 
 
One missing notion of the push-based strategy is the possibility of organizational 
members’ active participation in the alignment between individual goals and the 
collective goal, which may not always be conflicted. Celsi and Olson (1988) argue that 
organizational members’ perceived personal relevance is the essential characteristic of 
voluntary behaviors for such active participation. “We suggest that a concept is 
personally relevant to the extent that [organizational members] perceive it to be self-
related or in some way instrumental in achieving their personal goals and values” (Celsi 
and Olson, 1988, p211). The attitude of personal relevance to goal attainment is reflected 
in the behavior of felt involvement. Felt involvement, “a [organizational member’s] 
overall subjective feeling of personal relevance” (Celsi and Olson, 1988) is the central 
concept to explain the “fundamental processes of attention and comprehension by which 
[organizational members] attend to salient aspects of their environment and comprehend 
or make sense of that information” (Olson, 1978). In this pull-based strategy, members of 
an organization are “getting involved” when they pay attention to certain attributes of the 
organization and internalize the collective value indicated by those attributes. Both 
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technical and social traceability are critical to reveal the behavioral intentions. When 
individuals are self-identified to certain identities, in the processes individual goals and 
the collective goal are aligned. In this case, implementing a push-based strategy may be 
additional, generate waste, or, to be worse, demotivate entrepreneurial and prosocial 
behaviors. Embracing diversity and organizing social influence can be a creative strategy 
to leverage collaboration for innovative performance outcomes. Through communicative 
actions, rationally motivated collaborative partners would voluntarily contribute to the 
fulfillment of the collective value, as argued “not all individuals have only purely selfish 
personal goals” (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985b, p127).  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
1. Summary and Findings 
 
The Food Safety Modernization Act shifts the direction of food safety management from 
reaction to prevention. In the complex food system, due to bounded rationality, 
preventive control would face the threat of TYPE II errors and be ineffective. The 
advance of information and communication technologies enables creative strategies for 
public agencies to tap into previously unused external resources through collaborative 
partnerships in the food market. However, food safety is a public good. Empowering 
consumers and suppliers would encounter the free-riding problem. For that reason, 
coordination by public agencies is still required. Plural aspects of both collaboration and 
coordination present two forces, differentiation and integration, challenging effective 
system governance. Deploying a hazard intelligence platform is necessary to organize 
diversity. For public agencies as platform leaders to maintain the integrity of the system 
while preserving the prosocial ethos, understanding the dynamics of “non-regulatory 
supplements” to central governance is crucial.  
 
This dissertation consists of two parts. Part one is a conceptualization of the hazard 
intelligence platform. In the chapter 3, the concept of platform and related topics are 
discussed.  
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1) Strategic food safety inspection: it is a strategy to integrate multiple inspection 
methods with the goal to generate synergistic system performance. The 
conceptualization broadens the conventional definition of judgment inspection 
and centralized control. 
2) Food safety commons: an ideal organization for collaboration is a community as a 
functional whole. To overcome the commons dilemma, stakeholders jointly 
develop moral responsibility with self-respect and pride, leading to credible 
discretion and constructive empowerment.  
3) Intelligence platform: it is a virtual location that facilitates joint efforts of 
information processing and knowledge sharing. Gaps and lapses exist on the 
platform, especially in a dynamic and temporal sense, and would negatively 
impact collaborative performance. Therefore, collaboration requires 
accountability and traceability.  
4) Structural hazard communication: hazard communication forms a self-organized 
structure on the platform through four elements: resource, identity, structure, and 
knowledge. The RISK framework provides a conceptual ground for public 
agencies to influence platform behaviors.  
5) Engagement: public agencies can actively shape platform behaviors without 
coercion through the EIPDF model of social influence: engagement, interaction, 
performance, density, and formation.  
 
In the chapter 4, the EIPDF model is further elaborated into communicative actions. 
Public agencies coordinate collaborative partners by way of negotiated agreement, which 
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is a shared interpretation of negotiated definitions of a complex situation. Reaching a 
consensus requires proposing and evaluating validity claims. A brief economic analysis 
shows that social responses to the symbolic expression are driven by the social aspect of 
goal congruence and the technical aspect of situational ambiguity.  
 
Part two is an empirical testing of the conceptualized platform. In chapter 5, traceability 
represents behaviors of information processing and knowledge sharing on the platform. 
The free-riding problem of lacking social responsiveness is viewed as the traceability 
problem. A review on transaction cost economics provides a theoretical ground. The 
definition of traceability is distinguished into two kinds: technical and social traceability. 
Empirical findings are summarized as follows.  
1) Social traceability is statistically significant and positively associated with the 
improvement of collaborative performance.   
2) Social traceability positively contributes to the efficacy of technical traceability, 
but not vice versa.  
3) Technical traceability significantly contributes to both moderate and high 
performance improvement; while social traceability is only significant for 
moderate performance improvement. Therefore, the social effect is limited and 
contingent.  
 
In chapter 6, a managerial tool of an intelligence cohort is proposed to analyze the 
dynamic platform structure. By using technical and social traceability, an intelligence 
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cohort is constructed to create an additive learning structure in complex, crisis situation. 
The empirical results indicate three strategic considerations:  
1) Social significance: social traceability is the fundamental consideration to high 
cohort performance.  
2) Cocktail therapy: an integrative strategy with high social traceability and high 
technical traceability attains high cohort performance.  
3) Servant leadership: public agencies should exercise limited authority and perform 
a supporting role in the provision of appropriate technical traceability, while 
actively promoting social traceability in the system.  
 
2. Inferences 
 
System 
New policy initiatives shift the focus of food safety management from reaction to 
prevention and envision a strategic role for food safety inspections. Systematic meat 
inspections in the U.S. food supply originated a century ago when the “Jungle” 
conditions in the Chicago meatpacking industry, which were unsanitary, inhumane, 
corrupt, and filthy, revealed by Upton Sinclair, urged President Theodore Roosevelt to 
take actions on federal inspections. The Federal Meat Inspection Act enacted in 1906 
mandated that every carcass passing through slaughterhouses being physically examined 
by inspectors appointed by the federal agency. A food safety inspection system of 
extensive command-and-control regulation and intervention has since been put into 
effect. The radical innovation exemplifies social entrepreneurship as a self-correcting 
 164 
 
mechanism of the food system – initiated by a journalist who generated intelligence, 
driven by the general public who disseminated the intelligence, and implemented by the 
public agency who responded to the public voice.  
 
In the collaborative innovation approach, a rather passive role played by the private 
sector is somewhat a misfortune. An inspection is not an independent task. It is a quality 
function that supports the main production activities – to assure everything goes well 
according to the plan. Therefore, a comprehensive food safety management system 
encompasses both ex ante production system and ex post hazard inspections (Table 1). 
The two system components are interdependent to each other in a nested governance 
structure that is succinctly described by Williamson’s contractual reasoning: “differences 
in technology [ex ante production] give rise to different contractual hazards which in turn 
elicit safeguards [ex post inspection]” (Williamson, 1998, p37).  
 
Table 1. Comparison of different food safety management approaches 
 Production Inspection 
Traditional approach Control-oriented Reactive 
Current policy focus Control-oriented Preventive 
Alternative approach Involvement-oriented Preventive / Reactive 
 
When the traditional approach of food safety management was developed in the early 
twentieth century, the food system was less complex. The system design followed close-
system logic that ex ante system optimization would turn random food hazards into 
controllables which can be subsequently handled by a certain level of system reserves. In 
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this situation, a controlled-oriented production system with a reactive system safeguard 
sufficed. However, the modern food system is characterized by its complexity. Imagine a 
food system simultaneously shaped by the interplay of hundred millions of consumers 
and suppliers, to each his or her own preferences and actions. As increasing complexity 
renders control ineffective, it is not an easy task to maintain the close-system logic and 
predict how this system would change. Under bounded rationality (March and Simon, 
1958), a single incidence of food hazards, although initially deemed statistically 
insignificant, may amplify its negative effects through network interactions and trigger an 
outbreak that greatly impacts the food system.  
 
Taking preventive inspections is the first step to recognize the more practical open-
system logic. Ouchi (1980) identifies two ways toward improving organizational control -
- by reducing either performance ambiguity or goal incongruence. Implementing more 
rules and tighter standards may stabilize the food system and achieve the goal. Moreover, 
a stabilized food system would be more predictable and facilitates preventive hazard 
safeguards in terms of quick response -- early detection, containment, and reduction of 
food hazards from the sources. Following this rationale, the Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) and other science-based measures serve as a dominant logic 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) to reduce the complexity and expand the technical rationality 
of the food supply system. Nevertheless, across the farm-to-table spectrum of the food 
system, many critical control points are in fact located beyond the reach of supply control 
or science-based analytical measures. A food system under preventive control is still 
subject to error-based disruptions (i.e., Type I and Type II errors due to the limited 
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capacity and capability of the control methods in use). Failing to recognize the nature of 
imperfect knowledge in complex networks and imposing control measures give rise to 
premature programming (March and Simon, 1958) and unintended consequences 
(Williamson, 2002), “an attempt to control a problem that should be managed” (Landau 
and Stout, 1979).  
 
In an involvement-oriented food safety management system, the ideal food system 
resembles a high-performance work system. A high-performance work system (HPWS) is 
an organizational design that intends to achieve high organizational performance through 
motivating people, by adopting managerial practices with an emphasis on employee 
empowerment, involvement, and commitment, rather than control (Tomer, 2001; Lawler, 
1992). The market is transformed into a food safety community which accommodates 
consumers, suppliers, and public agencies, all of whom are stakeholders because food 
safety is a matter of everyone’s health and benefit. In this light, the responsibility of 
hazard prevention does not lie solely on the public agencies. The food safety community 
serves as a built-in safeguard to correct potential food hazards from the source. Imagine 
the provision of public service without public agencies’ command and control; no 
principal-agent relationship, and no moral hazard; no cat-and-mouse game, and no lock-
in mutual destruction. Imagine all stakeholders relinquishing myopic strategic behaviors 
and devoting to collaborative innovation on better public health. This would be Likert’s 
visionary System 5 comes true – what a wonderful food system!  
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Likert (1967) posited that a highly participative system, which he termed System 4, 
resulted in greater efficiency and effectiveness than did alternatives. System 4 employs a 
high use of participative methods involving all members of the organizational system.  
Hall and Leidecker (1981) characterized Likert’s System 4 as emphasizing trust, freedom 
to talk to superiors about the job, rewards as incentives, group involvement, 
responsibility of individuals towards organizational goals, co-operative teamwork, 
vertical and lateral information flows, and accurate communication. Wilson (2010, p40) 
suggests that “The proliferation of participative organizations, technological advances, 
and preferences towards collaboration in 21st-century organizations may at last be 
conducive for Likert’s visionary theory to succeed”. 
 
Designing and organizing a strategic food safety management system in complex food 
networks is challenging – multiple social relations and relational governance mechanisms 
are intertwined with contingencies of performance ambiguity and goal conflict. The 
challenge is exactly the problem Hayek (1945, p524) described in “The Use of 
Knowledge in Society”:  
 
“The economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the 
particular circumstances of time and space … the ultimate decisions must be left to the 
people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant 
changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them … We cannot expect 
that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central 
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board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some 
form of decentralization”.  
 
Nevertheless, decentralization through empowerment is not a panacea.  
 
“We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. But the ‘man on the 
spot’ cannot decide solely on the basis of his limited but intimate knowledge of the facts 
of his immediate surroundings. There still remains the problem of communicating to him 
such further information as he needs to fit his decisions into the whole pattern of changes 
of the larger economic system” (p524).  
 
The problem of systemic communication echoes the first question Hayek asked in his 
seminal work: "What is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational 
economic order" (Hayek, 1945, p519), and moreover, under time pressure, in "rapid 
adaptation to changes"? Hayek never expected a closed-system solution of a procrustean 
style (see Procrustes in Greek mythology) which amputates free flows of social energy as 
do sufferers of body integrity identity disorder (BIID). Rather, a spontaneous order with 
confidence is desired. The rational economic order consists of complex decision-making 
processes with a rationale (articulated reasons) and feelings (unarticulated reasons) of 
assurance that, although complicated means-ends relationships are not fully 
comprehensible, everything will be all right, onward, upward, and beyond.  
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The rational order of a market is reflected in its structure, which can be perceived from a 
two-dimensional conceptualization of centralization/formalization framework (Aiken and 
Hage, 1967). Systems are designated as being centralized when information and decision 
making are concentrated in the hands of a few individuals (Hage & Aiken, 1970). 
Decentralization, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which decision-making power 
is moved outward (and downward). Decentralized systems in which members establish 
exchange linkages with others having dissimilar asset profiles should lead to a greater 
variety of resources, thus, increasing information available to all members (Arya & Lin, 
2007). The empirical study in this dissertation supports this view with the evidence on 
social traceability. However, the results also indicate that technical traceability is 
significant, reinforcing social traceability, and necessary to higher performance. 
Formalization, defined as job codification and rule observation (Hage and Aiken, 1967), 
is the extent to which formal rules and policies are used to regulate behaviors and 
decision making in a system. Developing the two seemingly conflicting structural 
characteristics in a system would be problematic.  
 
Burns and Stalker (1961) presented a conceptualization of structure that involved one of 
two forms. The mechanistic form relies on standardization, centralization, and hierarchy 
and focuses on efficiency. The organic form relies on high levels of decentralization and 
autonomy and focuses on flexibility. Rather than be seen as distinct alternatives, some 
studies have claimed that aspects of each can be combined (Jansen et al., 2006; Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). So the organic form can be thought of as a relational form in which 
there are lateral communications between people of different ranks, resembling 
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consultation rather than command (Hoffer Gittell & Douglass, 2012). Hence, the organic 
form is conceptually similar to Williamson’s hybrid governance structure, whose viability 
relies crucially on the efficacy of system safeguards (Williamson, 2008, p8).  
 
System Safeguard 
Safeguards according to Williamson’s view are implemented through two ways: either 
vertical integration or credible commitments (Williamson, 1998, p38). Vertical 
integration organizes activities under a centralized authority to effect control and 
coordination through fiat, while credible commitments resort to crafting contract 
supporting devices for dealing with unforeseen contingencies during contract 
implementation, for example, “penalties for premature termination, information-
disclosure and verification mechanisms, specialized dispute settlement, and the like” 
(Williamson, 2005, p7). As Homans (1958, p604) argued that “a stable and differentiated 
social structure in a real-life group might arise out of a process of exchange between 
members”, the form of system safeguards is determined by exchange relationships. 
Williamson (2008, p10) distinguishes three leading styles of exchange relationships that 
mediate interactions within a governance structure: naïve trust, power, and credible. As 
Williamson (2008, p10) argues, a credible relationship is “hardheaded” compared to the 
naïve trust while “not mean spirited” compared to the power. From Likert’s system 
perspective, Williamson’s categorization of safeguards and exchange relationships 
corresponds to two kinds of organizations -- authoritative and participative (Likert, 1967, 
p14) (Table 2).  
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Table 2. Williamson’s safeguards and Likert’s systems 
Relationship \ Safeguard 
Vertical integration 
(Unified ownership) 
Credible commitment 
(Contract supports) 
Naïve trust 
System 0 
Laissez Faire 
N/A 
Absence of credibility 
Power 
System 1 
Exploitive authoritative 
System 3 
Consultative 
Credible 
System 2 
Benevolent authoritative 
System 4 
Participative 
 
While Williamson and Likert would agree on a general direction of organizational 
design, Williamson praises the advantages of credible commitments relative to unified 
ownership; Likert advocates the movement toward more participation in an organization, 
a guideline for implementation remains inconclusive. In Williamson’s transaction cost 
economies, how to balance cost-effectiveness and over-calculativeness when deploying 
credible commitments is still an unsolved problem (Williamson, 2008, p13). In Likert’s 
management systems, how to muddle through system 3, the overlap between two distinct 
management styles (authoritative and participative), is subject to a mysterious force that 
initiates the transformation. Likert’s system 5 represents a creative goal to integrate the 
two views. From a managerial perspective, through a process of delegation, members of a 
system enjoy a higher degree of discretion and incentives, while in return taking 
responsibility and meeting accountability. This is the rationale behind social traceability, 
technical traceability, and their high performance implications. Moreover, traceability 
creates a necessary structure that links collaboration to intended performance outcomes. 
Although both are managing without a boss, system 5 is quite different from system 0. In 
system 5, freedom from dictatorship leads to creativity and collective value, while in 
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system 0, the same organizational feature results in random walks and chaos. The 
difference lies in those stabilizing forces that maintain the system integrity – emergent 
leadership (Hollander, 1959), servant leadership (Greenleaf, 1973), followership (Burns, 
1978), organizational citizenship (Smith et al., 1983), social capital (Bourdieu, 1986), and 
communityship (Mintzberg, 2009).  
 
The development of social capital is closely related to the structure of the embedded 
social environment. Social capital is defined as advantages and opportunities accruing to 
people through membership in certain communities (Bourdieu, 1986). Coleman (1988) 
argues that social capital arises through changes in the relationships among members that 
facilitate interactions, manifested in three aspects of social structures: trustworthiness of 
the social environment, information channels, and social norms. Putnam (1993) points 
out that "social capital refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action". 
Therefore, underlying network structures are a conduit for information flows which 
enables collaboration and coordination through social effects.  
 
However, the structure of social exchange only partially explains performance outcomes. 
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), at the cognitive dimension, social norms 
represent a shared value which motivates members to forgo opportunism and act in the 
interests of collectivity. At the structural dimension, information indicates patterns of 
communications and provides a basis for interactions and relationship development. At 
the relational dimension, trust constitutes cohesion of relationships, developed through 
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interactions among members. The commitment-trust theory (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
describes how the three attributes of social capital are associated with relational 
performance. Shared value and communication, mediated by trust, lead to relationship 
commitment and cooperation. With relationship commitment, interactive parties 
recognize the importance of an ongoing relationship with one another and exert 
maximum efforts at maintaining it. With cooperation, interactive parties work together to 
achieve mutual gains or, even during disagreements, to resolve conflicts and avoid 
relationship dissolution. Stability and predictability are hence promoted and enables 
economics of scale, specialization, and experience in the relationship. All these benefits 
are based on the key mediator -- trust, suggesting that the creation of social value leads to 
economic value.  
 
In social network theories, the value of social capital is explained by two distinct network 
mechanisms. On the one hand, network closure theory (Coleman, 1988) focuses on the 
strong ties and argues that inward-oriented, dense networks with strongly interconnected 
members are the source of social capital. Closure is regarded as a property to form 
effective social norms, because corresponding network density is associated with strong 
social relations, which are a necessary condition to establish reliable communication 
channels and effective sanctions against opportunistic behaviors. Without network 
closure, reputation cannot be built. Collective sanctions cannot be applied. The 
consequent ineffective social norms and lack of trust encourage free riding behaviors, as 
people seek for protection from being exploited by others, initiating a vicious cycle of 
tension and conflicts. Social capital from this perspective adds value through uncertainty 
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mitigation. On the other hand, structural hole theory (Burt, 1992) emphasizes on the 
strength of the weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and argues that outward-oriented, loose-
coupled (Weick, 1979) networks with disconnected segments, named structural holes, are 
the source of social capital. Structural holes appear when people concentrate on activities 
within networks to which they belong and do not attend other networks. The 
disconnectedness between networks provides opportunities for boundary-spanning agents 
to bridge discrepancies, extend current network scope, and update network resources. 
Social capital from this perspective adds value through its function in brokering 
opportunities across structural holes.  
 
To reconcile the two arguments, Burt (1997) proposes a contingent view of social capital. 
The closure argument explains how dense or hierarchical network structures consolidate 
current networks and reduce risks, while the structural-hole argument explains how loose 
and organic network structures expand current networks and develop new opportunities. 
Alternative network structures are driven by two forces: competition and legitimacy. 
Competition refers to a frame of reference that leads to innovation. Legitimacy refers to 
mutual coercion which is established by congruent behaviors observed by the majority. 
The two mechanisms correspond to the two exchange characteristics of asset specificity 
and frequency in transaction cost economics. An intelligence cohort represents an 
integrative strategy to create a network structure that governs the dual properties and 
initiates high performance in the context of collaboration on complex tasks in crisis 
situations. Although the structure is dynamic, it intends to be manageable, because it is 
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modularized and additive; and practical, because it is both technically and socially 
traceable.  
 
3. Recommendations 
 
An intelligence cohort is a dynamic process to construct a flexible grand routine on an 
intelligence platform. For its inward mindset and repetitive nature, the notion of “routine” 
is sometimes associated with negative aspects of bureaucracy – insensitive, rigid, and 
dehumanized mechanical operations. The so called fixed routine specifies a situation in 
which an invariable environmental stimulus calls for deterministic operations. The 
repetition has its important economic rationale, as repetitive application of the same set of 
knowledge is a key source for gaining experience and improving performance – no 
matter it is regarding economies of scale or economies of specialization. Paradoxically, in 
an open system, in which ever-changing task conditions and uncontrollable inputs are 
common, a fixed response is less likely to be ideal.  
 
A performance strategy to resolve the dilemma is to employ multiple fixed routines and 
integrate them into a “grand” routine that is flexible to meet contingencies. In this sense, 
a flexible routine is conceptually similar to March and Simon’s (1958, p141) notion of 
performance program. Its performance outcome is contingent upon interactions between 
a program and its surroundings – in terms of performance outcomes, how the task 
environment impacts a program and how a program shapes its task environment; in terms 
of organizational learning, how unexpected disturbances surprise a program and how a 
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program mitigates the disturbances. The contingent capacity - capability to adapt to 
current situations - is thus a crucial differentiating feature between a fixed routine and a 
flexible one.  
 
Organizations perceive visible events as experiences and translate memorable 
experiences into routines. On the platform, updated routines set organizational goals, 
which further coordinate member behaviors. Ouchi (1980, p135) argues that 
organizational coordinating processes involve two mechanisms – “any organizational 
form must reduce either the ambiguity of performance evaluation or the goal 
incongruence between parties”. In this regard, performance outcomes of modularized 
platform can be interpreted by two dimensions: on the technical dimension, 
programmability of tasks; on the social dimension, predictability of responses. 
Accordingly, heterogeneous social interactions are categorized into 4 modules.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the four strategies, VSQC, that enhance traceability, create a rational 
order on the platform, and improve system performance, referred to the conceptualization 
schemes in chapter 5 (table 7) and chapter 6 (table 1 and 6), and an empirical testing of 
the strategies and their performance implications in the table 4 of chapter 6.  First, the 
verification strategy applies when both high technical and social traceability. At the 
module 1, although the same situation recurs in a predictable manner and the same 
response performs in a repetitive fashion, output variations may still occur due to 
differential quality of production resources or random errors. Optimization would enable 
the intelligence cohort to utilize traceability outcomes and articulate its sensing 
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capabilities. A feasible strategy is to set up a verification scheme that continuously 
improves operations toward standardization. Second, the socialization strategy applies 
with high social traceability but low technical traceability. At the module 2, the task is 
not programmable while the response is predictable. Social underpinnings suggest an 
effective strategy should rely on social remedies to compensate for technical deficiencies. 
Ironically, validity issues could result from predictable social responses due to behavioral 
biases, for example, the Asch effect, halo effect, or scapegoating, etc. In order to 
encourage “think[ing] outside of the box” (Baker and Sinkula, 1999, p413) and provides 
the “qualitative engine behind market orientation that prevents rigidity” (Baker and 
Sinkula, 1999, p416), socialization should have a higher order goal to improve technical 
traceability on the non-programmed tasks and lead to desired performance outcomes. 
Third, the qualification strategy is effective with high technical traceability but low social 
traceability. At the module 3, the task is programmable while the response is 
unpredictable. Free riding behaviors would arise due to insufficient social information 
processing. Since a programmable task environment allows operant conditioning, a 
feasible strategic goal is to leverage technical information and qualify prosocial 
stakeholders – by creating science-based measures to coordinate stakeholder behaviors, 
enhance information flows, and reach internal reliability. Fourth, introducing competition 
is an inevitable strategy when both technical and social traceability are low. At the 
module 4, the task is not programmable and the response is not predictable. Uncertainty 
and equivocality (Daft and Lengel, 1986) would require competition as a discovery 
procedure (Hayek, 2002) to create necessary conditions for effective management. 
However, as Hayek pointed out, competition is double-edged – an organizational learning 
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mechanism that could result in unintended social consequences. Therefore, it should be a 
way station in the intelligence cohort. Once sufficient technical or social intelligence are 
generated, other strategies (V, S, or Q) take over and relay for the pursuit of high cohort 
performance.  
 
On the intelligence platform, operational requirements of both collaboration and 
coordination for cooperation suggest plural governance, which involves both push- and 
pull-based strategies and alternative technical and social task conditions. An intelligence 
cohort can be viewed as a dynamic, self-organized platform structure that encompasses 
multiple aspects of social exchange. A modularized and additive task structure enables 
actionable strategies in complex crisis situations. Traceability strategies of the VSQC 
framework create and shape a rational order that leads to high performance in 
collaborative partnerships.  
 
Table 3. VQSC performance strategies for the intelligence cohort  
 
                                Technical Attribute 
Programmable Not programmable 
Social 
Response 
Predictable 
Module 1 (V) 
Verification 
Module 3 (S) 
Socialization 
Not 
Predictable 
Module 2 (Q) 
Qualification 
Module 4 (C) 
Competition 
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